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Abstract  
The present study aims to depict the continuity and change in the patterns of interaction and 
accountability in the Hellenic Railway Organisation (OSE), as these are influenced by the 
application of managerial accountability reform, in the context of the Greek public sector. In 
particularly the present study focuses upon the effects on inner organisational patterns of 
interaction and accountability from the use of strategic and operational plans, in the effort of 
the Greek State to keep the company’s executive officer accountable for his/her decisions 
and actions. Critical to the present analysis is the role of the European Union in the 
reformation process in the Greek railway industry. Structuration Theory was used to provide 
a theoretical framework to guide the empirical research.  
 
In the course of the thesis it emerges that the power of subordinates to control the 
reformation process and to hold superordinates accountable for their actions and decisions 
was critical to the creation of meaningful and accountable relations between organisational 
actors and their outer organisational context. The dialectic of control is seen by the present 
study as the key factor that allows an organisational system to maintain a level of managerial 
and operational independence from elements of the institutional environment, with 
contradictory and conflicting interests, which aim to influence managerial and operational 
strategies. Managerial and operational independence of organisational systems, from their 
institutional environment, is seen as a precondition in order for organisational actors to 
develop relationships of trust and responsibility and to re-rationalise and modernise the 
patterns of organisational action and accountability.  
 
The inability of the OSE to efficiently apply its modernisation project is seen as the outcome 
of organisational actors’ inability to maintain a level of independence from the institutional 
environment and to formulate meaningful and accountable relationships. For that reason 
operational plans and performance objectives have failed to be coupled in the ongoing 
relationship between organisational actors in the OSE and their institutional environment. 
The disaggregation of the OSE into a holding company and company’s current dreadful 
financial and operational conditions are seen as the unintended consequences of the 
organisational action. 
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1. Chapter – Introduction 
1.1. Preamble  
This thesis is concerned with the “Managerial Accountability”1 reforms in the Greek public 
sector, a subject which has hitherto received little attention. Using the Hellenic Railway 
Organisation (OSE) as a single case study, the principal research objective is to depict the 
way that the incorporation of strategic and operational plans, as formal accountability 
mechanisms, has influenced the patterns of interaction and integration between 
organisational roles within the OSE and between organisational roles and their institutional 
environment.  
 
Managerial accountability reforms in the guise of New Public Management aim both to 
redefine the concepts of public and private and to facilitate the explicit objective of the 
reforms, which is the privatisation of state owned enterprises. The model promotes a new 
form of governance for state-owned enterprises that is based upon managerial independence, 
whilst the incorporation of strategic and operational objectives into the model aims to keep 
management accountable for its actions. This preoccupation of NPM reforms with financial 
objectives and the need to measure managerial performance shifts steering mechanisms from 
process control to output control (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997; Gendron et al, 2000). 
Under this regime accounting mechanisms, change their functional characteristics and 
operational objectives; they are no longer solely mechanisms for recording transactions, but 
are rather utilised as measurements of financial efficiency and economic effectiveness 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997). The operational and strategic objectives are set and then 
measured and reported by the use of accounting indicators. This attempts to motivate 
organisational action by communicating common values and targets. Accounting thus 
becomes the centre of organisational action in the management of public sector organisations 
for planning, evaluation and also accountability purposes (Hood, 1995).  
 
                                                 
1The reforms in the public sector, can also be identified under the terms ‘New Public Management’ 
(NPM) or ‘Management by Accounts’  
  2
On that basis the Greek government in 1996, introduced law 2414 “For the Modernisation of 
the Public-for-Benefit Enterprises” (DEKO) with the aims of reducing the role of 
government in the country’s economic activity, reversing the problems of centralism, 
bureaucracy and favouritism that troubled the Greek public sector (Featherstone, 2006), and 
at the same time increasing transparency in the management of state owned enterprises. 
Managerial accountability reform is a model of public administration that has been adopted 
by different governments, in many different countries with diverse historical, political, 
economic, social and geographic characteristics (Lapsley, 2008). The reforms within the 
public sector are seen as the outcome of the neo-liberal approach to the social and economic 
function (Humphrey et al, 1993); strong advocates of which are international organisations 
like the World Bank, as well as political and economic unions like the European Union (EU). 
For that reason reforms in the Greek public sector have to be understood in the context of the 
country’s participation as a member state of the EU (Pagoulatos, 2006). 
 
The European rail industry, which is mainly run by state-owned organisations, is a 
characteristic example of the type of industry that NPM is aimed at. Following the model of 
private corporations the European Commission (EC) aims to modernise the European rail 
industry, by focusing upon the dimensions of financial efficiency, economic effectiveness 
and transparency. The previous model of public administration, (based upon the welfare 
state), is perceived to have failed in these aims and in addition, had resulted in the 
accumulation of large financial deficits in the rail industry. The new model of organisation in 
the European rail industry, promoted by the EC, is based upon the separation (either 
accounting or business disaggregation) of the rail infrastructure manager, which generally 
remains under state ownership, and the passenger and freight service providers. The main 
objective of the EC, working through the mechanism of European Directives1 (ED), has been 
the deregulation and liberalisation of the European rail industry from state monopolies. 
According to the European Rail Directives, issued by the European Commission, the 
provision of financial subsidies by national governments to state-owned rail operators has to 
be restricted only to the provision of rail services for social purposes. For that reason the rail 
business operators must also have profitable activities that will make rail operations 
                                                 
1 See EEC, 1991; EC, 2001 
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financially independent from the state. The national governments, on the other hand have to 
take responsibility for the accumulated deficits of these former state-owned enterprises.  
 
The changes in the Greek rail organisation (OSE) can be seen as having two distinct periods. 
The first period 1996-2002, involved the accounting segregation of the rail infrastructure 
manager from the service operators and aimed to create managerial autonomy within 
operational business units. In the second period 2003-onwards, however, the changes in the 
Greek rail industry reached a more holistic approach towards market deregulation. The 
outcome of this new orientation was (through the Presidential Decree 41 of 2005) the 
disaggregation of OSE into five separate companies, operating under a parent company. The 
analysis of the conditions and the power relations influenced these decisions, and of the way 
operational and strategic objectives were implicated in the process of the transformation of 
the OSE, constitute the core of the present thesis.  
1.2. Implications from the application of managerial Accountability 
reform in state-owned organisations  
NPM assumes hierarchical organisational structures, where the use of accounting control 
mechanisms aim to acquire the information that will allow management to appraise and 
control organisational activities. The model mainly emanates from the assumptions made in 
Agency Theory (Broadbent et al, 1996) and assumes that an agent (the manager) has the 
obligation to provide accounts to the principal1 for the responsibilities entrusted to him. 
Mutual responsibilities emanate from that relationship, as well as the sanctions and rewards 
contained within the contractual relationship of the employment agreement. Within the 
formulation of this contractual relationship operational and strategic plans have two 
functions. The first is to establish managers’ ability to exercise effective leadership as 
rational individuals with the competence to “anticipate and assess the probability of all 
possible future contingencies” (Baiman, 1990: 342). The second is the incorporation of 
operational and strategic objectives as the focus of monitoring mechanisms that attempt to 
align employees’ self-interested objectives to those of the principal.  
 
                                                 
1 The responsible minister in the case of the public sector 
  4
It can be seen therefore that following the tradition of Functional1 studies, NPM assumes 
managers/agents to be rational, self-interested individuals, seeking optimal solutions that can 
be identified by the utilisation of management accounting techniques. There is no space for 
fairness and trust, or for collective action. Accountability is seen as a mechanistic 
relationship, imposed upon subordinates, where managerial accounting techniques make 
visible their actions to create the possibility of control. Moreover, the model assumes that the 
accountability relationship is restricted to that between the principal and the agent-manager. 
For that reason it assumes internal organisational consistency.  
 
However, the preoccupation of the accountability relationship with financial and managerial 
objectives is the outcome of an abstract conceptualisation of social life (Mouritsen, 1994). 
For that reason this particular theoretical concept fails to recognise the dialectic relationship 
between object and subject. Organisational inconsistencies and the demand to meet 
principal’s objectives in a way that will also satisfy managers’ self interested goals reduces 
the accountability relationship to the management of the principal’s expectations and leaves 
space for the use of performance measurements for manipulation purposes (Baiman, 1990). 
Consequently, the ability of normative forms of organisational integration (such as the use of 
operational and strategic plans to communicate managerial rationality and competence), to be 
coupled with ongoing managerial and operational action is questioned by the present 
analysis.   
1.3. Accountability; in search of a methodology 
The process of creating new structures of organisational interaction and interrelationships is 
not uncomplicated, or without tensions. As Mouritsen (1994: 196) argues; “an institution 
survives because of a single-minded reproduction of taken-for-granted behaviour… which 
                                                 
1 Using two basic independent dimensions concerning the nature of society (objectivism and 
subjectivism), Burrell and Morgan (1979), reached a generic classification of the social and 
philosophical approaches that have influenced management research and defined the nature of the 
studies (regulative and radical change), (Hopper and Powell, 1985). In functionalism the social world 
is perceived to exist independent from social actors, it is a given objective situation. In that sense the 
nature of the study of the social world is to explore what regulates the function of social institutions, 
which exist only because they are necessary to the social function. The approach uses causal 
relationships that are perceived to emerge from the objective reality in an effort to explain social 
phenomena in society but without any intention of changing it (Puxty, 1993). 
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once was considered as rational”. That taken-for-granted behaviour is reproduced through 
organisational structures of interaction, which have been developed over a period of time. 
For that reason the application of NPM reforms in the different countries, have been 
accompanied by increased tensions and social conflicts within the target organisations (Nor-
Aziah and Scapens, 2007).  
 
However, while conflicts have emerged in many of the countries in which NPM reforms 
have been applied, the intensity of the structural impediments that have been seen in the 
Greek social context, make the realisation of the structural reformation of the country’s 
public sector organisations a highly intensive and complicated venture. This makes Greece a 
particularly distinctive example where twelve years after the first reforms were introduced in 
the Greek public sector “still the culture of state administration continues to display a 
suffocating legalism, inefficiency and lethargy” (Featherstone, 2006: 2; Philippidou et al, 
2008). The multiple interest groups that influence the formation of the country’s public 
policy and the asymmetries of power between these groups along with “the fact that social 
dialogue in Greece remains an exercise with a limited scope” (Lavdas, 2006: 76) are 
examined as the main causes for the inability of the applied managerial accountability 
reforms, to modernise the Greek public sector.  
 
In contrast though, New Public Management reforms are intended to establish a model of 
accountability that both enforces the control exercised by the government upon 
organisational actors and restricts the formation of organisational objectives between public 
sector managers and their political overseers (Sinclair, 1995; Broadbent et al. 1996; Goddar, 
2006). Thus, the intentions of CEOs tend to remain implicit and this undermines the 
formation of relationships of trust and responsibility which are the foundation of 
accountability between organisational actors, because subordinate managers and other 
employees perceive that their seniors serve pre-defined objectives.  
 
For that reason, the crucial issue for the modernisation of the Greek Railways is the use of 
the strategic and operational objectives not as mechanisms for conveying symbolic 
managerial power and competence (which is central to NPM reforms), but as normative 
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forms of dialogue where different approaches to the character of the Greek rail industry can 
be combined and common understandings of the objectives of organisational action, can be 
formulated. Organisational actors and collectives have to be persuaded of the need for a new 
form of organisational action. Without agreement, no new organisational integration will 
occur and, as a result, inter organisational conflicts will not allow the efficient 
implementation of the new formal structure with its accompanying roles and control 
techniques. 
 
The need to understand how the notions of accountability, trust, authority and power 
interrelate, in order to depict the changing process of management control structures in state-
owned organisations demands a different theoretical model from that of the Principal-Agent 
upon which NPM reforms rely; a model that understands managerial accounting practice not 
as a solely technical1 activity but rather as a social and institutional one (Potter, 2005). To 
this end, this thesis has employed structuration theory as a framework for the analysis.  
1.4. Structuration Theory  
The use of Structuration Theory in this thesis aims to model the conditions influencing the 
transformation of the Hellenic Railway Organisation; the norms, rules and regulations that 
govern the patterns of social interaction the rationality underpinning operational and 
managerial action and the way in which that rationality becomes observable and reportable to 
organisational agents and their institutional environment.  
 
Within the framework of Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1979; 2002; Parker, 2000), the 
formulation of accountability relationships between social agents is understood as the 
outcome of a social process where knowledgeable actors interact. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 3, accountability is based upon the ability of actors to provide accounts of the 
rationality of their actions. That ability is the outcome of a learning process based upon the 
                                                 
1 The argument that within the framework of contingency and systems theories (e.g. cybernetics), 
managerial accounting is seen as a solely technical activity is not completely accurate, since the study 
of accounting dysfunctions and its effects upon human behaviour have been influenced by social 
psychological studies as well (Hopper and Powel, 1985). However, the study of subject and object 
interrelationship remains within the framework of functionalism. For that reason accountability is 
coupled with control.   
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regularity of action. In practice accountability establishes a social rule of action that reflects 
the expectations of the other members of a social system, and in addition it allows agents to 
self-monitor their activities. This is why the efficient incorporation of formal control 
mechanisms is dependent upon the way that management accounting techniques, become 
embedded in day-to-day organisational activity, the way they will come to inform the 
meaning of organisational action and the way they will control and organise the new roles 
and relationships that emerge from the change (Scapens 1994; Barley and Tolbert 1997).  
 
The ability of subordinates to influence organisational objectives and the norms and rules 
that shape organisational action is regarded by the present analysis as the most critical 
condition for the formulation of meaningful accountability relationships. “Dialectic of 
Control” is the notion incorporated in Gidden’s (2002) theory of structuration in order to 
describe the relationship between superordinates and subordinates within social (and 
consequently organisational) systems and to describe subordinates relative power to 
influence the patterns of organisational interaction. 
 
The case-study research approach selected enables a deeper and richer understanding of the 
way that operational and strategic objectives become embedded in accountability 
relationships, influence and get influenced by the situated action (located in a particular 
organisational context) of organisational agents, and their interrelationship with the 
institutional environment (Nandan and Alam, 2004).     
1.5. Research Approach 
It is the effort to depict the way that the wider institutional environment and the micro-
organisational environment interrelate and how that interrelationship affects the rationality 
underpinning the accountability relationship among the members of an organisational system 
and their institutional environment that provides the basis for adopting a context based 
research approach. In contrast to statistical and to econometrical analysis that aim to prove or 
to falsify certain hypotheses and as a result obtain a static view of social life, a case study is a 
form of research that is able to capture the dynamic nature of day-to-day activity and to 
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provide a holistic approach without generalisations and over simplifications (Ryan et al 
2003).  
 
The main critique of case studies as a research approach is their lack of generalisation that 
makes research validity problematic. However, the present study argues that qualitative 
approaches using the case study method are compatible with the effort to depict the way that 
social actors interrelate and integrate and the way that strategic and operational plans bind 
and enable agents’ interrelation and integration. For that reason case study as method of 
research has been incorporated in the process of understanding how management accounting 
practises are implicated in the ongoing organisational activity (Scapens, 1990; Covaleski et 
al, 1996, Conrad 2005). 
1.6. Contributions  
This study contributes to an understanding of the reasons why strategic and operational plans 
and their associated managerial and operational performance objectives have failed to be 
coupled with ongoing managerial and operational action in the context of the Hellenic 
Railway Organisation (OSE). The analysis establishes the relationship between the concepts 
of trust, accountability and decoupling on the basis of the incapacity of organisational actors 
to establish a certain rationality of business action that would enable the reproduction of the 
patterns of organisational interrelationship. Depicting the materialistic conditions under 
which organisational agents interact and interrelate, the study argues that the inability of 
operational and strategic plans to be coupled in the ongoing managerial and operational 
action is the outcome of organisational actors’ incapacity to maintain a level of independence 
from the institutional environment.  
 
The tight embrace of the company’s management from the institutional environment resulted, 
operational and strategic plans never commonly to be used within the sequence of the 
ongoing organisational action and to facilitate cooperation between the executive managers 
and their subordinates. This is why, operational and strategic objectives have failed to 
become the expression of collectively formulated objectives; aiming, through a learning 
process, to rationalise the sequence and the objectives of the managerial and operational 
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action. Due to the implicit objectives pursued by social actors, managerial and operational 
objectives lack the ability to make transparent ministers’ and administrative manager’s 
intentions and for that reason to formulate relationships of trust with employees and social 
groups.  
 
An additional point that has to be underlined is that in contrast to other interpretive traditions 
that focus on organisational inconsistencies and on intra-organisational conflicts and 
antagonistic relationships the present analysis emphasises on the inconsistencies that 
characterise the relationships of parties in the wider institutional environment; namely the 
Greek Government, and the European Commission. More particularly, the conflicting, 
antagonistic and implicit expectations impose by the various parties of the institutional 
environment upon organisational actors emerge as causations of decoupling of formal control 
structures.  
1.7. The structure of the thesis  
Having outlined the basic features, the theoretical framework, and research methods of the 
study, this section explains how the remainder of the thesis is structured.  
 
Chapter two starts with an account of the characteristics of the NPM management reforms in 
different countries and in Greece in particular. It continues with an examination of the 
contradictions within the formulated accountability model and stresses the need for a new 
approach to the accountability relationship. 
 
Chapter three develops the study’s methodological framework, argues for the importance of 
structuration theory, and discusses the advantages and limitations of the data collection 
method used in the study.  
 
Chapter four introduces the reader to the reforms in the European railway industry and the 
emergent contradictions. Central to that analysis is the idea that the incorporation of 
managerial accounting aimed to shift the provision of rail services, from social entities 
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towards more corporate characteristics. In addition, the chapter argues that state-owned rail 
companies are still the cornerstone of the European rail industry.  
 
Chapter five introduces the reader to the Greek railway context and the social and economic 
patterns that have influenced its development. Chapter five provides an analysis of the social 
accountability model that the 1981-1989, socialist government introduced in OSE’s 
management. The aim of the chapter is to emphasise the reasons why the imposed 
accountability model failed to formulate social control relationships and to emphasise the 
increase role of the government in the ongoing organisational action. 
 
Chapters six and seven are the core analysis of the NPM reforms in the Hellenic Railway 
Organisation, and focus upon the emergent conflicts, contradictions and implications in the 
rationality that underpins the company’s operational strategies and targets. More importantly, 
both chapters emphasise the patterns of continuity that characterise the company’s systematic 
operation and the problems in the relationships of trust.  
 
Chapter eight summarises the findings of the study and draws the conclusions.  
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2. Chapter – The introduction of managerial accountability 
reforms in the context of state owned enterprises 
2.1. Introduction  
In the past twenty five years, “Managerial accountability reforms”, or different “New Public 
Management” (NPM) reforms, have been a dominant paradigm in the efforts to modernise 
public sector organisations in different countries around the world. Managerial accountability 
reforms question the welfare role of the state that developed in European countries and 
elsewhere after the Second World War. Their aim is to limit the size of the state and its 
participation in economic activity, and to transform governments “into a procurer and 
regulator of public services rather than a provider” (Shaoul, 2005:3). The reforms are 
influenced by Neo-liberal ideology (Humphrey, et al., 1993). This is why the extensive 
reforms applied in different countries involve the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and 
the outsourcing of many services to private companies (Parker, 1995; Barton, 2006). 
 
Following the dominant model of NPM, in the early 1990s the reforms were introduced into 
the Greek public sector as well. Act 2414/1996 ‘Modernisation of Public Enterprises and 
Organisations’ indicates that the Greek government considers the accounting instruments to 
be capable of constructing rational organisations. This means that accounting mechanisms 
are perceived to be capable of providing information for rational decision making, and that 
they also have the power to keep decision makers accountable and responsible for their 
decisions (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007). 
 
However, there is insufficient evidence for the efficiency of the model with regard to the 
Greek public sector, or elsewhere, which would justify the implementation of such reforms 
(Bogt and Helden, 2000; Lapsley, 2001; Townley et al 2003; Venieris and Cohen, 2004; 
Ballas and Tsoukas, 2004; Cooper, 2005; Johnsen and Vakkuri, 2006). Empirical research 
indicates that in certain organisational contexts instrumental forms of accountability fail to 
become integral parts of the everyday organisational activity (Carruthers, 1995; Fernandez et 
al 1999; Townley 2003; Modell, 2001; 2004; Caccia and Steccolini, 2006), a condition that is 
seen to diminish and restrict the accountability relationship (Glynn, 1996).  
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The objectives of this chapter are, firstly, to discuss the characteristics of managerial 
accountability reforms in the public sector and more particularly, with reference to the 
changes in the Greek public sector; secondly, to critically assess the implications for the 
accountability relationship of the coerciveness of the socio-political environment.  
2.2. Key issues in public sector management reforms 
Reform in the public sector is not a static situation, but rather a continuous process which 
reflects the dynamism of the rationalisation underlying these reforms. As Brunson argues 
“public sector reforms tend to emerge and gradually fade only to be replaced by new forms 
in wave-like patterns” (Modell, 2004: 39). The present analysis focuses on the reforms in the 
public sector, predominantly centred on the instrumental rationality of performance 
assessment, that are classified under the general title of New Public Management (NPM). 
 
NPM is a general term describing reforms in the public sector that have being taking place in 
different countries around the world. It can also be found under the terms of “managerialism” 
and “managerial accountability reforms”. The latter term is the one that will be primarily 
used in the present analysis, since it is closely linked to the development of management 
accounting techniques1 aimed at keeping management accountable for its actions both at an 
organisational level and by providing accounts for organisational performance to wider 
societal groups, as these affect, or are affected by, organisational action (Humphrey and 
Olson, 1995).  
 
Reforms towards managerial accountability in the public sector were initially observed in the 
United Kingdom and New-Zealand2 during the early 1980s (Lodge and Kalitowski, 2007). 
                                                 
1 The use of management accounting techniques aims to provide management with the necessary 
information in order to reach efficient decisions. They are also used to keep management accountable 
for their decisions.  
2 “In New-Zealand the respective roles of ministers and chief executives … are clearly defined in 
statute:  
• Ministers are politically accountable to parliament (and to public) for the conduct of their 
agencies they are responsible for strategic direction, policy decision, the public advocacy of 
the decisions made and outcomes. 
• Chief executives are responsible to their ministers and to parliament for the conduct of their 
agencies – they are responsible for policy advice and implementation, service delivery, the 
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While the reforms are considered to be closely associated with neo-liberal, conservative 
governments, and mainly with Thatcher’s governments in the UK, managerial accountability 
reforms were also introduced in countries with different social contexts than that of the UK 
and by left-wing democratic governments. The reforms in the Swedish public sector are the 
main example (Hood, 1995; Schedler and Proeller, 2002; McLaughlin and Osborne, 2002). 
Initially changes in the public sector were limited to the introduction of management 
techniques, such as “management by objectives” and “zero-based budgeting” (Schedler and 
Proeller, 2002). However, since the 1990s reforms have gradually been gaining a more 
holistic approach towards managerialism and, as already mentioned, they are also known as 
“managerial accountability” reforms. Regardless of any differences existing in the empirical 
implementation of the reforms in the public sector in different social contexts, changes are 
mainly based upon “the desire to place public services in market or quasi market services” 
(Lapsley, 1999:201). An example of this rationale, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, 
is the European railway industry. The strategy that defines railway policy, as formulated by 
the European Union Committee (EC), includes three blocks of European directives that 
attempt to harmonize the different national networks and to introduce competition by 
liberalising the provision of railway services (European Directives 91/440; 2001/12/13/14).  
 
The reforms in the public sector explicitly aim to reduce the state’s share of the production of 
national income and to change the role of governments so that they become the enablers 
rather than the providers of public services (Glynn and Murphy, 1996). To summarise, the 
reforms in the public sector are governed by the following common principles:  
? Desegregation of public organisations into separate units of management. 
? Introduction of greater competition amongst public sector organisations, and also 
between public sector organisations and private entities. 
? Emphasis on the efficient use of resources, while control is exercised according to output 
measurements with emphasis on end results. 
? Managers are assigned particular responsibilities and are accountable for the 
organisation’s performance (Hood, 1995; Stiglitz, 1998). 
                                                                                                                                                       
management of their agencies, outputs and managing for outcomes” (Lodge and Kalitowski, 
2007:12) 
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This rationality considers the private sector to be a more efficient model than the public 
sector. Accountable management is being aligned with a managerial approach, which stresses 
a shift towards private sector managerial principles (Lane 2000, Llewellyn and Tappin, 
2003). The private company becomes a model of “self government” of the individual. The 
concept of the enterprise “facilitates national economic health while also respecting the self-
actualizing and self-regulating capacities of individuals” (Humphrey, et al., 1993:13). The 
accountability relationship in the public sector is redefined by private sector criteria that 
focus upon the efficient utilisation of the resources entrusted to agent-managers. The 
characteristics of the managerial approach towards the accountability relationship are 
discussed in the following section. 
2.3. Managerial Accountability in the public sector 
New Public Management reforms provide a model for public administration, which depends 
upon roles and control techniques that introduce a new form of governance that dictate 
politicians’ (governmental) responsibility towards the management of public organisations 
and attempts to enforce the autonomy of individual action by making managers accountable 
for the efficient utilisation of the resources entrusted to them (Humphrey et al., 1993; Gray 
and Jekins, 1995; Hood, 1995; Black, 1999; Lane,2000; Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley 
et al., 2003; McDam and Walker, 2003; Jackson, 2004; OECD, 2004; Lodge and Kalitowski, 
2007; Lapsley, 2008; Verbeeten, 2008). In the face of reforms in the public sector, the roles 
of national governments and public sector organisations, as well as the relationships between 
them are changing. According to the new rationale, which is heavily underlined by the 
ideological1 framework of neo-liberalism,2 the state will no longer be the provider of finance 
but will instead become the purchaser of the services that the public sector produces 
(Humphrey et al, 1993). The economic rationality introduced into the public sector imposes a 
                                                 
1 It is important to emphasise the use of the term ‘ideological’ which according to Giddens (1979: 6) 
it is understood as “the capability of dominant groups or classes to make their own sectional interests 
appear to others as universal ones.”   
2 The Neo-liberal agenda has certain implications for institutionalisation as a theoretical process.  
• The concept of utilitarianism reduces the action to a calculated self interested approach to 
decision making 
• The concept of instrumentalism tends to define decision making and the allocation of 
resources as society’s central problem (March and Olsen, 1989:3) 
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provision of services that take into consideration the cost of production and potential profit, 
or at least the balance between costs and revenues. This new model introduces a new 
momentum to the affairs of the management of public sector organisations and their 
institutional environment.  
 
Contrary to the previous model of accountability, in which public organisations were 
allocated funds that they utilised according to professional norms without being accountable 
for the revenues or the costs generated by these services, the new model is based upon 
financial efficiency and performance measurement (Hood, 1995). Such a change requires a 
shift from traditional steering mechanisms, which were based upon public law and a large 
number of administrators who where used to monitor procedures in public sector 
organisations. Such mechanisms are now seen as being inefficient and inadequate for the 
purposes of the new accountability relationship (Lane, 2000:305; OECD, 2004).  
 
As a result, the intention of NPM reforms is to reconstruct public sector enterprises by 
altering the rules and norms upon which organisational actors base their actions. The 
decision-making process is preoccupied with economic objectives at the expense of social 
targets (Dent, 1991; Ogden, 1995; Conrad, 2005). In contrast to the traditional type of public 
management (based on an orderly hierarchy, uniformity, legality and policy making) the new 
managerial role is linked to innovation, creativity and empowerment. Chief Executive 
Officers (CEO) emerge as the dominant organisational agents, having the responsibility for 
the efficient utilisation of the resources that financing bodies (governments, international 
organisations, societies, etc) have entrusted to public organisations, and for the shift of the 
public sector organisational procedures beyond traditional norms and values (Catasus and 
Gronlund, 2005).  
“Central… was the commitment to bring a ‘wayward’ public sector under ‘proper’ 
control and vesting powers in managers who would do the ‘right thing’… coupled with 
marketisation this new emphasis on managerialism seems to place public sector 
managers in a position of unparalleled power and authority… More than this, central 
government and sections of public sector agencies invested faith in managers and in the 
language, techniques and values of managerialism, as the only way actually to deliver 
change (Exworthy and Halford, 2002).” 
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Expectations for the efficient and the effective operation of the resources are explicitly 
defined through contracts and in the formation of quantitative and qualitative targets that the 
management must meet (Glynn and Murphy, 1996). The model assumes greater autonomy 
for the agent-manager over the utilisation of resources but, at the same time, it makes their 
actions visible to the institutional environment through the use of instrumental accountability. 
The contractual relationship between the resource providers1 and the agent-manager develops 
a new structure of interaction that affects the roles of the two parties. Following the example 
of the private sector accountability model, the party that provides the resources becomes the 
organisation’s principal, a role that alters the meaning of his/her action. “No longer is the 
principal a provider of resources to enable professional work to occur as defined according 
to professional norms. He or she is there to transfer resources in expectations of definable 
contracts. The principal becomes the definable of these professional activities …” 
(Broadbent, et al, 1996: 262).  
  
The process of change is based upon the adoption of new patterns of interaction by the 
organisational systems that will shape actors’ behaviour and action according to the 
principal’s expectations. Monitoring techniques are employed in order to ensure that the 
agent-managers’ actions promote the principal’s interests. It is a low trust accountability 
relationship based upon the diversity of interests between the principal and the agent; a 
relationship which causes increased stress and uncertainty and demands instrumental 
mechanisms of accountability that will explicitly specify the meaning of organisational 
action and will establish norms of behaviour for organisational members (Scapens, 1994; 
Burns and Scapens, 2000; Olson, et al, 2001). For this reason, organisational control is 
orientated towards holding managers accountable for the impact that their decisions have on 
the principal’s interests. 
 
Accounting techniques, budgeting and performance measurements are deployed in the name 
of increased efficiency and become mechanisms that demonstrate the economic rationality 
that underlines decision-making and the responsibility of the agent-manager to act 
                                                 
1 This role is predominantly undertaken by the national states but in addition from international 
political constituencies like the E.U. 
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accordingly. The communication of the rationale that underlines organisational conduct is 
based upon the quantification of information as a mean of holding the agent-manager 
accountable over his/her actions (Lapsley, 1993; 1999; Dillard and Ruchala, 2005).  
2.3.1. The international aspect of managerial accountability reform  
Reforms in the public sector, such as those happening in different countries around the globe 
with different economic characteristics (developed or developing economies) and different 
social contexts, are marked by the effort to establish a new model of public administration, 
heavily informed by the model of managerial administration, and grounded on instrumental 
accountability, as has been developed in the private sector.  
“A globalization discourse of administrative reform assumes growing policy 
interdependence and economic and political integration so that the same management 
technologies and skills can be applied to national settings. Reforms are thus perceived 
as largely instrumental and managerial – a matter of improving government 
performance and management based on so called objective and rational methods” 
(Cheung, 2002:245). 
Reforms in the public sector are influenced and diffused by the so-called globalisation 
process through the participation of the national states in wider political and economic 
organisations like the World Bank, the Organisation for the Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)1, the European Union (EU), and through the power that these 
organisations have to diffuse, influence and impose such changes upon national states 
(Borins, 2002; Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Lapsley, 2008). This is why the reforms in the 
Greek public sector have to be understood in relation to the country’s participation as 
member state of the European Union, and in relation to the wider European social, political 
and economic context.  
 
The term “Europeanisation” conceptualises the efforts made by successive Greek 
Governments towards the country’s economic and social modernisation according to the 
dominant paradigm of privatisation, deregulation and that of the single European market. The 
target of the stabilisation of the Greek economy, according to Maastricht criteria and its 
                                                 
1 “The OECD (1994) has published examples off good practice, and the contention that effective 
performance is a sound basis for accountability… (Lawyon, at al, 2000:13)   
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subsequent entry into the European Monetary Union (EMU), were recognised as the main 
driving forces (Lyrintzis, 2006). Moreover, Europeanisation is viewed as ‘‘a process of 
institutional and policy adaptation as a response to EU policies, but also as the process by 
which national policies are transferred up to the European level and become the objective of 
collective decision-making process’’ (Paraskeuopoulos, 2006: 224). This approach 
demonstrates that the institutional adaptation and the reformation of national structures are 
preconditions for the country’s participation in the EU. Consequently a cause and effect 
relationship exists that drives institutional reformation in the member countries of the EU; a 
cause and effect relationship that facilitates the need for the formation of efficient multi-level 
governance in a multi-layered policy-making environment like the European Union (ibid). 
The following section outlines some key reforms in the Greek social context. 
2.4. Reforms in the Greek Public Sector 
The expansion of the public sector and its increased involvement in economic activity was a 
dominant trend in the European countries in the decades after the Second World-War. 
However after the 1970s, this trend was reversed and privatisation of public enterprises was 
the norm. Such strategies are held to be promoted by the ideological and economic concerns 
diffused by international agencies; a process that has been termed ‘modernisation via 
internationalisation’ or ‘imitation with integration’ (Liberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002: 93). The 
importance of this process, not only in terms of financial and economic change, but also in 
terms of social and political reconstruction, is encapsulated in the following statement made 
by the former Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis1. 
“… the first major issue is financial and economic globalisation. The structural 
characteristics of production and the traditional social model of organisation have 
changed dramatically. It becomes increasingly obvious that this course is not reversible 
… however, that does not mean that we should accept fatalistically any development. 
New rules which will deter phenomena that threaten or undermine stability, growth and 
social cohesion have to be established. Only the European Union as a totality can 
mutually define such rules …” (Simitis, 1996; trans.) 
                                                 
1 Costas Simitis was Prime Minister of Greece and leader of the Greek Socialist Party PASOK 
(literally Panhellenic Socialist Movement) between 1996 – 2004 
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Since the 1990s, following the general trend of reforms in the public sector around the world, 
the then ‘conservative’ Greek government1, and later PASOK’s ‘socialist’ governments, have 
introduced a number of schemes for the reformation of Greek public sector enterprises. The 
ensuing changes were the result of the influence exercised by a rationale favouring more 
accountable management, and of the demands of the European Union for the creation of 
competitive markets in economic activities provided by state monopolies 
(telecommunication, railway, public transport, electricity utilities).  
“Governmental economic policy is based upon the privatisation of public sector 
enterprises and activities. Their operation within competitive markets will enforce the 
country’s economic development and it will result in increased efficiency” (Simitis, 
1996; trans.). 
The period 1996-2001 was a crucial one for the country as macroeconomic stabilisation 
became a priority for the Greek government of PASOK in order to meet the Maastricht 
criteria and to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The government saw the 
Greek public sector, which included banks, insurance companies, public utilities, the health 
sector and universities, as costly, overstaffed and inefficient. This inefficiency was perceived 
to be the outcome of the increased politicisation of the state-owned enterprises that had 
turned them into a mechanism, which served governments’ clientelistic relations with the 
electorate, and various interest groups (Burnes et al, 2004; Lavdas, 2006).  
“Through dialogue, we have identified the multilateral weaknesses and the “sickliness” 
that characterize parts of what we define as wider public sector … and more particularly 
the problems of centralism, bureaucracy, and favouritism, the cliental relations and the 
lack of infrastructure. It is common conviction that these weaknesses do not allow the 
public sector to fulfil the expectations attached to its role as a lever of growth. For this 
reason, we agree to promote a plan of reform and change, which should become the 
object of a wider dialogue and agreement that will ensure their effectiveness and 
prevalence through time” (Social agreement, 1996; trans.). 
“Reinventing the Government”2 became the main concept in expressing the need for less 
governmental intervention and increased competitiveness in economic activity. Such an 
                                                 
1 The Greek conservative party New Democracy succeeded PASOK in government and remained in 
power for three years, until PASOK regained power in 1993. 
2 ‘Reinventing the government’ the title of the book by Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1993)   
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orientation presupposes a different public sector; one that is more focused on the provision of 
services to customers, and the introduction of incentives for increased productivity, as well as 
the formulation of a new corporate culture for everyday action. As in other countries, 
privatisation and modernisation became the main objectives of the reforms, in an effort to 
reduce bureaucracy, favouritism and corruption, and to restrict the economic burden upon the 
country’s national budget, caused by the public sector’s inefficient operation (Alpha Bank, 
2005). 
2.4.1. Privatisation and Modernisation of Greek state owned enterprises 
Through privatisation, the Greek government is attempting to transfer the ownership and the 
management of Greek public sector enterprises and utilities to the private sector. The strategy 
aims to deregulate markets which used to be controlled by state-owned monopolies. It is 
taken for granted that competitive markets and the private sector model will improve 
efficiency and service quality (The Bank of Greece, 2005).  
 
However, it has been agreed that some companies will remain under state ownership1 should 
increase their effectiveness and reduce the budgetary deficit that they create. For that reason, 
it is considered essential for radical reforms to take place that will modernise the operation of 
these organisations according to market criteria. It is also considered essential for state-
owned-enterprises (SOE) to operate in competition with the private sector, having, as their 
main objective, the attraction of private funds. The main features of this process of 
modernisation are increased accountability and transparency, as well as the adoption of 
principles of corporate governance (Social agreement, 1996). 
 
                                                 
1 That decision was the outcome of increased political conflicts and indicates the strong opposition 
that the process of privatisation faced in Greece. During the period 1990-93 when PASOK was in 
opposition, they opposed the privatisation of major state owned organisations that the conservative 
government of New Democracy attempted, accusing the government of a sell-out of national wealth. 
Thus, after 1993 when PASOK was returned to government, privatisation stopped being a 
governmental priority. Instead more emphasis was given to the reconstruction of state-owned 
organisations. The turning point in PASOK’s governmental strategy was Simitis’ election as the 
party’s leader and as the country’s Prime Minister. The strategy adopted was one of moderate 
privatisation, where the state retains management control in the major public-utility enterprises 
(Pagoulatos 2006: 137-144). An example is the case of the Public Power Corporation (DEH) and the 
Greek Telecom (OTE) (Burnes, et al 2004).  
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Act 2414, ‘Modernisation of Public Enterprises and Organisations’, was passed by the 
socialist government in 1996 in an attempt to modernise public sector organisations (DEKO). 
According to the proposal made by the Greek government, the main targets were DEKOs’ 
organisational and operational modernisation and the enforcement of managerial 
independence through the explicit definition of the relationships between the state 
(ministerial responsibility) and DEKO’s management. Following the spirit of the reforms in 
the public sector as defined by managerial accountability, the state is viewed as having the 
strategic role and responsibility for defining the macroeconomic and social framework within 
which DEKO will operate, as well as the responsibility for the evaluation and control of 
DEKO’s annual results.  
 
According to the new legislation, the control and evaluation of organisational efficiency is 
based upon the existence of quantified targets defined by both DEKO’s operational plan and 
the managerial contracts that constitute the agreement between DEKO’s management and the 
state. In addition to the operational plan, every organisation has to prepare and publish annual 
‘social balance-sheets’ that will disclose the cost of the provision of social services that 
burdens the state. The legislation also introduced criteria for choosing the management and 
the members of the boards of directors of these organisations, while it also secured the 
participation in the boards of directors of labour representatives as well as of the 
representatives, of social groups.  
 
Strategic and operational plans as well as managerial contracts, were introduced in an effort 
to keep the management of public organisations accountable for their actions in terms of the 
utilisation of the resources entrusted to them and the efficiency of the services provided to 
consumers. The 2414 Act of 1996, together with the Act 3429 of 2005, ‘Public Enterprises 
and Organisations (DEKO)’, that later replaced 2414, were efforts to introduce a strategic 
dimension  to the way that these organisations operate and are controlled (see table 2.1 which 
identifies the managerial accountability reforms and the amendments introduced to law 
2414/1996 by law 3429/2005).  
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Nevertheless these organisations are still responsible for providing social services and for 
formulating their objectives according to the government’s priorities and objectives. The 
industrial unions whose representatives participate in the formation of DEKOs’ business 
plans also have a significant role in the process of modernisation. Reforms are considered to 
be subject to a wider social agreement that will secure social consent (Social agreement, 
1996). In addition, organisational objectives must be in alignment with EU expectations, for 
the EU partly finances investments in these organisations, and it also exercises control over 
the efficient utilisation of European resources.  
 
In summary, the reforms in the Greek public sector are driven by the rationale of managerial 
accountability, which is part of a wider agenda. However, despite expectations for increased 
accountability, studies of different social contexts show that management reforms has often 
reduced accountability rather than enhanced it (Humphrey and Olson, 1991; Hoque and 
Hopper, 1994; Sinclair, 1995; Goddard, 2005).   
Table 2.1: Managerial Accountability reforms – Law 2414/1996 and law 3429/2005 
Objectives 
 
1. Managerial Independence; 
 
2. Operational and managerial modernisation 
towards financial effectiveness; 
 
3. The state remains the obligation to formulate 
the general strategic objectives; 
 
4. Operational and strategic plans are approved 
by the government, whilst the quantified 
indicators incorporated in the managerial 
contract are used by the government for the 
company’s substantial control; 
 
5. The company within the framework of the 
common agreed targets has the necessary 
independence; 
 
6. The annual ‘Social Balance Sheet’ makes 
governmental obligations transparent. The 
main target is to secure managerial stability 
and efficiency. For that reason management 
has to be selected on the basis of CEO 
competence and not on the basis of his 
political beliefs.      
 
1. Efficient process for the 
development and monitoring 
of the operational planning; 
 
2. Managerial and Operational 
modernisation according to 
corporate characteristics; 
 
3. Modernisation of the 
employment rules; 
 
4. Application of corporate 
governance principles  
 
Strategic Plans 
(SP) 
Within the framework of the general governmental 
policy SP defines company’s long-term objectives  
No changes 
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Table 2.1 continues 
Operational 
Plans (OP) 
 
OP define company’s short and medium term plans 
(3-5 years). In each OP are defined: 
1. The monetarist value of objectives  
2. The time needed for their implementation; 
3. The means and the cost of implementing the 
objectives; 
4. The steering mechanisms  
 
No changes 
 
Internal Control 
 
 Independent executives; 
 
1. Monitoring of the internal 
regulations; 
 
2. Monitoring and reporting 
conflicting interests of the 
members of the BoD 
 
Management 
 
1. Board of Directors (BoD): It has the 
responsibility for the company’s strategy. In 
the BoD participate state’s representatives (the 
Chairman and the CEO included) two 
employee representatives and one 
representative of the Social and Economic 
Committee;  
2. CEO: Is appointed by the government; 
3. Executive Board: the objective is to succeed 
the necessary managerial integration and 
coordination. In the board participate the 
Chairman, the CEO and Executive managers 
of each business unit.  
4. As Executive managers can be appointed 
managers from the private sector as well  
 
1. The law foresaw the 
participation in the BoD of 
non-executive independent 
managers 
2. The law did not foresaw the 
Executive Board, which it 
was abolished  
 
Managerial 
Contract 
 
Between the Chairman of the BoD, the CEO and 
the Minister of Finance and Transport. 
It defines: 
1. Managerial objectives; 
2. The performance indicators; 
3. Managerial compensation   
4. The BoD at the end of each financial year 
evaluates managerial performance and provide 
the necessary accounts to the Ministries of 
Finance and Transport 
 
 
Governmental 
approval 
SP and OP are the subject of government’s 
approval (common decision of the Minister of 
Finance and the Minister of Transport)  
The law established a committee 
with representatives of the 
Ministries of Finance and 
Transport, responsible for the 
approval of OPs  
Responsibility 
to the customers 
? The company has to disclose its obligations 
towards customers; 
? It has to develop indicators that monitor the 
efficiency of customers’ services    
Similar to 2414  
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2.5. How rational are public sector reforms?  
Within the framework of managerial accountability reforms the notion of accountability is 
understood as the outcome of a hierarchal process based upon the assumption that superiors 
have the authority in terms of rights and power to keep subordinates responsible for the 
rationality of their actions (Berry, 1989). In hierarchical structured social contexts, 
accountability becomes an instrumental relationship in which management accounting 
techniques are regarded as systems of organisational communication that have a central role 
in organisational and social affairs, (Willmott, 1996; Dillard and Ruchala, 2005). Reflecting 
that rationale, reforms in the public sector impose on formal organisational control structures 
the adoption of management accounting and organisational control mechanisms, as essential 
parts of their ongoing accountability relationship. Technical mechanisms of control are seen 
as accommodating and expressing expectations that shape human action and behaviour 
(Miller, 1992) 
 
However as “March and Simon long ago stated no action can ever be as rational as it is in 
theory, but for many public sector management reformers, NPFM1 has become a super-
rational means to achieve cost-efficiency savings and effectiveness improvements” (Olson, et 
al, 2001). Furthermore, a variety of conclusions exist about the efficient implementation of 
such reforms in different countries (Verbeeten, 2008; Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). As 
Lapsley (2001) argues, these studies show evidence of attempts at change, rather than actual 
results.  
2.5.1. The consequences of normative approaches upon accountability 
The first issue to emerge is that the reforms of the accountability relationship in the public 
sector attempt to “supersede other forms of accountability” (Sinclair, 1995:219). Sinclair 
(1995) characterises accountability as ‘chameleon’, multiple and fragmented, continually 
being constructed. Managers in the public sector consider themselves accountable to a 
number of groups such as professional peers, administrative hierarchy and employees, 
government and governmental agencies, the public and the customers (Goddard, 2005). 
Sinclair (1995) claims that no evidence is provided that will support the effectiveness of 
                                                 
1 New Public Financial Management. 
  25
trying to solve the ‘problem’ of multiple accountabilities that face public sector managers by 
imposing tighter requirements for managerial accountability. In addition focusing on 
financial issues distract from fundamental issues in the provision of public services 
(Willmott, 1996; Shaoul, 2006). As Sinclair suggests “such efforts assume that 
accountability can be delivered, like a product batch” (Sinclair, 1995: 233).  
 
The linking of the accountability relationship to financial and managerial objectives 
contributes to the creation of a self consciousness such “that accountability has a key role in 
making the self visible, both to self and others” (Roberts, 1996:41). Visibility in 
organisational life can be understood in terms of making certain aspects of agents’ action 
visible whilst other dimensions remain invisible. What is perceived as important is defined 
according to conventional terms that are “abstract and conceptual phenomena, creations of 
human intellect forged and shaped by economic, social and institutional forces” (Hopwood, 
1988: 9). Visibility can have both positive and negative results, a conclusion that generates 
contradictions over the utilisation of management and financial accounting technologies.  
 
The positive effects from the use of accounting technologies emerge, for example, in their 
role as instruments of capital asset utilisation, in the sense that increased visibility enables “a 
greater awareness of assets” (Lapsley, 1999: 204) owned by state-owned organisations 
whilst, the application of modern investment appraisal and asset evaluation techniques 
enforce their efficient management (Aidemark and Lindkvist. 2004). The negative effects 
may occur when accounting is mobilized “as part of the rhetoric of the rationalized, 
modernised public sector” (Lapsley, 1999: 204) and is implicated in politics of certain 
groups that aim to render certain aspects of business organisations visible whilst other remain 
invisible.   
 “It is possible to probe into what a particular organisation seeks to make visible by its 
accounting … Moreover, by making some things visible and other things not, an 
organisation can strive to exclude particular visibilities from the official organisational 
agenda. What, we can ask, is treated in this way, and why? And which groups have the 
power to influence the patterns of visibility prevailing in the organisation? What bodies 
of knowledge and sets of organisational practices are involved in making some things 
visible and other things not? (Potter, 2005: 268) 
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As in the case of the private sector reforms in the public sector and the rationality imposed by 
them, attempt to delimit the accountability relationship, between the parties that participate in 
the contractual relationship namely the principal (in the case of the public sector the 
ministers) and the steward-manager of state-owned assets, who represents the public 
organisation. The model assumes divergent and conflicting interests between the principal 
and the agent. Thus, the aim of managerial performance objectives, as these are described in 
managerial contract and influence business and operational objectives, is to reduce the 
information asymmetry between the agent and the principal (Mayston, 1993). According to 
the foundations of Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) increased managerial 
accountability will result in greater efficiency in assets utilisation and will offset the 
increased costs generated from principal’s decision to abolish his right to manage the capital 
assets he owns.   
 
Thus, the shift from a legal form of accountability to performance accountability and at a 
later stage to strategic accountability is a shift towards a tighter form of control since its 
target is to bring agents’ behaviour in line with principals-politician’s expectations 
(Broadbent et al. 1996; Llewellyn and Tappin, 2003; Goddard, 2005; Broadbent and Guthrie, 
2008). For that reason the introduction of corporate planning as an accountability mechanism 
(as in the Greek case) can be conceptualised as a process of evaluation of managerial activity 
against predefined performance standards, since government ministers, who exercise control, 
have the ability to define corporate goals according to their political objectives. 
 
As a result executives in public sector organisations enter into commitments without having 
examined all the alternatives. Such decision making procedures are characterised by 
“selective visibility and an art of impression” (Lioukas, 1985: 953). For that reason, as 
literature indicates, the use and role of management accounting control technologies in state-
owned enterprises, and more importantly the use of budget planning, aiming to monitor the 
effective utilisation of financial resources is undermined. As Humphrey and Olson (1995) 
point out, reforms in the management of public organisations and the use of performance 
measurements have been mainly used to manipulate the effectiveness delivered by public 
organisations and to support desired organisational or political outcomes. Management 
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control systems shift away from the control of input and it is directed towards management 
of performance and desired outputs (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). Consequently, the use of 
accounting for accountability purposes “reduces accountability to the management of 
expectations” (Sinclair, 1995: 233) with negative effects on inner organisational dialogue. 
According to Townley (2003), NPM reforms in local governments in Alberta, Canada, were 
initially seen as an opportunity for public consultation and dialogue over the formation of 
objectives and targets as well as the development of technologies that will keep professionals 
more accountable to the public. However, middle managers saw these mechanisms as 
delimiting their role in decision making and promoting instrumental rationalisation, whilst at 
the same time their use as accountability mechanisms was undermined.  
“Technical inquiry soon overshadowed deliberation about values and identities… 
participation was carefully managed to marginalize many voices …” (Townley, 2003: 
1067).  
As a consequence, instrumental accountability mechanisms tend to fail to integrate diverse 
expectations and interests and while they have been “introduced with the potential of 
enchasing reasoned justification, these technologies (accountability reports, business plans 
and performance measurements) simultaneously work toward a dominant instrumental 
rationalisation” (Townley, 2003: 1064). Managerial accountability reforms are mainly 
perceived by managers as increasing control and stewardship rather as enforcing 
accountability with reference to future planning. Accountability is seen to be enforced “by 
the budget system which accords with core values of service delivery” and not by new public 
management reforms (Goddard, 2005: 211).  
 
For those reasons reforms fail to constitute frameworks of organisational cooperation and 
coordination that will enforce accountability and the formation of organisational goals. The 
disintegration of managing accounting techniques from the on going managerial and 
operational action is discussed in the coming section  
2.6. De-Coupling 
As Hoque and Hopper argue, “wider social, economic, political and institutional contexts 
govern the way management control operates in the organisation” (Hoque and Hopper, 
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1994: 5). Using a Jute mill in Bangladesh as a case study, they emphasise the influence of the 
political institutions on everyday organisational activity in state-owned organisations. They 
argue that in contexts where management control is perceived as a political and social 
phenomenon rather than mechanisms of rational decision-making, instrumental mechanisms 
of organisational control such as budgeting and financial reporting systems are primarily 
used for legitimacy purposes in the face of external demands (Hoque and Hopper, 1994: 25; 
1997).  
 
“Decoupling1 can be defined as the process of disintegrating the structural elements of 
different parts of the organisation in response to institutional pressures to comply with 
inconsistent norms” (Brignall and Modell, 2000: 290; Dillard et al, 2004; Nor-Aziah and 
Scapens, 2007). There are a number of different explanations as to why decoupling as a 
phenomenon occurs. According to Meyer and Rowan, the formal structures of many 
organisations reflect the “myths” of their institutional environment instead of their 
organisational needs (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341). “Decoupling enables organisations to 
maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response 
to practical considerations” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 357). As DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) further argue, ‘Institutional Isomorphism’ explains the structural similarities appear in 
contemporary business organisations. Isomorphism as they emphasise, is not the result of a 
rational choice aiming increase financial efficiency, but rather it is the outcome of the need of 
business organisations to secure legitimacy within the social environment they operate, and 
upon which they depend in order to secure the necessary financial resources (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1991; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Dillard et al, 2004).  
 
                                                 
1 At this point it has to be emphasised that the term loosely coupled systems introduced into the 
literature of organisational theory by Weick (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007). Following Weick’s 
(1976) view, loosely coupled organisational systems can have certain advantages related to their 
ability to persist to environmental pressures and to better understand and incorporate structural 
elements existing in the wider institutional environment. In relation to tightly coupled systems, 
loosely coupled ones can have more operational diversity and allow self determination (in the sense 
that an organisation does not have to respond to each little change occurs in institutional environment) 
and for that reason they are relative inexpensive to run and control. In loosely coupled organisational 
systems less necessity for coordination exists, a condition that results in less conflicts and 
contradictions (Weick 1976: 6-8). 
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Formal organisational structures adapt to the expectations and rules imposed by the external 
environment, but actual process and inner organisational actions remain unchanged 
(Covaleski, et al, 1993). Hence, decoupling within the framework of ‘Institutional 
Isomorphism’ is seen as the result of the strategic choice (self-interested) made by 
organisational agents in order for them to accommodate and manipulate the pressures 
exercised by the institutional environment (Fernandez, et al, 1999; Dillard et al, 2004). 
Furthermore, decoupling is seen as the result of the efforts of organisational managers to 
avoid the inspections and controls by external constituents. Thus, formal structures are seen 
as adapting to technical rationality in order to manipulate expectations and to gain legitimacy 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). For that reason the introduction of management accounting 
techniques and the process of organisational change are regarded as an effort by public 
organisations to gain external legitimacy rather than trying to alter the way that 
organisational actors interact and provide accounts for their actions in their everyday 
organisational conduct.  
 
Such an assumption is based upon two main arguments: the first is the division of 
organisational systems between technical and institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977), while the second is that organisational actors passively comply with the expectations 
imposed by the external environment. Manipulation as a cause for structural decoupling is a 
central idea within these frameworks of analysis (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). 
However, the idea of passiveness is criticised by other authors who consider that agent 
managers can be proactive in balancing conflicting interests. According to Brignall and 
Modell, (2000) decoupling occurs when an increased reliance on financial performance 
measurements fails to accommodate the expectations of organisational actors-professionals, 
who produce and reproduce organisational knowledge upon which organisational systems are 
based. In that case, decoupling is the result of the conflict between the increased powers 
assigned to managers and the power, in terms of the knowledge that professionals possess, 
which allows them to resist financial and managerial forms of organisational control. 
Decoupling as an organisational phenomenon emerges from the conflicts and loss of 
legitimacy from the attempt to control and coordinate activities. Hence, in decoupled 
organisational structures, control and performance evaluation have a minor role to perform, 
  30
and performance measures fail to become part of an integrative control system, linked to the 
strategic objectives, that will balance and express the expectations of the different 
institutional groups that have an interest in organisational operations (Scott, 1995; Lawton, et 
al, 2000; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007). 
 
The use of institutional isomorphism ignores organisational complexities and it also ignores 
the fact that structures are not static but are subject to change, due to agents’ interaction and 
interdependence. As a consequence, changes in formal structures affect social forms of 
accountability and vice-versa. The main problem with that theorisation is that it disassociates 
the characteristics of the diffused MA techniques and performance evaluation mechanisms, 
from the forms and patterns they adopted from particular organisational and social contexts. 
Such a framework is not adequate to explain the differences in the implementation of 
changes in formal organisational structure between different countries, since it fails “to 
address the relations between established practises, dominant ideals, discourses and 
techniques of control” (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000: 715).  
 
An approach that addresses this problem by utilising in its analysis the relations of power 
between the various institutions and business organisations has been developed by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983; 1991), in which they suggest that different agencies can be a source of 
coercive pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Modell, 2006). 
As Lawton et al (2000) demonstrate in their study, in the UK public sector, managers 
perceive the influence of the institutional environment, and mainly the influence exercised by 
the legislation and the government, as critical in the formation of performance standards. 
From this point of view, decoupling emerges as the loss of confidence of operational 
managers in organisational objectives that are considered to be externally imposed and 
inconsistent with organisational needs.  
 
The comparison between public sector reforms in the UK and Sweden shows that in 
countries with a history of less coercive change, such as Sweden, less conflict exists between 
funding institutions and organisational actors, management of SOEs has more decentralized 
powers and as a result it has the ability to choose performance measurements and control 
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systems that can accommodate the expectations of a wider number of institutional factors 
(Lawton, 2000; Laegreid et al, 2006). In contrast in the UK, it appears that the government 
leaves organisational actors little space to choose the instrumental mechanisms most suitable 
to their needs and imposes the uniform implementation of financial and managerial control 
mechanisms - an attitude that leads to decoupling (Brignall and Modell, 2000).  
 
More dynamic approaches to institutional change recognise explicitly the relationship 
between changes, organisational roles and techniques of control, and their analysis attempts 
to identify the interplay between management, and the organisational and institutional 
environment. During the process of transformation, instrumental forms of control can have a 
central role in transmitting the rules and the meaning of organisational conduct and change 
(Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000: 715). Thus, what is seen to be important is the utilisation 
of instrumental mechanisms to develop competency and trust between organisational actors, 
which in turn permits the efficient implementation of organisational change. The recognition 
of mutual competency and trust between organisational agents facilitates the “acceptance 
and progressive sharing of new rationalities among professionals with different backgrounds 
and with different degrees of knowledge” (Busco, et al, 2006: 37). Yet, such a relationship is 
only possible through co-operation within common practices (Johansson and Baldvinsdottir, 
2003; Busco, et al, 2006; Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). For that reason reforms in the public 
sector need to promote trust and cooperation rather than opportunism and self interest 
behaviour that constitute the substance of the managerial accountability reforms in the public 
sector (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002).  
 
As Ribeiro and Scapens (2006: 105) support, the reason for the emergence of decoupling is 
that these instrumental mechanisms “were implicated in the strategies of power of a specific 
group of key organisational actors – the managing director and his key allies”. As a 
consequence, instead of operational and strategic plans in the public sector being used as 
accountability mechanisms, providing reasons for justification of decisions and the 
formulation of strategic objectives, they become mechanisms of power, imposing a particular 
rationality that alienates organisational managers from the scope and objectives of the SOE 
(Townley, 2002; Townley, et al, 2003).  
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The importance of managers’ participation and cooperation in the reform process in the 
public sector is evident in a comparative study of the application of management accounting 
practices, in the local governments of Scotland and New Zealand. Lapsley and Pallot (2000) 
observe that the managerial role has been critical to the integration of management 
accounting techniques into the everyday accountability relationship, and also illustrates the 
differences in the empirical implementation of new accounting methods in the two countries. 
Such action, though, is enabled or hindered by the coerciveness of the institutional 
environment and is contingent upon local politics and the strategies of governing elites 
(Cheung, 2002; Uddin and Hopper; 2003; Laegreid, et al, 2006) 
 
The particular qualities and implications characterise the Greek social context are discussed 
in the following section.    
2.7. Characteristics and implications in the Greek social context 
Seeking an answer to the question: “why has accounting not been used in certain public 
bureaucracies as much as it might”, Ballas and Tsoukas (2004: 661) argue that in the Greek 
public sector, accounting has played a marginal role in its development, due to the 
historically high politicisation, “bureaucratic, clientelistic-cum-populist… and 
particularistic-cum-personalistic culture” (Ballas and Tsoukas, 2004: 665) that characterise 
the organisation of the relationships between individuals and collectives (Mossialos and 
Allin, 2006).  
 
Focusing on the Greek National Health System, Ballas and Tsoukas (2004), regard as critical 
for the lack of modern accounting systems, the dominant role of Doctors’ Union and the lack 
of independent managerial elite. Accounting techniques and the accompanied values 
(abstraction, objectivity, standardisation and rational calculation) tend to be underestimated, 
“since [accounting] is in conflict with the established logic of the system” and the various 
individual and collective interests (Ballas and Tsoukas, 2004: 684). As they argue, in highly 
politicised social systems like the Greek one, accounting has a limited contribution in the 
formulation of trustful and legitimate relationships. The legitimate role of administrative 
management is not based on the evaluation of individual performance and competence, but 
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rather upon political status secured, by the close ties between the Greek political parties and 
the administrators of state owned organisations.  
 
The taken-for-granted perception of the technical characteristics of accounting as a 
mechanism that promotes objectivity and rational calculation, lead Vallas and Tsoukas 
(2004), to conclude that the inability of the Greek public sector to apply accounting 
techniques, is the outcome of the fact that “the Greek socio-political context has historically 
privileged local values and the familiar over the universal and the abstract” (Ballas and 
Tsoukas 2004: 686). However, such an argument presupposes the disassociation of the 
implemented managerial accountability reforms, from their neo-liberal ideological origins 
and the effort to deregulate markets, and the potential social implications emerging from 
symbolisms assigned to managerial role. Moreover, it seems to overcome the results of 
studies that indicate that the “dichotomy” between managers and health care professionals in 
the UK hospitals, is seen as the main reason why NPM reform (accounting techniques being 
at the centre of the reform) face difficulties in their application (Lapsley, 1999: 204).  
 
The lack of the use of accounting techniques in the Greek public sector is discussed in 
Venieri’s and Cohen’s (2004) study. As they argue the only form of accounting used by 
Greek Universities, is cash-based budgeting. Even then, as the authors point out, “budgets do 
not reflect clear and measurable goals”, since they are the outcome of a bargaining process 
between the Universities and the Ministry of Education (Venieris and Cohen, 2004: 186). 
Although, it is their responsibility, many Greek universities fail to apply the accounting 
double entry bookkeeping system and to publish annual balance sheets. As a consequence the 
67.60% of their operating expenses, financed by public subsidies, are not disclosed 
(Papadeas, 2008).  
 
The multiple interests involved in the production of public policy in Greece have resulted, in 
the reforms in the Greek public sector failing to make major changes, or to improve cost 
efficiency and the effectiveness of resource utilisation (Mossialos and Allin, 2006). The 
various parties involved in the operation of the Greek Universities, as well as the overlapping 
authorities between the Ministries of Finance and Education, the lack of financial and human 
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resources, the bad planning, and the lack of commitment, emerge as the main reasons why 
the rationalisation of managerial and financial control mechanisms in the Greek universities, 
and the application of accrual accounting, faded out (Venieris and Cohen, 2004). 
Contradicting the conclusion reached by Ballas and Tsoukas (2004), the reason behind the 
failure of reform, in the Greek social context and elsewhere, is deemed to be the 
implementation of a global model of public administration similar to that of the private sector 
in the English spoken countries, which is however, “different in constitutional structures and 
conventions, size, political culture, ethos and available technology or skills” (Venieris and 
Cohen, 2004: 201) from the Greek administrative model.  
 
The administrative model of managerial accountability is foreign to Greek corporate culture. 
Indicative of that is the fact that, while the Greek listed (private and state-owned) enterprises 
claim that they tend to comply with the requirements of Law 3016/2002 (“Principles of 
Corporate Governance), they do not in practice apply the principles of corporate governance 
(Kazas and Refenes, 2005 and 2006). The paternalistic characteristics of the Greek 
corporations are perceived to be the main reason why they are not familiar with the use of 
instrumental forms of accountability. The Greek private sector is characterised by the high 
concentration of capital ownership. The majority of the Greek private enterprises are family 
businesses. In six out of the ten companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), the 
Chairman and the Chief Executive is the same person; and in cases where they are different 
persons, they are linked with family ties that secure the necessary trust in the management of 
Greek corporations.  
 
Critical to the emergent implications for the Greek social context, is the argument that the 
Greek public sector has a limited experience in participative management schemes, the 
emergence of which is associated with the growth of the labour movement and the 
democratisation of the political and social institutions that took place in Greece, during the 
1980s (much later than other European countries). In comparison with other European 
countries that have employed advanced managerial participation schemes, often with positive 
results, the application of similar managerial systems in Greece, have generated highly 
debatable and contradictory results (Papoulias and Lioukas, 1995). Such diversities in the 
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social contexts make the transfer problematic (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002). Managerial 
accountability reforms in the Greek public sector “conceived a narrow frame, with little 
investigation of the effects of its application on the organisations involved and without 
profound reference to the problems and the contradictions that might occur… the new system 
[NPM] never gained the necessary confidence that could facilitate its implications” 
(Venieris and Cohen, 2004: 201).  
 
The lack of necessary resources and the underdevelopment of social capital, which is 
characterised by the absence of formal and informal regulations that would foster and sustain 
trust and cooperation, is seen by Lyberaki and Tsakalotos (2002) as the main reasons why 
subsequent reforms in the Greek public sector faded out. Relationships between the various 
interest groups and collectives have been characterised by mutual suspicion over the 
objectives of the reforms and the interests they have come to serve (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 
2002). Such distrust among the various parties is the outcome of the coercive influence of the 
governments’ intervention in the organisational activity of state-owned enterprises and the 
formation of strategic objectives (the scope of enterprise activities). The intervention of the 
Greek government traditionally has been associated with asymmetries of power and the lack 
of collective decision making which “implies the reproduction of a pattern of power 
relations which relied on a specific system of relations between political institutions and 
interest groups: a system marked by weak state capacities and asymmetrical penetration of 
state structures by various interests” (Lavdas, 2006: 89). Consequently the role of the 
administrative managers in Greek state-owned organisations is seen to be constrained by the 
strategies that the various interests groups follow, in order to achieve their objectives or even 
worse, they tend to be identified as the ‘Trojan Horse’ of those interests within the context of 
state-owned enterprises. 
 
Indicative of the lack of social dialogue in the Greek social context and of the emergent 
conflicts, is the critical role in the process of managerial modernisation of the Greek state-
owned enterprises, of consultants. In the case of the Greek Universities the modernisation of 
the accounting procedures, was not carried out by universities’ personnel and managers (the 
parties directly involved with the management and operation of the Greek Universities), but 
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rather by appointed consultants, whose participation was seen as a necessity for the 
promotion of the necessary changes. In reality their expertise aimed at “legitimating 
decisions and seizing opposition from other parties” (Venieris and Cohen, 2004: 188). The 
modernisation project of Greek state-owned enterprises failed to secure the necessary 
acceptance and to introduce necessary changes. For that reason in an effort to overcome the 
lack of justifications, the “Modernisation” project in the Greek public sector was reduced to 
that of Europeanisation (Lyrintzis, 2006: 29). It was a conscious choice made by the 
‘governing elites’ for the project to gain the necessary legitimacy and the crucial coalitions to 
be formed in order that the European objectives be realised and the institutions, coercively 
adapt to the European ideal (Lavdas, 2006).    
 
The emergence of planning and performance activities in the Greek public sector, and 
elsewhere has to be understood in relation to the particular characteristics of the context in 
which they are introduced and moreover on the conflicting effects that the expectations of 
local and global institutions have upon the way that individuals understand their role in 
relation to the others, within organisational systems (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990). Thus, 
ongoing organisational reality cannot be perceived as objective and rational (Bogt and Jan 
van Helden 2000). By emphasising the way that management accounting techniques “are 
both constituted by the context  and are constitutive of the context’’ (Broadbent and Guthrie, 
2008: 152) and by having the role of administrative management at the centre of the analysis, 
a more dynamic approach to the study of the accountability relationship in the organisational 
systems is adopted. For that reason the study of accountability relationships emphasises the 
way that management accounting mechanisms embed in the social and organisational reality 
(Modell, 2004: 40) and upon the role of organisational agents in relation to their institutional 
environment. 
2.8. The need for a new approach to accountability  
What is crucial to the notion of accountability is the “alignment of organisational rhetoric, 
and practice with wider public discourses1” (Ahrens, 1996: 168) that influences the 
individual’s role and shapes accountability relationships according to the techniques (e.g. 
                                                 
1 As Ahrens (1996) emphasises, accountability “is characterised by contemporariness and public 
appeal”. 
  37
performance measurement) that accompany these frameworks (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 
2000). ‘Accountable management’ reforms are perceived not as a mechanism of instrumental 
change, but as an activity introducing a new rationality into the structural elements of the 
public sector (Meyer, 1998). Common-sense understandings of managerial authority cannot 
be accepted uncritically if the significance of them in the formation of organisational 
accountability relationships “within particular power-knowledge relations” (Willmott, 1996: 
25) is not justified.  
 
Accountability is defined by the context within which an organisation operates, and as a 
result it expresses the dynamics of that social context. The use of accounting for 
accountability purposes becomes relevant only when organisational actors can understand, 
interpret, and perceive as reasonable the meanings conveyed by accounting technologies. 
“Those reasonable accepted ways make out an organisation’s style of implicating 
accounting into process of accountability” (Ahrens, 1996: 168). The proliferation of 
instrumental forms of control might lead to ‘failing accountabilities’ if these are unsuccessful 
in aligning roles and relationships, and if they give organisational actors no legitimacy or 
power to change the way that they perceive organisational action and the accountability 
relationship (Hasselblach and Kallinikos, 2000). 
 
Managerial accountability reforms and the use of accounting technologies attempt to 
demonstrate and hence to promote the responsible and efficient utilisation by management of 
the resources entrusted to public organisations. Monitoring mechanisms are employed in a 
way that serves the interests and the role of the state and the paternalistic structure of power 
relations between SOEs and governments. “The gap between the introduction of new 
accounting techniques and their actual usage” (Bogt and Helden, 2000: 277) can be 
understood as the outcome of the effort made by the principal-government “to secure total 
submission of the agent” and the ability of the latter to make alternative choices of action, a 
result which introduces “a vicious cycle of control and deceit” (Willmott, 1996: 32).  
 
An alternative to that problem is to rebuild respect, in terms of competency and trust that will 
secure the use of formal organisational structures as a means that will enforce inner 
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organisational dialogue and interaction (Johnson, 1996; Busco, 2005). These will result in 
common understandings of the meaning of organisational action and organisational 
performance (Sinclair, 1996). Trust, a dimension of the accountability relationship that has 
not been adequately discussed in the literature (Laughlin, 1996; Busco, 2005; Ribeiro and 
Scapens, 2006), is a condition mainly built upon practices generated by the members of an 
organisational system during ongoing organisational interaction. It is also considered to be 
restricted by the application of universal principles (Jonsson, 1996).  
2.9. Conclusion 
The present chapter attempted to make familiar the reader to the foundations of managerial 
accountability reform in state-owned organisations. The chapter discussed the reasons that 
NPM reform emerged in the context of state owned organisations, and more particularly in 
the context of the Greek public sector. The literature review aimed to critically assess the 
application of reforms in the various social contexts and to identify potential implications and 
contradictions in the formulation of accountability relationships. A third objective was to 
address the implications of such reform in the context of the Greek public sector, and to 
depict the factors that restrict the efficient incorporation of accounting technologies that 
constitute the core of NPM, in the context of state-owned enterprises.  
 
It was argued that NPM is a global paradigm applied in different countries with diverse 
characteristics, aiming increase accountability and efficiency in the management of state-
owned organisations. Within the framework of NPM reform, accountability relationships are 
seen as a mechanistic approach to organisational relationships that are defined by the 
responsibility of managers to provide information for rational decision making (Puxty, 1993).  
 
However, it was made apparent that various institutions affect the management of state-
owned enterprises and influence the formation of accountability relationships. The 
application of accounting techniques is related to a political process. Administrative 
managers as a dominant organisational role, implicate management accounting in their effort 
to promote their strategies and to establish their authority within state-owned organisations. 
Participation in state-owned organisations is marginalised and as a result managerial 
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accounting techniques disintegrate from the every-day managerial action with administrative 
management not having the adequate capacity to control and coordinate the operations of 
state organisations.  
 
The implications in contexts like the Greek one become even more apparent. Managerial 
accountability reforms applied in a context that traditionally is characterised by the lack of 
participative managerial schemes and the absence of social dialogue. The lack of institutions 
that will foster trust and cooperation between organisational actors and organisational actors 
and the institutional environment is examined as the critical reason why managerial 
accountability reform in the Greek public sector faded out.      
 
The elaboration of ‘Structuration theory’ that follows in the next chapter, allows us to shift 
the focus of the study of accountability relationship beyond the purely technical to 
encompass the concepts of power, trust, responsibility and dialogue. 
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3. Chapter - The concept of accountability within the framework 
of Structuration theory  
3.1. Introduction  
The ability of organisational actors to influence the meaning of organisational action, 
discussed in the previous section, introduces the need to clarify how actors and structures 
interrelate in the production and reproduction of organisational knowledge and how they 
order and affect the meaning of the accountability relationship. The elaboration of 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1976; 1979; 1999; 2002), allows a conception of operational 
and strategic plans as properties of organisational interaction upon which organisational 
actors draw in order to formulate and rationalise the meaning of organisational action and 
thus, accountability relationships (Mackintosh and Scapens, 1990).  
 
The utilisation of strategic and operational plans as patterns of organisational integration 
intended to transform the context of public sector organisations cannot be perceived to be 
independent from the relations of power existing in the organisational as well as in the wider 
social contexts (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005). Thus, the elaboration of structuration theory 
additionally, offers a wider analysis of the changes that take place in social systems and how 
these affect state owned enterprises (Conrad, 2005). 
 
The aims of the present chapter are: 
1. To develop the theoretical framework underpinning the current analysis and to provide a 
theoretical understanding of the concept of accountability within the framework of 
Structuration Theory;  
2. To describe the research strategy and methods used to accomplish the research 
objectives. 
 
For that reason the following chapter is divided in two main sections: research methodology 
and research methods.   
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3.2.  Structuration  
‘Structuration’ theory views organisations as social systems produced and reproduced 
through ongoing interactions underlined by common norms and rules that constitute 
organisational knowledge1 (Giddens 1976, 1979, 1999, 2002; Roberts and Scapens, 1985; 
Mackintosh and Scapens, 1990; Scapens and Mackintosh, 1996; Boland, 1996; Parker; 2000; 
Conrad, 2005). Central to structuration theory is the notion of social structure. Structures 
refer to the structuring properties (norms, rules and resources) that bind the transformation of 
social systems in time and space. That means that the existence of structural properties makes 
possible the formulation of patterns of social action that exist across time and space and 
define a social system. Consequently, social systems as reproduced social practices reveal the 
elaboration of certain rules and resources. The most deeply embedded structural properties 
implicated in the reproduction of social systems are the institutions (Giddens, 1999). 
 
The importance of structuration theory lies with the use of the concept of duality, which 
Giddens uses to establish the interdependence between structures2 and agents’3 action. 
Duality is used by Giddens in his effort to overcome the concept of dualism according to 
which ‘Object’ (structures) and ‘Subject’ (human agents) are in conflict and mutually 
excluded. According to duality of structure, the rules and norms are both the medium and the 
outcome of human action and this is why the constitution of agents and structures cannot be 
perceived as two independent phenomena. This is where structuration theory differentiates 
from functionalist and structuralist approaches that regard that structures exist, external to 
human action as a source of constraint (Scapens and Mackintosh, 1996).  
 
In functionalist tradition structures are perceived in a mechanical way as some kind of 
patterning of social relations represented as a “visual imaginary, akin to the skeleton or 
morphology of an organism” [for example the organisational chart-flows] (Giddens, 1999: 
                                                 
1 That is, how things should be done. 
2 “Anything can be considered as structure provided it is conceptualised as composed of relations of 
parts” (Parker, 2000: 6) 
3 Agency refers to the actions taken by individuals under particular social circumstances. The 
importance of that proposition is that it introduces acting in an existentialistic way that means that 
agents could have acted otherwise, according to alternative choices (Mackintosh and Scapens, 1990). 
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79). In contrast Structuration Theory contends that structure only exists paradigmatically in 
the constituting moments of social systems: a) as knowledge (memory traces) that defines 
human conduct, b) as recursive mobilisation of knowledge and c) as capabilities that the 
production of social interaction demands (Giddens, 2002: 236). 
 
In order to understand how knowledgeable actors and social structures interact, Giddens 
proposes three dimensions of social structure upon which actors draw for their actions; those 
of ‘signification’ (communication of the meaning)1, ‘legitimation’ (morality)2 and 
‘domination’ (power)3 (Mackintosh and Scapens, 1990; Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Dillard at 
al, 2004). The importance of that distinction lies in the way that knowledge is communicated 
to agents through the use of interpretive schemes, rules and norms that affect the way actors 
understand the meaning of organisational conduct and formulate their aims and targets 
(Giddens, 1979; Scapens, 1994).  
 
Following Mackintosh and Scapen’s (1990) argument, management accounting techniques 
can been understood as: 
1. “Interpretive schemes which management uses to interpret past results, take actions, and 
make plans, 
2. Norms which communicate a set of values and ideals about what is approved and what is 
disapproved, and 
3. Facilities which managers at all levels use to coordinate and control participants” 
(Scapens and Mackintosh, 1996: 680)  
 
“Although separable analytically” structures of signification, legitimation and domination 
“are inextricably linked” (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990: 457). This means that the level 
according to which the meaning of organisational action is socially constructed determines 
                                                 
1 Signification is based upon interpretive schemes in the communication of the meaning of every-day 
organisational interaction 
2 Communication of the meaning within structures of legitimation is based upon the utilisation of 
norms and moral codes which sanction particular behaviours.  
3 Domination as structures of interaction is based upon the procession of power to distribute 
organisational recourses. Such power is distinguished between the power to allocate materialistic 
resources and the authority to organise and coordinate organisational activities.  
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the moral principles that “give legitimacy to certain actions of organisational participants” 
and as a result it justifies their authority to keep others accountable for their actions (ibid). 
 
The same stock of knowledge that actors use to draw upon for their actions is also used by 
agents to provide justification for the purpose of their actions. Thus, it derives that the notion 
of accountability is contingent upon the structures of signification, legitimation and 
domination that define organisational action. In structures of domination, accountability is 
defined as the power that an agent has to keep other members of the organisational system 
accountable for their activities. However, acknowledging that the reproduction of 
organisational systems is the outcome of a social process of interaction and mutual 
understanding1 makes the notion of accountability relevant only in the social structures of 
signification and legitimation (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990).  
 
The concept of accountability relationships within the framework of Structuration theory is 
discussed in the subsequent section of this chapter. 
                                                 
1 The argument that the members of an organisational system, share common meanings and mutual 
understandings in the process of the structuration of organisational relationships, as that appears in the 
analysis made by Mackintosh and Scapens (1990), is challenged by Bollard (1996). Common 
meanings and collective action constitute a methodological problem in the framework of 
Structuration analysis (Cohen, 2000: 97). Thus, Bollard (1996) rightly argues that within the 
framework of Structuration Theory, coherent interpretations of management accounting cannot be 
assumed. As he argues, common stock of knowledge shared by the members of an organisational 
system is not used, in the production of shared meanings; they are used by organisational actors in 
order to make themselves accountable to self and others. The purpose is one to construct a self image 
of a competent and rational agent, acknowledged by the other members of the collective. However, 
while social reality, cannot be seen as common interpretation, nor can agency be seen, as the centre of 
social/organisational analysis (Calhoun, 2002: 222). Consequently, arguing that “management 
accounting reports mean what readers of them make them mean” … as Bollard (1991) does, [the 
researcher appear] “to privilege agency over the structure … [However] in structuration theory agent 
and structure presuppose one another” (Scapens and Mackintosh, 1996: 680). The ongoing 
reproduction of social life presupposes skilled individuals that cannot act without drawing upon 
collective interpretive schemes (Calhoun, 2002: 223). For that reason the present thesis adopts 
Mackintosh and Scapens (1990) argument over the use of management accounting as an additional 
(among others) interpretive scheme, in the construction of shared meanings in the process of the re-
production of organisational relationships. This is a valuable argument in the understanding of the 
reasons why certain management accounting practices were enacted in the managerial and operational 
process in the public sector. 
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3.3. Accountability relationships in day-to-day organisational 
interrelationships and rationalisation of the action 
The way that agents act in their everyday organisational life, reflects the patterns of 
organisational interaction and determines the organisational boundaries since “to be part of 
an organisation is to be subject to that organisation’s system of accountability” (Roberts and 
Scapens, 1985: 448). For that reason giving accounts for the purpose of organisational 
conduct is defined by moral principles (Johnson, 1996).  
 
Accountability refers to organisational action as a continuous flow of conduct, involving 
agents in an ongoing activity, and it “establishes a rule-following aspect of action” which 
bounds the meaning of rationality, defines future conduct (Johnson, 1996: 113; Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997: 94), and becomes “observable-and-reportable in those ways that are 
commonsensical to other members who share this way of accomplishing a commonsense 
world” (Willmot, 1996: 25). Importantly, accountability allows the members of an 
organisational system to monitor and acknowledge the competence of individual actors to 
produce, and reproduce the meaning of everyday organisational action (Giddens, 1979: 83). 
The recognition of individual competence is based upon agents’ ability to demonstrate their 
‘mastery’ upon organisational practices through, ongoing interaction that enforces inner 
organisational dialogue, trust and, as a result, responsibility. This is why responsibility and 
trust are justified by providing accounts for the rationality of agents’ decisions that the other 
members of an organisation can understand and use in their judgment.  
 
The repetition of the action defines an agent’s ability to give accounts (either upon demand 
or for self-examination purposes) for his/her actions according to rule-based behaviours that 
Giddens calls “reflexive monitoring of conduct” (Giddens, 1979: 81). Reflexive monitoring 
is based upon “purposive action which involves the application of knowledge so to produce a 
particular outcome or a series of outcomes” (Giddens, 1976: 81; Giddens, 1979: 57), and 
includes the monitoring of settings of interaction and not just the behaviour of individual 
actors (Giddens, 1979: 57). Agents do things purposively by following particular routines 
since that gives them the ability to monitor their own activities and to secure certain 
outcomes and qualities. Accountability is based upon agents’ capacity to explain the purpose 
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of their involvement in that series of outcomes, and can be provided “at two levels of 
consciousness - discursive and practical” (Mackintosh and Scapens, 1990: 458). At 
discursive level agents can discursively articulate reasons for the purposes of their conduct. 
At practical level agents’ action, is defined by implicit stocks of knowledge (tacit 
knowledge1) that inform actors about what is considered and what is not considered as an 
acceptable form of action.  
 
The argument that structures and, as a result, organisational systems, are produced and 
reproduced though organisational routines and everyday activity “entails interpreting [by 
agents] a stream of messages coming from members of the organisation and the 
environment” (Scapens, 1994: 310). Reflexive monitoring of action “operates against the 
background of the rationalisation of the action” (Giddens, 1979: 57) in the sense that 
rationalisation is the result of the monitoring process of everyday organisational life. 
Through rationalisation, agents intend to reorganise the technical characteristics of the 
reflexive monitoring of conduct, meaning to change the sequence of ongoing purposive 
action and to introduce to organisational systems new rules and routines that will regulate 
organisational interaction and behaviour and importantly to explain the reasons of their 
conduct (Giddens, 1976: 84; Mouritsen, 1994). As a result, accountability in everyday 
organisational life is the outcome of tensions resulting from the way that rationalisation of 
action is embedded within the stream of conduct of organisational agents and collectives 
(Giddens, 1979: 57; Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Conrad, 2005). 
 
However, while accepting that rationalisation is a chronic feature of daily conduct, that 
presupposes the existence of competent organisational agents, whose competence is adjudged 
by other organisational actors in the court of the every-day reproduction of organisational 
systems (Giddens, 1979: 57; Parker, 2000), Scapens argues that we should “distinguish 
evolutionary (routine2) from revolutionary (critical) change” (Scapens, 1994: 311). “The 
process of institutional decay or disruption produced by the encounter of traditional cultures 
                                                 
1 Tacit knowledge provides the necessary skills in order for agents to perform daily activities and 
monitor their actions, and the actions of the other members of an organisation (Scapens, 1994). 
2 The reason why agents reproduce ongoing routines is related to ontological aspect of the individual, 
in the sense that the familiar in social relations reduces anxiety (Giddens, 1979: 128). 
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with the economic imperialism of the advanced societies [as this is expressed with economic 
organisations like the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD, or the EU]” is seen by Giddens 
(1979: 228), as an ‘episode’ of critical change in social systems. For that reason the strategic 
choice of the transformation of the state owned enterprises is seen as an attempt to introduce 
conditions of crisis, since it questions the applicability of the already formulated 
organisational relationships and practices and further affects the interrelationship between the 
wider global and local institutions1 (Pettigrew, 1987; Dent, 1991; Ogden, 1995; Conrad, 
2005). Under conditions of crisis agency reshapes the structures influencing the patterns of 
organisational interaction. Thus, the incorporation of a new rationality involves a significant 
disruption of established routines since it attempts to institute a new meaning of 
organisational activity, a process that affects traditional roles and relations of power 
(Scapens, 1994; Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
 
The constitution of agency (the enactment of conduct under particular conditions that remain 
accountable for the reasons of conduct) in organisational systems is a complex project, based 
upon a dialectic relationship between the ways that an actor perceives his/her role and the 
way that the others (institutions and individuals) understand and inform that role. The 
multiple expectations imposed by the different wider global and local institutions are 
conflicting and antagonistic. The formulated conflicting situations under conditions of crisis, 
increase contradictions between agents and institutions, and make the articulation of 
reasoning, and thus, the formulation of relationships of trust among the various roles 
problematic. Trust is further constrained by the motivational characteristic of action, which is 
linked to the individuals’ personal interests (Giddens, 1979).  
 
The grey areas in the accountability relationship indicate that the reproduction of 
social/organisational systems can also have unintended consequences (Giddens, 1979; Baxter 
and Chua, 2003). The transformation of organisations is the outcome of a multilevel process 
that apart from rational choices is also shaped by the interests and commitments of 
individuals, the changes in the wider social environment, and the conflicts, tensions and 
                                                 
1 As it will be shown in the subsequent chapters in the case of the Hellenic Railway Organisation the 
strategic choices are affected by the EU, the World Bank, the Greek government, and all the relevant 
institutions implicated in the formulation of railway policies in Europe and in Greece.  
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politics existing and exercised within the inner organisational system (Pettigrew, 1987). This 
is why operational and strategic objectives are rather part of a wider organisational system 
that defines the way that participants communicate, exercise power and sanction or reward 
particular organisational behaviours (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
 
The study of the process of structuration within organisational systems reveals the way that 
agents understand social interaction between organizational members and their external 
environment and the way that agents cope with anxiety and uncertainty about the meaning 
that defines social conduct (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). The importance of the 
institutionalization of operational and business objectives is laid down in the specification of 
social roles and relationships it comes to control (Hasselblach and Kallinikos, 2000), a topic 
discussed in the coming section. 
3.4.  The utilisation of control and planning mechanisms in the 
formation of responsible relationships 
The distinction between action and intention is one that gives substantial meaning to the 
instrumental communication of organisational knowledge (Kallinikos and Cooper, 1996: 3). 
The use of business plans by the Greek Government in the state owned rail company 
provides a tool for evaluating organisational objectives and activities and as a consequence to 
enable the definition of roles and the rights that bound the organisational and institutional 
environment (Mackintosh and Scapens, 1990). Their incorporation as organisational 
structures in the Greek public sector intends to formulate certain relations and integrations 
that otherwise would have remained visual (Parker 2000). This why management accounting 
techniques cannot be characterised as neutral, since these techniques tend to facilitate the 
domination and legitimation of managing directors in state owned business organisations 
(Scapens and Mackintosh, 1996).  
 
More particularly, business plans, the elaboration of which in the Greek public sector 
constitute the research topic of the present thesis, were introduced as formal accountability 
structures in an effort to provide increased powers to the role of the managing director in 
order to alter the already established perceptions that define the operation of the SOE. More 
particularly the utilisation of strategic plans provides a useful tool in the process of the 
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“rationalisation” of PSE since they allow the “development and specification of abstract 
categories, the simplification of phenomena, and the formulation of patterned relations 
produce simplified and generalized structures…” (Townley, 2002: 176).  
 
The incorporation of strategic planning, introduces in PSE all the taken-for-granted notions 
of improved management competence and increased management accountability that 
legitimate managerial roles and thus ideas (Oakes et al, 1998; Townley, 2002). For that 
reason it can be further argued that their articulation in the public sector’s management, in 
addition attempts to de-legitimatise pre-existing ideas and roles (Pettigrew, 1987). Thus, 
business plans communicate normative rules that sanction or reward certain characteristics of 
organisational action and demonstrate the moral ground of the responsibility entrusted to 
management to commit an organisational system and its members to “contracts” with the 
external environment.  
 
Central to the process of analysis in the transformation of state owned enterprises is the role 
of the CEO, in relation to the existing organisational context and the efforts to establish 
relations of trust in order to secure the control of the intentional organisational action and its 
outcomes. However, that relationship cannot be perceived as being isolated from the external 
institutional environment and the expectations it imposes upon organisational roles. Locating 
actors within institutional environments means that their intensive action is subject to pre-
existing beliefs, and to rules and relations of power (Scott, 1983). That means that actors’ 
ability to introduce changes to organizational systems is shaped by pre-existing structures of 
interaction that delimit or attempt to delimit individuals’ action1, and as a consequence, to 
define the meaning of their role. The reaction to the exercise of power by the dominant 
group/individual in the accountability relationship is contingent upon the way that the 
dominant part in that relationship conceptualises its power. 
 
Seeing accountability solely as a hierarchical process which is identified as synonymous to 
control (Berry, 1989) restricts the meaning of accountability from a mutual dynamic 
                                                 
1 We must not forget that individuals have the ability to shape organizational structures. As a 
consequence, it is acknowledged that actor’s individual characteristics play a crucial role. 
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relationship to a unilateral exercise of power from those that have an authority thus, it 
becomes meaningless. Within a political process everybody is mutually accountable. The 
mutuality in an accountability relationship is restricted from the asymmetry of power within 
a social/organisational system (Kreiner, 1996). For that reason the possibilities of the 
accountability are determined by the diffusion of power between actors and groups of actors. 
This topic is discussed in the following section. 
3.4.1. Relations of power and domination in organisational contexts: the 
concept of dialectic of control  
Central to Gidden’s conceptual framework, is the notion of power, which is inherent in all 
human relationships. Power in Structuration theory is not seen as unidirectional process but 
rather as a dialectic relationship between the superordinates and the subordinates of an 
organisational system. Dialectic of control is used to describe the power that superordinates 
have by means of access to resources and authority but at the same time it describes the 
power that subordinates have to penetrate the conditions of organisational reproduction by 
having the ability to control the resources (Mackintosh and Scapens, 1990; Uddin and 
Tsamenyi, 2005; Conrad, 2005).  
 
The power of the subordinates operates as leverage to the power capabilities of the 
superordinates and results in the creation of relations of autonomy and dependency that 
restrict and at the same time enable1 organisational actors’ transformative capacity. In that 
                                                 
1 In that sense the analysis of managerial accounting as social and institutional practice under the 
structuration theory differentiates from structuralist, mainly Marxists approaches, that regard 
accounting as an element of the capitalistic system used to impose certain relations of power within 
organisational contexts (Toms, 2005: 628). According to that approach accounting is seen in relation 
to the capitalistic structures of our society. Hopper and Armstrong (1991), adopt the labour process 
approach to economic and industrial history, according to which the social and economic conflicts 
arising from the modes of control that characterise the different phases of the capitalistic development 
generate new control technologies that attempt to accommodate or even to eliminate social conflicts 
and the emerged implications in the process of establishing profitability objectives by corporations. In 
that sense the emergence of accountability is perceived as the outcome of capital socialisation and the 
increase dependence upon capital markets that require increase accountability for the use of the funds 
made available. However, “this tendency is not perceived to proceed historically in a straight line 
from opacity to transparency”, but rather it is the result of the increase “policing arrangements”. It is 
the outcome of a crisis in corporate profitability and the inability of managerial control to secure 
capital investors’ returns (Toms, 2005: 648). Consequently, financial accountability is the outcome of 
the contradictions and drawbacks of managerial control used to restrict labour force and to impose 
capitalistic interests. It is an objective situation that has to change radically. 
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sense dialectic of control is a crucial parameter in the formulation of accountability 
relationships within organisational systems and between the actors of an organisational 
system and the social, political, and financial institutions. Unless accountability relationships 
and the meaning of organisational conduct are socially constructed, accountability will fail to 
shape roles and responsibilities. It will fail to establish the significance of instrumental 
rationalisation and to define the meaning of social conduct.  
 
Scapens and Mackintosh (1996) make a very interesting point concerning the incorporation 
of dialectic control in the analysis of organisational interrelationships; the lack of goal 
congruence, within Agency theory, is seen as evidence of inefficient management control 
mechanisms. A conclusion that ineffectively leads to the application of new management 
control systems, based upon performance measurement and reward systems. Within the 
framework of structuration theory the very concept of goal congruence is challenged. The 
inability of agents to formulate common business goals is seen as the outcome of structural 
contradiction. Consequently, the application of new control mechanisms that enforce the 
power and domination of administrative managers, as it was made apparent in Chapter two, 
will result in greater resistance. As Scapens and Mackintosh (1996: 687) conclude, goal 
incongruent can “be beneficial to the extent that it enables managers to cope with 
hierarchical demands, while still accomplishing their productive potential”. 
 
In order for instrumental communication mechanisms to become a day-to-day accountability 
routine that will influence the patterns of on going organizational action, a monitoring 
mechanism must be put in place, which will collectively question the adequacy of existing 
ongoing practices, and which will justify the necessity for the implementation of new 
institutions to increase organizational efficiency (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Such a 
mechanism presupposes the existence of trust. In the case where no such monitoring 
mechanism exists that would enforce mutual understanding, intention becomes the unilateral 
expression of the will of the dominant actor in the accountability relationship, and as a result 
the rationality of instrumental mechanisms fail to become understood and accepted by actors 
as ongoing accountability mechanisms (Burns and Scapens, 2000). In that case, the meaning 
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of action is not determined by a morally established and trustful authority1, but by a loosely 
defined and non accountable authority that undertakes the responsibility to plan 
organisational action and setting organisational objectives. As a consequence, decision-
making becomes increasingly independent of trust and responsibility (Townley et al. 2003: 
1067). Managing directors’ inability to establish their legitimation in the context of state 
owned enterprises and to productively inform the ongoing organisational tensions is 
examined as the main reason that negatively affects the ability of organisational systems to 
operate effectively.  
 
To recapitulate, “Structuration Theory depicts the conditions governing the continuation and 
transmutation of structures and therefore the reproduction of social systems” (Giddens, 
1999: 86). Figure 3.1 that follows is based upon the Macintosh and Scapens (1990: 459) 
depiction of structuration process. However, for the purposes of the present study the figure 
is slightly different from that of Macintosh and Scapen’s. Figure 3.1 explicitly attempts to 
emphasise the argument that the elaboration of legitimate structures of organisational 
interaction is based upon the way these become embodied in the organisational context and 
influenced by the way actors perceive, and understand the new relationships, and roles. 
Values, norms, rules, and beliefs exist in the institutional environment and attempt to 
formulate the meaning of organisational knowledge, to define organisational conduct and to 
“identify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships” 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 96). These patterns of interaction attempt to construct 
accountability relationships that will delimit individual behaviour and will control 
organisational action according to the dominant rationality. Yet, at the same time, these are 
the product of the influence exercised by actors and collectives during organisational action 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 96). The use of double arrow connectors expresses the dialectic 
relationship. 
                                                 
1 Authority that establishes organisational objectives and actions, in interaction with organisational 
actors, whilst it takes into consideration the expectations of the social environment. 
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Coupled to the context, roles and rules, their ongoing reproduction is based upon the 
mobilisation of consciousness that repositions the relationship between acknowledged and 
unacknowledged conditions of action (by making visible certain dimensions) and change the 
patterns that define the formation of responsible relationships. Reflexivity and the demand 
for the agent to demonstrate his/her mastery upon new intentional objectives of conduct, is 
the critical condition in order for on going organisational action to change and to reposition 
the relationship between intended and unintended consequences of action. The ability of the 
organisational context (the systematic functioning of patterning relationships) to succeed in 
the intentional outcomes as these are defined by the legitimate structures and roles is the one 
that secures the trust of the institutional environment in the organisational system and its 
structures.  
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However, the dialectic relationship between the components that constitute figure 3.1, 
indicates that their action and pursuits is not coherent but rather conflicting. This means that 
agents have different and conflicting objectives that could become explicit or could remain 
implicit. Conflict and resistance within organisational life shows that the communication of 
organisational objectives does not operate outside the relations of power as these are 
constructed in terms of communication of the meaning and sanctions of social conduct 
(Giddens, 1979:82). As a result it can not be taken for granted that organisational objectives 
and, as a consequence, the targets of organisational control are unambiguous and accepted by 
all organizational actors. The importance of accountability lies upon its ability to 
communicate organizational objectives through the process of interaction.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to conceptualise the content of the managerial accountability 
reforms, in relation to the particular characteristics of the Greek social context in which they 
were introduced, a context that as it was mentioned in chapter two, traditionally has been 
characterised by the “difficulty with engaging in collective decision making” (Lavdas, 2006: 
85) The study focuses upon the structures of organisational action and interrelationships and 
it examines patterns of continuity and change in the accountability relationship. The lack of 
social dialogue in the Greek social context indicates a statism; an outcome of the state’s 
inability to alter the relations of power among the various interest groups (Lavdas, 2006: 85). 
The interesting issue to be examined is the way that patterns of continuity between the 
various social groups have been affected by the challenges imposed by the European 
environment. For that purpose the present thesis examines the way that strategic and 
operational plans, initiated after European Commission’s demand, are coupled to the context 
of the Hellenic Railway Organisation and have managed to mobilise agents’ discursive 
consciousness and capabilities.  
 
The need to depict the way that strategic and operational plans are implicated in the ongoing 
organisational action and influenced the structuration process also defines the research 
strategy adopted by the current analysis. That topic is discussed in the following section. 
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3.5.  Research Methods and Sources  
In order for the researcher to depict the norms and rules that govern the structuration process 
in the Greek railway company, case study analysis emerges as the most appropriate method 
of empirical research. Moreover, the adoption of case study as a method of analysis is fuelled 
by the need to understand how the organisational context and the wider institutional 
environment are interrelated in the process of structuration. According to Yin (1994: 13) “a 
case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context”.  
 
There are a numerous studies that support the adequacy of case studies in accounting and 
management accounting research (Otley, 1990; Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Otley and 
Berry, 1994; Ogden, 1995; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996; Potter, 2005; Cooper and Morgan, 
2008). For example, Langfield and Smith (1997: 221) argue that, in contrast to empirical 
forms of research that are based upon the statistical analysis of large and extensive 
populations, which fail to capture the dynamic nature of human relationships and therefore 
present a static view of the relationship between management control and strategy, case study 
research offers the “potential for a deeper examination of the process involved in that 
relationship”. In contrast to generalisations and simplifications of the empirical observations, 
case studies, through the development of theoretical frameworks provide a holistic research 
approach to the understanding of organisational systems (Ryan et al, 2003).  
 
The use of case studies, as a method of empirical research, can be identified in functionalist, 
structuralist and interpretive studies1 as well as in studies that adopt structuration as a 
                                                 
1 The analysis is based upon Hopper and Powell’s (1995) taxonomy of accounting research (Ryan et 
al, 2002). The analysis draws upon Burrell’s and Morgan’s (1979) classification of the dialectic 
relationship between social structure and agency that defines a researcher’s personal stance over the 
restrictions that social structures impose on agents’ action. Functionalist approaches perceive social 
world as objective. Researchers adopt functionalist tradition have no intention to change social order, 
which is perceived as granted. Their effort is to understand the way the objective social world 
functions by identifying casual relationships. On the other hand structuralism (mainly draws upon the 
ideas of Marx and the Frankfurt School) understands social structures mainly as a constrained to 
human action. Thus researchers following that approach aim to radically change social structure. 
Finally the interpretive approach aims to understand social relationships (the interaction between 
object and subject) and through that understanding the necessary changes to be introduced. It 
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framework of analysis. However, the aim of the use of case studies in functional research is 
quite distinct from that of the other traditions. Within functional research the use of case 
studies aims to generate assumptions that will be tested in large-scale statistical studies 
targeting to generate or to extend theories (Kaplan, 1986). In contrast to functional studies, 
theory falsification is not the objective for the present work. Hence searching for 
“representative” case studies is not seen as the right strategy (Ryan, et al, 2002).  
 
The selection of OSE as a case study was made upon the belief that the case directly 
addresses the research issues. OSE in a period of five years (2003-2008) became the state-
owned organisation, with the higher financing deficit in Europe (Tzanavara, 2010). Twelve 
years (1996-2008) after managerial accountability reforms were introduced in the Greek 
social context, the company’s rapidly increasing operational and non-operational deficits and 
its inability to realise its strategic potentials, raises the issue of the appropriateness of the 
implementation of strategic and operational plans as forms of instrumental accountability. As 
the following statement quotes made in a Greek radio station1 by the Minister of Transport 
who has the responsibility for the company’s operational and administrative control (trans.):   
“OSE is the most problematic state-owned enterprise, whilst many accusations 
concerning the company’s mismanagement exist…” (Xatzidakis, July 10 2008). 
The design of the research approach is discussed in the following section. 
3.5.1. Pilot Research  
“Good case research begins with a careful research design” that must include a well 
justified set of research questions, criteria for interpreting the findings and in addition the 
careful choice of the research participants (Cooper, 2005: 171). For that reason the research 
strategy has been divided in three main parts. In the first part a preliminary research was 
                                                                                                                                                       
becomes understood that from that classification structuration theory is attributed to one of the above 
three categories. Due to its interpretive character many authors tend to consider structuration analysis 
as part of the interpretive tradition (Ryan, et al, 2002). However, as Scapens and Mackintosh (1996), 
argue it is not accurate to consider structuration analysis as part of the interpretive tradition, the 
voluntaristic character of which, privileges agents’ interpretations in the production of social reality. 
In Structuration theory structure and agency presuppose one another (Scapens and Mackintosh, 1996: 
688). For that reason Structuration analysis is seen as distinct from interpretive studies.       
1 In Greek: “Αθήνα 9.84” 
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conducted the main objective of which was to understand the way that the company’s 
managers perceive the notion of accountability. The second objective of the preliminary 
research was to depict the perception that managers have of the role of the CEO in the 
organisational context, whilst the third was to identify the impact of strategic and business 
objectives in the day-to-day managerial and operational action. An additional task was to 
identify the active participants, meaning those managers willing to contribute to the research 
and mainly those managers that have had a critical role in influencing company’s operational 
and strategic objectives (Barrett et al, 2005). Even though, considerable effort was made to 
interview the managers and supervisors of the financial, accounting and administrative 
departments, something like that was not always feasible. Consequently at this stage of the 
research, the selection of the participants, up to a point was random.  
 
The preliminary research lasted for a period of one month between August 10 2005 and 
September 11 2005, whilst nine departmental managers and a former General Director who 
was also at that time a member of the BoD, participated (see appendix 3.1). In an effort to 
prioritise research questions and objectives structured interviews were chosen as the most 
appropriate method of engagement for the data selection. All the interviews took place in the 
organisation’s headquarters in Athens. The duration of the interviews was one hour (1h) to a 
maximum, one and a half hour (1.30h). The interviews were not recorded but notes were 
taken and transcribed later on the same day. 
 
As Mason (1996: 42) mentions good qualitative interviewing is hard, creative work, the 
demands of which I will add, are not realised unless the researcher gets involved with it. 
While a great effort in the pre-interview process was dedicated to formulate a set of six 
questions, for forty-five minute interviews the result was that these could only be used as a 
general framework of discussion. The major difficulty was the definition of the notion of 
accountability and more over, the way that systems of management control and planning can 
be implicated in the accountability process. This is why the concept of responsibility was 
elaborated as a more appropriate notion in order to replace the one of accountability and to 
make the conversations meaningful.  
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An important point is that in some interviews the interviewees felt annoyed by the use of the 
word “accountability” and even more to the question “to whom do you feel accountable for 
your actions and decisions”. Indicative of that is the reaction of one of the company’s senior 
managers. During the interview, when the researcher explained to him the purpose of the 
study and the importance of his participation, his answer was:  
“go and discuss the managerial accountability issue with the Chairman [of the board of 
directors] and if he answers to you then come back so we can discuss it together, 
otherwise I am not discussing anything”.  
However, in contrast to the previous manager, many of the interviewees welcomed the 
interviews as an emanicipating opportunity offering them the ability to air views that they 
had long held. The period during which the pilot and the main research occurred was a 
transitional period for the company. As will be elaborated in subsequent chapters this was the 
period when OSE was transformed from a single company to a group of companies. 
Consequently, all the interviewees were expressing anxiety caused to them by the changes 
incurred in the company at the time and their effects on them. Since one of the objectives of 
the preliminary research was to depict the way that the operational and strategic plans had 
been incorporated in organisational action, since they were first introduced as frameworks of 
instrumental accountability in 1996, the tendency of the interviewees to concentrate the 
discussion in the period after 2003 was initially perceived by the researcher as a drawback to 
the research objectives. However, that turned out to be an advantage, since the researcher 
overall gained a valuable understanding of the organisational conditions influencing the 
patterns of interrelationships between organisational actors and the wider institutional 
environment. More important however, was the realisation of the fact that this period was a 
critical one in the company’s structuration process, where the traditional norms and rules that 
had been influenced the patterns of organisational interaction were challenged. Consequently, 
the result was to understand, how intra-organisational tensions and accountability were 
affected by the efforts made by the management to implement the formulated changes and to 
strategically position the company in the environment created by the new conditions.  
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3.5.2. Main Research 
The second, main part of the investigation took place a year after the plot study and it lasted 
for almost four months, between June 15, 2006 and October 20, 2006. Interviews were again 
the main source of data collection, along with a big number of internal and public reported 
documents. During the four months period, forty-five interviews were conducted (see 
appendix 3.2). Each interview was recorded and transcribed on the same day. 
 
The interview participants included CEOs, management and operational administrators, and 
employees. In addition members of the BoD, and employees’ representatives in the industrial 
union participated in the investigation. Furthermore, the research included interviews with 
previously appointed CEOs and executives as well as two representatives of “Friends of the 
Railway Association” an active social group, intended to promote the development of train 
services in Greece. In addition an interview appointment was arranged with a representative 
of the “Managing Authority” the responsible body for the control of the efficient and 
transparent implementation of the investments in Greek rail industry co-funding by the 
European Union and the Greek government through, the second and the third Community 
Support Frameworks. Due to the integrated and important role of the contracted management 
consultants in the ongoing managerial action and decision making and more over, after the 
encouragement of the then company’s CEO, the researcher arranged and conducted 
interviews with representatives from two, of the active management consulting companies1 
(during that period in the organisation). Both companies were implicated in the formulation 
of the (2006-2007) strategic plan to disaggregate the company. 
 
In order to overcome the difficulties faced in the pilot research, with the employment of 
structured interviews, this time a different strategy was selected. Thus, the conversations with 
the interviewees were loosely structured. In that sense the interviews were not orientated to 
ask the same questions (see appendix 3.3) to all the interviewees in order to verify and 
compare facts but rather they were attempting to explore the various perceptions that 
organisational actors had formed and consequently to create a clearer picture of the structures 
                                                 
1 Both required confidentiality to be kept with respect to the firms they were representing. 
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influence their actions (Hoque, et al 2004). Ferreira and Merchant (1992: 14) as well as Yin 
(1994: 84) argue that this method of interview is most commonly used in case studies.  
 
However, from observations made during the interviews it was apparent that regardless of the 
type of questions (structured, semi-structured or open questions) the direction of the 
conversation was controlled by the interviewees and not by the interviewer. More precisely it 
was the quality, the personality and the initiative of the interviewee to contribute to the 
research that defined the type of the interview strategy that the interviewer followed. Thus, 
the researcher must always be ready to motivate the participant but in addition to give him 
the time and space to express his or her perceptions and opinions. The ability of the 
interviewer to understand the personality of the interviewee and to adjust his/her strategy 
accordingly is supported to be just one aspect of the communication between researcher and 
participant. The other important aspect is the interviewer’s ability to make sense of the 
circumstances and experiences of the participant and to ask meaningful to him questions 
(Mayson, 1996: 45). Furthermore, an additional aspect is the ability of the researcher to gain 
the trust of the participant and to infuse to him the importance of his participation and 
contribution to the study. 
  
In order to secure the above conditions, prior to each interview, questionnaires were 
distributed to the participants so they could gain an understanding of the research issues. 
Completed questionnaires were to be returned to the researcher prior the interviews. 
Certainly, that was not a practice that always worked out, since many of the participants had 
not spent the necessary time to complete the questionnaire prior to the interview. But even 
when they were providing the questionnaires after the discussion it was a valuable 
contribution, since they revealed individuals’ perceptions that could be verified and better 
understood. The questionnaire as a form of research approach was complementary to the 
interviews and its purpose was not to measure and to statistically analyse the provided 
answers, but rather to involve the participants with the research concepts and to help them 
understand and become familiar with notions such as accountability.  
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For that reason it was not given to all of the participants but it was rather directed to low, 
middle and high rank managers, within the company’s establishment, all of whom were rail 
employees working under permanent employment agreement in the railway company. The 
questionnaire was not given to the appointed CEOs, the members of the board of directors, 
employees’ representatives and managers from OSE’s subsidiary companies who contributed 
to the research by providing interviews and related material for example documents, internal 
notes and publications they have done.  
 
The thirty four questions (see appendix 3.4) developed for the purposes of the questionnaire 
were based upon the questions first developed by Swierenga and Moncur (1975) and 
subsequently used by Hoque and Hopper (1997) to measure managers’ perceptions of 
budgeted related activities in the nationalised Jute mills of Bangladesh. However, the 
questions were modified in order to meet the needs of the present study. More particularly 
the questionnaire aimed to satisfy the following objectives: 
i. To display the level of managers’ agreement or disagreement with the statement that the 
strategic objectives are the outcome of organisation’s expectations or they are the 
outcome of the expectations imposed by the institutional environment;  
ii. To display the level of managers’ agreement or disagreement with the statement that the 
operational strategies aim to make the organisation more efficient, transparent and 
accountable for the operational outcome; 
iii. To display the level of their agreement or disagreement with the statement that the 
formulation of the operational objectives and strategies of each 
department/administration are the outcome of a collective process in which they 
participate and express an opinion; 
iv. To display the level of their understanding of the operational targets and strategies; 
v. To display the level of their agreement or disagreement with the statement that he/she 
provides accounts for the efficient implementation of the operational objectives; 
vi. To display the level of their agreement or disagreement with the statement that his/her 
performance is evaluated according to the successful implementation of the objectives 
set; 
  61
vii. To display the level of their agreement or disagreement with the statement that the 
implementation of operational objectives is the outcome of collective action and 
collaboration; 
viii. To display the level of their agreement or disagreement with the statement that 
performance measurements make their work more efficient. 
 
Albeit, questionnaires fail to capture the multiple rules and norms that shape the patterns of 
organisational action and moreover, the way they affect the interrelationship between the 
organisational context and the wider institutional environment. Hence, questionnaire 
participants conceptualised strategic and operational objectives independently from other 
structural properties influencing organisational action. For that reason questionnaires were 
not elaborated in the analysis process. They were just used in the study as a focus for 
discussion during the interviews.  
 
An additional reason, for not using the questionnaires in the analysis process was the 
symbolic meanings attached to strategic and operational objectives (Model, 2001: 442). 
While the questionnaire aimed to demonstrate the way that strategic and operational plans 
have been implicated in the day-to-day action and how managers perceive their role as part 
of their organisational routine, many of them were expressing their view according to their 
understandings on the way they should have been used. The realisation of the particular 
contradiction during the interview sessions, gave interviewees the opportunity to emphasise 
the way that they actually perceived the conditions influencing ongoing action. Many of them 
began their interviews saying: “I understand what you are saying [in the provided 
questionnaire], however these are not applying to organisational reality, which is…” This is 
why, the method proved to be very effective since, it gave managers the ability to gain an 
overall understanding of the issues under discussion and to express their opinions whilst at 
the same time feeling able to contribute to the study. This is why many times during the 
interviews, the interviewees stopped their narrative to ask me if their answer was relevant to 
the question and helpful to my research. Moreover, many times, they purposefully were 
provoking discussions with other managers and employees in an effort to demonstrate the 
true conditions in which organisational action had taken place. In addition they were 
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providing the researcher with valuable internal knowledge that otherwise would have been 
very difficult to obtain. During these interviews a large number of internal documents were 
gathered. Private archives, press publications as well as laws and regulations of the Greek 
State and the European Union were important sources of information.  
 
Further evidence was gathered from a short trip1 made to Athens on 1st February, 2006 when 
the researcher attended the presentation of the results of the survey made in cooperation by 
the Economic University of Athens and the auditing company Grant Thornton, on the level 
of the incorporation of the Corporate Governance Principles by the listed in the Athens Stock 
Exchange companies and the SOE. In that presentation the then CEO of OSE gave a speech 
where he discussed the way that, OSE as a state owned company implements the corporate 
governance principles as these are defined by law 3016 of 2002 “Principles of Corporate 
Governance”.  
 
During the writing up stage of the thesis, in an effort to understand the consequences of the 
implemented changes in the organisational context, a further two interviews and four 
telephone conversations were conducted. Managers and employees were open and friendly 
always willing to answer to researcher’s questions. For that reason it was not difficult for the 
researcher to go back and ask for additional information.  
 
While case study as a method of research in management accounting can make substantial 
contributions to the study of accounting systems in organisations (e.g. Hopwood, 1983; 
Otley, 1984; Hopper & Powell, 1985 Scapens, 1990) it also has limitations and critics that 
are discussed in the following section. 
3.6.  Disadvantages and arguments against the use of case studies 
The most critical challenge of the use of empirical research within the framework of 
Structuration theory emanates from its foundations. While Giddens reject the argument that 
                                                 
1 The researcher is particularly obliged to OSE’s CEO, Mr Chionis for his mediation with Grant 
Thornton and to Professor Refenes, of the Economic University of Athens, who invited him to the 
event and covered the expenses. 
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his approach to structuration is too abstract, in order to be relevant for empirical research, he 
accepts, that his theory was not intended to be used as method of research, or even as a 
methodological approach (Giddens, 1994: 293). Consequently within the framework of 
Structuration theory, the basic critique exercised in case studies, for the lack of theoretical 
generalisation that will explain social relations, becomes even more important. According to 
Chenhall (2003: 160) the claim of case study researchers, that configurations of power are 
well understood and illustrated, often is based upon the use of sociological theories that are 
often “ill structured that regularities cannot be meaningfully represented” and consequently 
generalities cannot be produced.  
 
While the aim of the research, as has already been mentioned, is not to make generalisations, 
their absence makes the research validity problematic. The interpretive and subjective 
character of the research emphasises the problem of researcher bias (Ryan et al, 2003). For 
that reason a large number of investigators, mainly emanating from normative approaches to 
research, regard case studies as less desirable form of empirical research (Yin, 1994). In 
interpretive and structural studies, theory plays a central role and overlaps with observation 
(Hopper and Powel, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996). However, 
Gidden’s dislike with the way that Structuration has been elaborated in empirical work, leads 
him to suggest that Structuration theory should be “utilised in a selective way and should be 
seen more as a sensitising device than as providing detailed guidelines for research 
procedure” (Giddens, 1994: 294).  
 
However, while Giddens warns about the possible pitfalls of empirical research, mainly 
related to the interpretation of research results and the lack of explanatory generalisations, he 
does not exhaust the possibilities, of even small scale ethnographic work to reach valuable 
conclusions about the structuration process. Conrad (2005: 4) argues that the incorporation of 
Structuration Theory provides a framework that makes it possible for the social researcher to 
make sense of the way that social structures have influenced management control in public 
sector enterprises, and consequently case studies can contribute to the understanding not only 
of the changes that take place at organisational, but at the wider social level as well.  
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Many researchers in order to overcome the validity problem adopt a form of triangulation 
research approach, that includes both qualitative and quantitative analysis (Yin, 1994; Hoque 
and Hopper, 1994; 1997; Caramanis, 1996). However, as has already been discussed, the 
present thesis considers that quantitative analysis of the perceptions identified in the 
questionnaires used would not contribute to study’s validity since the static nature of a 
questionnaire makes it irrelevant in analysing the patterns of continuity and change in the 
ongoing organisational interaction and accountability. In order to overcome the validity 
problem and the emergent critique, the multiple sources of data that have been collected 
during the research stage aim to provide a rich description of the social and organisational 
settings and of the structures that influence actors’ interaction (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005). 
The purpose is to put the reader of the thesis in a position to develop alternative explanations 
of the findings (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992) whilst, comparisons with additional case 
studies can provide a solution to the problem of generalisations.  
 
Following Humphrey and Scapens, (1996: 99) argument, from such a perspective the 
incorporation of structuration theory is used both for interpreting the context of the Hellenic 
Railway Organisation and convincing for the validity of the findings and interpretations. The 
objective is to critically evaluate the established assumptions, about the incorporation of 
management accounting techniques for accountability purposes into the Greek public sector 
and to further develop knowledge over the effects that managerial accountability reforms 
have on the way that roles formulate meaningful organisational relationships.   
3.7. Conclusion  
The main purpose of this chapter was to develop the argument that the meaning of 
accountability relationships is socially formulated; an outcome of the ongoing interaction 
between agents. Accountability bounds the rationality of organisational action but at the 
same time it enables the formulation of meaningful relationships between social roles. 
Accountability becomes meaningful when agents’ purposive action and its outcomes become 
observable and reportable in those ways that can be understood by those actors that share 
common meanings and target to accomplish common objectives. The formulation of 
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commonsense patterns of social action enables collective control and it attempts to restrict 
the implications of potential unintended consequences, derived from agents’ action.  
 
This particular conceptualisation is the product of the use of structuration theory as that has 
been developed by Giddens and introduced the notion of duality that characterises the 
relationship between structure and agents. Social systems are constituted by social structures 
that through the incorporation of structural properties define the way that agents interrelate 
and integrate while at the same time their meaning is influenced by actors’ action. Within the 
framework of Structuration Theory the normative approach to the managerial accountability 
relationship is challenged. The application of managerial accounting mechanisms in the 
management of the state owned enterprises is not perceived as an adequate condition to 
empower the newly introduced role of the CEO to alter the rationality of organisational 
action towards financial performance objectives.  
 
The efficient incorporation of strategic and operational plans in state owned organisations 
depends upon their use as structures that communicate the CEO’s competency and establish 
relations of trust over his responsibility to efficiently change the patterns of organisational 
interaction and the already existing relations of power. Established responsibility secures the 
necessary legitimation for executive management to gain the authority to demand reasons for 
conduct. However, it presupposes that senior managers are in a position to provide accounts 
for the rationality underlying their decisions and actions to their subordinates. This is why 
accountability is relevant only in structures of signification and legitimation, an outcome of 
the tensions that emerge during the process of rationalisation of the flow of purposive action 
and the redefinition of the norms that sanction and reward certain sets of actions and 
behaviours. However structures of signification and legitimation cannot be understood 
independently from structures of power. Within the framework of structuration theory the 
ability of the subordinates to penetrate and to influence the conditions of the structuration 
process is regarded by the present thesis as a precondition for the utilisation of strategic and 
operational plans as structures of signification.  
 
  66
Even though, a substantial problem exists that is linked to the inability of social actors to 
provide accounts for all the dimensions of their actions. The articulation of reasoning is 
bounded due to actors’ limited discursive capabilities and in addition due to individualistic 
interests that are not defined by the common knowledge shared by the members of a social 
system. The accountability gap results in unacknowledged conditions of action that lead to 
unintentional outcomes and intraorganisational conflicts.  
 
The research design that was developed in order to examine the aforementioned research 
objectives was explained in the second part of this chapter where a detailed description of the 
research methods was provided and the implications/difficulties emerged during that process. 
The participants in the research, the sampling design, the research instruments used and the 
administration of the survey were discussed. The thesis argues that the single case study 
adopted as a research method constitutes the most appropriate approach in outlining the 
specific research objective, and it also acknowledged its basic limitations and justified the 
precautions taken in order to overcome these problems. 
 
The following chapter discusses the changes in the European rail industry and their effect 
upon the national settings. 
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4. Chapter - European Rail Industry in search of efficiency 
4.1. Introduction  
Two main conclusions were drawn from the literature review. The first conclusion is that 
there is insufficient evidence to justify the efficiency claims of the reforms towards 
managerial accountability in the public sector. Consequently the wider acceptance of these 
reforms are seen as the result of the influence exercised by the institutional environment in an 
attempt to delimit organisational action and to define organisational roles by imposing 
particular rationalities the validity of which is taken for granted. This argument constitutes 
the second conclusion.  
 
Before starting the analysis of the Greek Railway Organisation it will be useful to give a 
short introduction to the nature of railway service and the particular characteristics of that 
industry which have influenced the development of certain structures of ownership and 
control and make railway companies worthwhile as case studies. The purpose of this chapter 
is to trace the conditions that have influenced the development of organisational structures in 
the railway industry, an industry that world-wide, is mainly run by state-owned enterprises. 
For that reason the layout of this chapter begins with an outline of the way that the rail 
industry has developed and a discussion of the factors that have influenced that development. 
In addition, the recent changes to the European railway industry will by presented in order to 
gain a better understanding of the conditions that influence the operation of the Greek 
Railway Organisation. More particularly, this chapter will focus on the effects of the external 
environment upon railway organisations, the implications of that upon the operational and 
financial conditions and the efforts for their modernisation. Particular attention is paid to the 
fact that ownership (whether state or private) is still a contentious issue for the European rail 
industry.  
 
More over, the discussion will emphasise the particular role of the nation-state both in the 
development of railway networks and of railway services and in the fact that the railway 
industry and its efficiency is interwoven with less individualised forms of economic and 
social activity. As a consequence the role of the institutional environment emerges as a 
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crucial factor in influencing the meaning of action, roles and accountability relationships in 
railway companies. 
4.2. Factors affecting the financial and managerial efficiency of the rail 
industry 
Any railway company has as its primary function the provision of transportation for people 
and freight between different destinations. In that sense the activities of a railway company 
are the same as those of companies that provide transport services (passengers and freight) 
through the air (airlines), the road networks (busses and lorries) and the sea (ships). The 
difference between the railway service providers and the other sectors of the transport 
industry is that the railway companies can undertake various methods of transportation, each 
with their own characteristics and market1. That means that a railway service provider has to 
cope with different requirements of the development of the services and the competition2 in 
each of these markets. Furthermore, the provision of railway services is a very demanding 
and complex task since it requires day-to-day maintenance of the availability of relevant 
subsystems like the train engines and wagons, as well as the maintenance of the rail track, the 
buildings (e.g. railway stations) and telecommunication (e.g. signalling).  
 
The complex nature of railway services, which demands the cooperation and coordination of 
multiple subsystems, as well as the geographical extent of the railway business, makes it a 
unique case study. No other transport industry has at the same time the obligation to develop 
and maintain its infrastructure and at the same time to provide successful (in terms of 
financial, time and safety efficiency) services (Paradisopoulos, 1989). As a consequence 
issues of coordination and control are extremely important to the provision of railway 
services in terms of the safety of the transportation service, and to its economic effectiveness 
and operational efficiency. However, the rail industry has not been considered a model of 
                                                 
1 The number of the services varies according to customers’ needs. These might be high speed 
intercity services or frequent community services or rural services or even the provision of railway 
services for social purposes (isolated areas or areas with low economic interest). Freight services 
might vary from services provided to big customers who might own their own wagon-fleet to small 
customers who might want to transfer small parcels. 
2 Competition to railway transport is subject to the modes of transportation that historically its 
country has developed. As competitors can be recognized the sea, air and road transport 
companies and pipelines.  
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financial and managerial efficiency and the particular conditions, under which railway 
companies operate, have resulted in the accumulation of big financial deficits which have 
imposed the need for their reorganisation and reconstruction.  
 
During the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century trains were the 
main means of transportation for both passengers and freight. The ‘Railways Problem’ (this 
is how it was characterised by the World Bank in 1992) can be traced back in the early 1950s 
(after the Second World War) when the importance of the railway industry to the western1 
economies had declined and there was no incentive for private capital to invest in the 
industry. Investments in fixed assets (railway infrastructure, control and communication 
systems) became expensive for private capital and as a result efforts to redevelop the railway 
networks and services came solely from the state, but governmental priorities typically lay 
elsewhere at this time. 
 
With technological advances, in the aerospace and automobile industries, western 
governments’ main strategic objective was to invest massively in these sectors (new airports, 
roads and ports) at the expense of railways (Mourmouris, 2005). In most western countries, 
personal income gradually increased and made it more affordable for middle and low class 
households to have their own private car and to use airplanes for long-distance journeys 
(trains used to dominate long-distance journeys). Only a small portion of governments’ 
investment was directed towards research and development in the railway industry. Later, the 
need for more sophisticated and complex services, like door-to-door and just-in-time 
deliveries that demand multiple pick-ups and drop off points, created requirements that the 
railway industry was unable to accommodate. Furthermore, the dependence upon petroleum 
products of the developing car industry and linked industries (such as the road construction 
companies and car tyre manufacturers) had created a strong economic lobby influencing 
governmental strategies so that the rail industry was further marginalised in the global 
economy (Sarigiannis, 1993). 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the decline of the railway industry in the former communist countries was 
delayed until the 1990s when the market reforms started taking place (Perkins, 2002) 
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The railway business most affected was freight transport. For example in 1974 passengers’ 
usage counted for 55% of the total revenue of UK railways whilst in 1994 it accounted for up 
to 71% of total revenue due to the decline in freight. The freight business was and still is 
crucially affected by the economic cycle. For example in the UK the declining importance of 
coal and steel to UK economy had major effects upon the railway industry (Shaoul, 2004). 
This decline is a general trend that has characterised the European (and other) railway 
industries, which within a period of thirty years (1970 – 2000) has seen shrinking of its total 
transport share equal to 40% of the passenger usage and 60% in parcels and freight business 
(COM, 2010). Comparing the railway industry to road transport companies (buses & 
coaches, cars and two wheels vehicles) the latter now takes 84% of the passenger transport 
compared with 7% for rail (5.8% rail and 1.2% tram and underground) while in freight 
business1 the railways takes 10% of the goods transport compared with 44% by the road 
transport industry (the rest market share is split among the other means of transport). 
Furthermore in the period 1995 – 2004, when the transport sector rapidly increased its 
importance to the European economy, the European rail industry had the smallest share of 
that increase both in passenger and freight transport services (EUROSTAT, 2007). 
 
The inability of the railway companies not only in Europe but world-wide to compete and the 
low financial support2 from the governments forced the management of these organisations 
to borrow the necessary funds to enable the continuation of their operations.  
‘‘Separated from market signals by fiat and/or politics and overwhelmed by the 
challenge of day-to-day control of what is always a quasi-military operating 
organisation, the rail culture inexorably focused on running trains and producing ton-
km and passenger-km, while struggling to maintain track and rolling stock with 
unpredictable and increasingly inadequate funding’’ (Thomson, 2003:312) 
                                                 
1 ‘‘The European Commission frequently extrapolates the trends to show rail freight transport 
disappearing in 20 years time. This will not happen, but reflects real concerns that rail is losing 
markets because its quality of service is relatively poor and its labour productivity relatively low’’ 
(Perkins, 2002: 6) 
2 All European Governments finance railways. The provided funds aim to compensate the railway 
companies for the geographic coverage of the network, the frequency and speed of services. The 
theoretical ground justifying the provision of financial subsidies lies upon the perception that the long 
asset lives and the large sunk costs that characterise the investments in the rail industry and are not 
perceived as optimal for a private company. 
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These policies resulted in the creation of such high financial deficits1 (see table, 4.1) that it is 
considered impossible for the railway companies to repay them and this undermined their 
future development (UIC, 1992). 
Table 4.1: Historical debts of European rail companies (Source: Perkins 2005) 
  1994 Railway 
debts (million 
ECU) 
1994 Rail debt in 
% GDP 
Austria 28921 1.7
Belgium 3539 1.8
Denmark 2782 2.3
Finland 166 0.2
France 28731 2.6
Germany 5795 0.3
Greece 9371 1.1
Ireland 323 0.7
Italy 42067 4.9
Luxembourg 168 1.4
Netherlands 2807 1.0
Portugal 1529 2.1
Spain 8140 2.0
Sweden 1958 1.2
UK 10709 1.2
TOTAL 112543
Defined by the neo-liberal perception of the role of the state in economic development the 
World Bank perceives that the financial crisis in the railway industry is the result of state 
                                                 
1For example the Japanese National Railway Company, which for a period of twenty years suffered 
from chronic losses (1967 – 1987). Before the company was broken up and privatised in 1987 (Kasai, 
2001) the total accumulated debt exceeded the US$ 286 billion caused by annual losses approaching 
US$ 18 billion (Thomson, 1992). 
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intervention that has restricted the ability of the railway companies to adapt to the new 
conditions imposed by the technological advancements and market competition. State 
ownership and control, is decisive, more or less, in all countries (apart from USA) and it is 
seen as causation for the disorientation of management from business objectives towards 
political imperatives. For that reason the quality of services provided by the railway 
companies is inadequate for customers’ needs and for that reason they are under priced. 
 
An additional factor that has restricted the competitive position of rail enterprises is the high 
labour cost, which for most railway companies is the largest part of total operating cost. 
Apart from the US rail companies and the Chinese Railway Organisation few of the rest of 
the world’s railways have a labour cost-to-revenue ratio that it is between the 50% and 100% 
whilst in Europe the same ratio tends to reach 80% and 120% while in some cases it is well 
above the 200%. That ratio means that one Euro of revenue costs approximately one Euro or 
more, in labour alone (Thomson, 2003). For that reason all the efforts for the modernisation 
of the railway industry around the world sought the reduction of the labour force. For 
example the reorganisation of the Japanese Railway Company (JNR) resulted in a reduction 
of the number of employees by 34%. In Canada the National Rail in the period 1990 to 1997 
reduced the number of employees by 28%. The pressure exerted by industrial unions1 against 
efforts to change work rules to boost productivity, as well as strict regulations are considered 
as a major reason for the difficulties of the railway companies to adapt to new market 
conditions.  
 
Governments eventually responded to the decline of the railway industry for two main 
reasons: firstly because of the high deficits that railway companies had accumulated and 
secondly due to the increased importance of the railway industry in the creation of a social 
                                                 
1 The modernisation of railway companies focuses upon the reduction of the labour cost and 
consequently governments have introduced a number of redundancy schemes. A common practice 
followed by railway companies is a gradual attrition of the labour force. This policy has the negative 
effect that the loss of labour force is not replaced by younger people with newer skills. In cases where 
the organisation is at the edge of financial collapse more active labour redundancy programmes are 
adopted in order to improve efficiency and labour productivity ratio 
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and naturally sustainable environment1 (train as a means of transportation is considered more 
eco-friendly than air and road transportation). Focusing upon the European railway industry 
which provides the wider context of the Hellenic railway industry, these changes have had 
two strategic directions; in order to make railways more competitive to passenger and freight 
service the first strategic direction has aimed to redirect rail services towards combined 
transportation systems and to the development of high speed networks; whilst the second 
objective has been to change the structural elements of the provision of rail services and to 
introduce new forms of management and competition in the European railway industry.  
4.3. Reforms in the European Rail Industry  
Whilst many countries have pursued their own rail reform agendas, driven by the national 
priorities and characteristics, related to the role of the rail industry in the economic settings of 
each country, the EU has also played a major role in influencing change and the formulation 
of national strategies. While changes differ significantly2 from country to country the general 
trend is towards ‘‘a single model of competing train operators using a network run by 
separate infrastructure managers’’ (Perkins, 2002: 6).  
 
The objectives of EU transport policy are defined in the 1996 and 2001 White Papers COM, 
1996 and COM, 2001 major objectives of which have been the provision of efficient and 
effective transportation systems that will enhance the mobility of people and business 
throughout Europe and at the same time promote, environmental (e.g. the environmental 
targets agreed in the Tokyo summit) and social sustainability (mobility will bring economic 
growth and employment). The European strategy for the development and the modernisation 
of the railway industry was first defined by ED 91/440EC and later by the so called ‘Rail 
                                                 
1 ‘‘…on average, passenger rail currently emits approximately half the carbon dioxide per passenger 
kilometre of cars and around a quarter that of domestic air-travel. Since 1995/6, passenger rail has 
improved its position substantially: average emissions per passenger km falling by an estimated 22% 
compared to an 8% reduction from car traffic and 5% increase from domestic air-travel’’ (ATOC, 13th 
March 2007).  
2 Complete separation in private companies (Great Britain); holding company (Germany and Italy); 
infrastructure managers and railway companies set-up as separate companies with different 
executives (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal and Norway); hybrids where 
railway infrastructure financing is separated but infrastructure and operating activities remain under 
one entity (France, Austria); separate division within an integrated company (Belgium, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxemburg) (NERA, 2004)  
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Packages’ introduced in 2001 and 2004 (see figure 4.1). The rail packages are an explicit 
model that influences the formation of certain patterns of interaction and integration between 
national railway industries and their institutional environment. Aiming to create a single 
European rail market the introduced changes promote the liberalisation of the European rail 
industry and the abolition of national states’ monopolies. For that reason the introduced EDs 
establish, rules and conditions that raise the geographical, technical and technological 
barriers in order to create competition and interoperability between the different national rail 
networks. Opening up the railway industry to regulated competition was intended to attract 
companies “from other backgrounds, with solid experience of logistics and inter-modal 
integration” the arrival of which is expected to increase competition and to improve the 
quality of services (COM, 2001: 27). The aim of the European Commission is competition to 
impose radical changes in the ongoing patterns of managerial and operational action and to 
redefine the relationship of the state owned railway companies with their institutional 
environment.  
Figure 4.1: European Directives defining the liberalisation of the European Rail Industry  
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ED 91/440 imposed the requirement of separate accounts to be kept for railway infrastructure 
management and the provision of railway transport services1. Furthermore the directive 
provided certain access rights to international rail transport for railway undertakings 
(companies that provide railway services). Articles four2 and five3 promote independent and 
transparent administration in order to secure management’s market orientation and rail 
companies’ competitiveness. Furthermore, in article nine4 the EU explicitly defines 
governments’ obligation to undertake all the previous years’ accumulated deficits (EEC, 
1991).  
 
ED 91/4405 was a first step towards the liberalisation of the European railway market and the 
potential privatisation of the railway operators. The separation between rail infrastructure 
manager and service providers can be seen as the effort of developing a new mode of railway 
business since it enables individual undertakings to compete with publicly owned 
undertakings and to operate a wide range of services over the same infrastructure. The basic 
change is the changeover from an integrated hierarchical structure to one with fragmented 
                                                 
1 Article 6: “Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the accounts for business 
relating to the provision of transport services and those for business relating to the management of 
railway infrastructure are kept separate. Financial subsidies paid to one of these two areas of activity 
may not be transferred to the other. Member States may also provide that this separation shall require 
the organisation of distinct divisions within a single undertaking or that the infrastructure shall be 
managed by a separate entity…” 
2 Article 4: “Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that as regards management, 
administration and internal control over administrative, economic and accounting matters railway 
undertakings have independent status in accordance with which they will hold, in particular, assets, 
budgets and accounts which are separate from those of the State…” 
3Article 5: “Member States shall take the measures necessary to enable railway undertakings to adjust 
their activities to the market and to manage those activities under the responsibility of their 
management bodies, in the interests of providing efficient and appropriate services at the lowest 
possible cost for the quality of service required. Railway undertakings shall be managed according to 
the principles which apply to commercial companies; this shall also apply to their public services 
obligations imposed by the State and to public services contracts which they conclude with the 
competent authorities of the Member State. Railway undertakings shall determine their business 
plans, including their investment and financing programmes. Such plans shall be designed to achieve 
the undertakings' financial equilibrium and the other technical, commercial and financial management 
objectives; they shall also lay down the method of implementation...” 
4Article 9: “ In conjunction with the existing publicity owned or controlled railway undertakings, 
Member States shall set up appropriate mechanisms to help reduce the indebtedness of such 
undertakings to a level which does not impede sound financial management and to improve their 
financial situation…” 
5 As this was completed with the directives 95/18, 95/19 and 96/48  
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structure based upon contractual relations between infrastructure operators and service 
providers (ECMT1, 1996). 
 
Separating government from the operation of railway organisations has proved a difficult 
task as it makes the responsibility of each party visible, an objective that was very difficult to 
realise under the previous organisational structure, and the amendments introduced by ED 
91/440 were not perceived as radical enough to achieve the necessary modifications. The 
assessment of the development of European railways made by the EC in 2001, demonstrated 
that the objective of fair and non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure had to be 
enforced through, the separation of certain essential functions and the creation of a rail 
regulator, fulfilling the control and implementation functions as well as through the 
separation of profit and loss accounts and the balance sheets (COM, 2001).  
 
The first “package”, attempted to create a genuine European rail market. The directives 
opened up the competition in international freight transport in 2003 a strategy that was fully 
applied in 2008. These seven years (2001 – 2008) were a transitional period provided by the 
EU in order to allow the different national rail systems to meet common safety and 
harmonisation standards, which promote interoperability between national rail networks. 
Moreover, the first package introduced access rights to all networks for any operator thus 
national governments were compelled to establish rules and fees for the allocation of 
capacity to multiple operators.  
 
In the same way the second European Rail Package further enforced the implementation of 
common legal and technical aspects for the European rail industry, which has to be 
considered as a unified area (COM, 2004). The third rail package, which has not been 
implemented yet (in 2010) is expected to be an additional step towards competition in the 
European rail industry by liberating the provision of passengers’ services from the first of 
January 2010 and further to extend the access rights to include cabotage2 (The Scottish 
Government, 2008). The main objective of the European policy has been to liberate the 
                                                 
1European Conference of Ministers of Transport   
2 i.e. loading and unloading international trains and adding and removing wagons within transit 
countries and to cover domestic freight markets  
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European Railway Enterprises from the close relationship they have developed with national 
governments (it has to be remembered that this strategic direction is in accordance with the 
points made out by the World Bank). The changes imposed by the European Commission 
have aimed to open all EU rail infrastructures to licensed competitors and to break down the 
barriers in rail transport dominated by state monopolies. National states’ intervention has 
been seen as a major problem as it disorientated the management of railway companies and 
confused operational with governmental objectives.  
‘‘Government ministers set policies, define social objectives, regulate safety and 
economic activity, and play politics’’ (Thomson, 2003:316).  
The dominant role of governments made railway organisations vulnerable to unreasoned and 
inconsistent demands from ministers and political institutional factors. The clearest examples 
are the obligations imposed on the railway companies to operate unprofitable services for 
social reasons, or to impose tariffs below the marginal cost, or providing discounts to 
particular social groups (e.g. soldiers, or families with many children). Often as in the case of 
the Greek Railway Organisation, the burden of these imposed policies has been undertaken 
by the rail companies and not by the state, which decided and imposed these policies 
(Mourmouris, 2005). Financial agreements have aimed to establish mutual responsibilities 
for rail companies’ management and National Governments. Nevertheless, forms of 
accountability that attempted to introduce more transparency and feasibility into relationships 
between the state and rail organisations proved to be not very effective, notably because the 
national governments never fulfilled their obligations towards the organisations (Thomson, 
2003). 
 
The European rail industry has been the subject of intensive reconstruction and 
reorganisation that attempts to make the operation of the railway organisations more efficient 
by introducing managerial methods of administration and by privatizing rail operators. 
Following the dominant neo-liberal ideology the social role of the European rail industry 
under national ownership is redirected towards the model of private company, based upon the 
notions of performance, efficiency, and competition. However, the introduction of the ED 
91/440 and of the subsequent rail packages reveals the interplay between the national 
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governments, the rail companies and the EC. While the EC did not impose the privatisation 
of the railway operators, and infrastructure managers, but rather market deregulation, it has to 
be emphasised that the selected policies constitute a normative paradigm in that direction. 
The reasoning is that privatisation “is probably the most silent and direct” of the dominant 
discourses that re-defines the concept of what constitutes private-public 
benefit/service/commodity (Pagoulatos, 2006: 136).  
 
In that interplay accounting practices1 play a central role in the modification of the long-term 
perception that characterises the European context in which rail services are regarded as a 
social good provided by the state. Therefore, the reorganisation of the European railway 
industry makes apparent the intrinsic role of accounting in the development of business 
knowledge and privatisation culture. 
4.4.  The use of accounting in the modernisation process  
Within Chapter 3, it was mentioned that the institutionalisation of structural properties 
intends to provide substantial meaning to roles and relationships2. Securing the necessary 
freedom to management to run rail companies as commercial businesses independent from 
governmental influence has been the central theme of the EU’s policy as formulated by the 
EDs. In order for the management of the rail companies to gain the necessary independence 
                                                 
1 It is of value to mention the contribution of the railway industry in the development of accounting 
for accountability purposes. In the period 1830 – 1870 the British railway companies were the first 
multi-million-pound enterprises, with large number of shareholders, the world saw. Aiming to secure 
shareholders interests, the Great Western Railway Act 1835, initiated the use of accounting and 
financial reporting for accountability purposes (Lee, 1982: 80). 
2 The utilisation of accounting in the process of privatisation is exemplified by the case of the 
Canadian Railway Company (CN) as well. Accounting rhetoric was used to express a ‘hard line, 
economic rationalist, free market ideology impelled’ CEO and assisted him to impose a particular 
rationality that redirected the organisational knowledge from the provision of rail services according 
to traditional norms to business direction that were intended to make the company more competitively 
capable to compete with the more efficient US operators (Craig and Amernic, 2004). In the Canadian 
case, the CEO asserted his power from two main facts: the first is that he, as a personality, was 
deemed capable of effecting organisational reformation, while the second fact is the wider perception 
in the Canadian culture of CEOs as individuals capable of exercising ‘pragmatic leadership’ and who 
are actively engaged in important issues of the day. Having established his position in the 
organisation the CEO was in place to promote his prearranged objective, which was company’s 
privatisation. In that process accounting was used in such a way as to win the public support for 
turning CN into an entity operating according to private criteria (Craig and Amernic, 2004). 
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to formulate competitive pricing strategies, a sound financial structure had to be developed. 
For that reason the crucial change has been the separation between service operators and 
infrastructure managers.  
 
Following the structural characteristics of the other modes of transportation, the separation of 
these two activities has aimed to allow operators’ managers to develop the necessary 
operational and business strategies and to be evaluated on their performance without having 
to bear the cost of maintaining and modernising the railway infrastructure. Furthermore, the 
requirements for separate management and in addition, for separate accounts between the 
infrastructure management and the provision of transport services attempts to make visible 
the provision of financial subsidies from the national governments; a practice that 
compromises competition between state owned and private rail service providers. The 
provision of financial subsidies is restricted to the infrastructure manager and to the provision 
of services for social purposes. The need for transparent management of rail businesses 
introduces the use of financial and managerial accounting systems as structures that promote 
visible and trustful relationships between the EU the national governments and the railway 
undertakings (public or private).  
 
The decision of the way that segregation of the national rail industries would be implemented 
is a choice left to member governments of the EU. Even though, the business separation 
between the different business activities is perceived by the EC as a more transparent and 
efficient way to oversee the cost and revenues of the state owned operators. While EDs 
91/440 and 2001/12 did not require the implementation of that particular strategy as the 
following citation indicates, the market driven objectives imposed along with competition, 
implicitly aim to impose the institutional separation of business activities. 
“The law does not require institutional separation… though the emphasis in commercial 
market-driven entities would certainly suggest institutional separation along lines of 
business: moreover, if infrastructure is institutionally separated the keeping freight and 
the various passenger services institutionally combined is much weaker… in addition if 
market driven entities compete with private companies, institutional separation would 
make it easier for publicly owned commercial operators to respond to pricing and 
costing needs and to prove that no State support is being provided to the competing 
entities” (ECMT, 2007: 7) 
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The silent objective of the EU was that institutional separation would endorse privatisation 
since the “private involvement and institutional separation tend to reinforce each other 
because private companies require the clarity that institutionalisation brings” (ECMT, 2007: 
7). It becomes apparent that the strategy of the EU to impose requirements for the managerial 
and accounting separation between the railway business divisions reinforces the need for the 
organisational segregation of these activities, aiming to endorse the privatisation of the 
railway operators. 
 
However, due to certain materialistic conditions1, mainly related to the technical operational 
characteristics of the European rail industry, privatisation and corporatisation as structures 
underlining the rationality of organisational action, fail to provide adequate justification over 
the efficiency of the implemented changes. The best example of the implications arising from 
privatisation in the European context is the UK railway system2. Their privatisation began in 
1993 and it was completed in 1996. The decision of the then British government was justified 
on the grounds that privatisation would improve ‘‘industrial performance by subjecting the 
nationalised industries to the discipline of the market and yield benefits, via greater 
                                                 
1 The model of the reorganisation of the European railway emanates from the US one, where 40% of 
the goods are carried by rail. However the US industry is a quite distinct context from the European 
one. The differences can be identified in three main factors. The first is that the US network is not 
technically fragmented which is a very important condition since no railway system in Europe can be 
fully competitive unless all maters relating to interoperability and technical barriers (as these have 
been influenced by the different social, economic and geographic characteristics of the member 
states) will be removed. The second reason is that size of the territory of the EU-25 (all the 25 
countries) is only two-fifths as large as the United States. This condition makes the per unit cost of 
rail freight transport more efficient for the US rail operators. For that reason the US rail industry, 
which constitutes the model for the changes in the European context, is an inadequate paradigm. An 
additional reason that makes the US railway system an inappropriate model for the European railway 
market and the environmental and social sustainability objectives set by the countries members of the 
European Union is the low density of the rail network. In 2003 the EU-25 was counting 50 km of 
railway line per 1000 km² while in the US was only 17 km of railway line per 1000 km². This is an 
evidence that justifies the argument that competition in the provision of rail services results in the 
devaluation of parts of the rail network that have no commercial and consequently profitability 
potentials and lead to its abandonment and deterioration. In the United States the privatisation of the 
railway industry has led to the exploitation of services that will generate substantial profits to the 
private providers. This is why competition is restricted to the freight service provision and has 
excluded the provision of rail services to the passengers. Rail services to passengers are undertaken 
by the publicly owned company “Amtrak”. 
2 The UK rail industry is the only example of a totally privatised European industry and for that 
reason it provides a very good and unique example of the negative effects of privatisation in rail 
business. 
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efficiency from the ability of the new owners, with their superior management skills, to 
intervene and control performance that would benefit everyone’’ (Shaoul, 2004). However, 
as a poll by YouGov.com in January 2002 show, 65% of the population in Britain believe the 
railways have worsened since 1997 (Leach, 2004). The case of the UK railway industry, 
which is the only example within the European context where privatisation gained a holistic 
character (the UK government privatised rail operators and the infrastructure manager), is 
discussed in the following section. 
4.5. Railway privatisation a venture with uncertain potential 
Discussions over the profitability potential of the UK railway industry started to take place in 
early 1970. Studying other modes of transport and mainly the pricing systems for the use of 
roads, the proposed strategy was based upon the idea to split service providers that can 
operate profitably from the infrastructure, which has to be subsidised. For that reason the 
potential for the railway industry to become profitable was perceived to be achieved by the 
separation of operating services and infrastructure (Lapsley, 1984).  
 
Privatisation in the UK, eventually adopted a more holistic approach and included not only 
the service operators but in addition the infrastructure manager. The former state-owned 
British Rail was transferred to Railtrack plc and the equity issued to private sector investors, 
while the company’s income came from infrastructure user fees charged to private sector 
operators, who were awarded train franchises. The rolling stock was transferred to three 
asset-holding companies, which then leased it to operators (the freight rolling stock was sold 
off to three freight operators). In addition the government established the rail regulator in 
order to regulate Railtrack’s activities, whilst the performance of train operators was 
monitored by the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (Charlton, 2000).  
 
The model adopted by the British rail industry, has proved to be inefficient, costly, based 
upon complex relationships and was considered responsible for safety failures. The 
privatisation of the British Railway Company was followed by a number of tragic train 
accidents that were directly linked to safety issues and made visible the absence of a relevant 
safety culture in the private operator. This problem was further reinforced by its business 
policy not to invest in track maintenance.  
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‘‘Under Railtrack’s ownership (1996-2002) the rail network suffered considerable 
neglect and there was a public and political perception that shareholders’ interests 
were placed before reliability and safety’’ (McArtney, 2004: 7).  
In 2001, the financial problems the company was facing and its inability to adequately 
maintain the rail infrastructure led Railtrack to financial collapse, and put the company under 
state’s administration. The inappropriateness of the venture in the UK rail industry, was clear 
from its early stages ‘‘the £500 million cost of privatisation, followed by the sale of rolling 
stock companies (ROSCOs) for a £900 million profit just months after they were privatised’’ 
(Leach, 2002:13). In addition the UK government was paying public subsidies for ‘Railtack’, 
which was a private monopoly, whilst it simultaneously paid out £600 million dividends.  
 
The UK example indicates the implications that financially orientated measurements might 
have for the formulation of operational strategies. The use of financial measurements for the 
formulation of accountability relationships, concentrates the control relationship, and as a 
consequence the critique on railway organisations, and their ability to operate in order to 
generate profits. However, financial targets provide no guarantee of efficient resource 
allocation1 (Lapsley, 1984).  
 
While the EU has understood these implications and has provided a seventeen year (1991 – 
2008) transitional period for national rail industries, the liberalisation of the railway market 
still introduces complex patterns of integration between the railway systems (technical and 
managerial), the formulation of which are based upon contractual relationships. It is 
indicative that in the United States, the local, private rail industry rejected the proposal (made 
by the government) for the separation between infrastructure and service provision in the 
light of the difficulty of allocating responsibilities between the parties involved in the 
contractual relationship. There is doubt, therefore, that the model of reorganisation in the 
railway industry promotes the modernisation and the efficient operation of the rail industry. 
For example in the period 1990 – 2003, the effort to create a Trans-European, high-speed rail 
network (speeds at 250 km/h or more) led to the creation of 2,799 km of high-speed rail 
                                                 
1Financial targets may encourage the adoption of less profitable projects in order to boost short-term 
profitability objectives 
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track. Although, the “Eurostar” network (linking London with Paris and Brussels) is present 
in the UK the country’s network had not adapted to high-speed standards in the manner 
achieved by France and Belgium (EUROSTAT, 2007: 12). The effort for the establishment 
of high-speed networks has been adopted by the integrated (infrastructure and service 
provision under one business entity) state owned French and Belgium’s rail companies but 
not from the private, UK rail companies. As Shaoul states, the financial collapse of Railtrack 
soon after its privatisation makes visible the problems of private ownership and finance in 
capital intensive business:  
“…it is impossible to provide efficient, safe, affordable and pollution-free public 
transport as long as it is a commodity to be sold for profit and run in the interests of the 
providers of finance. What is required is a planned system of public transport 
integrating all modes of transport – for both people and freight – that will end the 
overdependence on private motor vehicles’’ (Shaoul, 2006:36). 
That conclusion transfers the argument over the financial ineffectiveness (mainly) of the state 
owned operators from their close relationship with the government to the dominant patterns 
of economic and social relationships within which they operate. The argument made above is 
further supported by examining the conditions that underlined the development of rail 
passenger services in the US, and France.  
“The 1950s and 1960s were decades of profound change for both France and the 
United States… the [USA] had emerged victorious and unscathed from the Second 
World War… a torrent of pent-up demand was released for new housing, new 
automobiles, and new products… France, in contrast, emerged from the war a 
shattered nation… it opted for dense, mixed-used urban development connected by fast 
and efficient rail service. In the United States, most of the new growth took place 
outside the city centres, unplanned and uncoordinated. Housing developments, office 
parks, and shopping centres were scattered across the country side, connected by miles 
of asphalt. A conscious decision was made that the automobile and the airplane would 
be the backbone of our postwar transport systems. We invested hundreds of billions of 
dollars in these modes, and in these modes only… We are now beginning to suffer the 
consequences of our shortsightedness. The Interstate Highway System is choked with 
traffic… Our airports are just as crowded… meanwhile… Amtrak is a capital-starved 
railroad, which… is still operating most of its trains at speeds that do not exceed 79 
miles per hour… France… in September 1981, launched the first super fast train, the 
TGV. The rest as they say is history…” (Doukakis: in Meunier, 2002) 
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To recapitulate, in an economic system that considers that the main interest is the 
maximisation of private capital it is understood that priority will be given to those sectors of 
the economy that maximise private investment. Under conditions of free market competition 
the only way that the railway industry will regain the necessary market position, is the 
present transportation system to reach its financial and environmental limits. Only under the 
pressure of social control, will governments be forced to adopt more rational approaches to 
the planning and development of transportation systems and more particularly to the function 
and the role of the railway industry (Sarigiannidis, 1993).  
4.6. Conclusion 
The first objective of this chapter was to establish the problem in the rail industry as that it 
was defined by the World Bank and the European Commission, and to underline the major 
changes initiated in the European context. The aim was to develop linkages with the analysis 
made in chapter two, and to make explicit that the reform introduced by the European 
Commission’s directives, concerning the European rail industry, are based upon the 
principles of managerial accountability, that constitutes the dominant model for public 
administration policy.  
 
The reforms emphasise the need for increased financial efficiency in the management of rail 
companies that will result from the increased visibility in managerial action and decision, and 
from the deregulation of the rail industry (the competition between state-owned and private 
operators within a common European market). Taking from that, the second objective of the 
chapter was to make apparent the role of accounting in the realisation of the objectives of 
visibility and market deregulation in the rail industry.  
 
In order for enhanced visibility and competition in the rail market to be achieved, European 
directives impose the separation of the various business units of the state-owned rail 
organisations. The objective of disaggregating operators from the infrastructure manager is to 
separate their financial accounts. The use of accounting techniques aim to measure 
managerial performance and the effectiveness in the utilisation of financial resources, to 
allocate responsibility for the output results, and to ensure that rail companies are not 
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financially subsidised by national states. The latter is a critical condition in sustaining a 
competitive rail market where private and state rail operators compete in order to increase 
their profits.  
 
However, as was emphasised, the implicit objective of the reform in the European rail 
industry is the privatisation of rail operators. It was made apparent that the European 
Commission perceives private companies as more efficient in delivering customer orientated 
services than the state-owned operators. However, the exemplification of the operating 
conditions in the UK and the USA rail industries, challenge the European Commission’s 
argument over the efficiency and effectiveness of the privatisation of rail companies, and 
especially the privatisation of the rail infrastructure manager. That was the third objective of 
this chapter.  
 
To sum up, the European directives tend to restrict the reform strategies in the rail industry 
towards the model of market deregulation and the privatisation of the state-owned rail 
companies. However, the fact that the model of privatisation within the European context, is 
restricted in the UK (let me say that private and privatised state-owned rail companies can be 
identified in other European countries as well. However, only in the UK privatisation gained 
such a momentum), in addition, to the variety of business models adopted by the various 
European countries, indicate two interrelated facts; the first is the inability of privatisation as 
structure influencing the patterns of organisational action in the European rail industry to 
persuade of its efficiency, while the second is the ability of the state owned rail organisations 
to influence the process of the transformation of the European rail industry. Using the French 
state-owned rail organisation (SNCF) as an example such a power capacity is the result of the 
system’s ability to persuade the environment of its competence in successfully serving its 
social role.  
 
The purpose of the following chapter is to link the managerial accountability reforms to the 
context in which they were introduced. 
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5. Chapter – The Hellenic Railway Organisation (OSE): 
administrative corporatisation and social control (the period 
1970 – 1996)   
5.1.  Introduction 
One of the arguments articulated in Chapter 3, was that agents are located in institutional 
environments, and their action is shaped by pre-existing rules and relations of power that 
define the accountability relationship. The present chapter aims to sketch the rules, norms 
and relations of power, within a particular time period (1970-1996), that shaped the 
formulation of the meaning of the accountability relationship between organisational actors 
and between organisational actors and their institutional environment. The purpose is to 
analyse and make sense of the context in which managerial accountability reform applied.  
 
For that reason Chapter 5 is divided in three parts. The first part of this chapter aims to depict 
the circumstances under which state-ownership emerged in the Greek rail industry, and to 
draw the basic lines that define its position within the Greek social and economic context. 
For that reason the first part of this chapter is dedicated to a brief historic overview of the 
conditions influenced the development and decline of the Greek rail industry, and the 
particular role of the Greek state in that process. However, the analysis in this chapter mainly 
focuses on the period 1983 – 1989, when social control bodies were introduced in an effort to 
make company’s administration more transparent and socially productive, and the period 
1990 – 1993, when the then conservative government attempted to redefine the 
accountability relationship according to managerial objectives. The aim of these two sections 
is to depict the way that the initiated changes have influenced the patterns of interaction and 
integration between organisational agents. More particularly, the aim is to bring to the 
surface the actual modes of mediation as these evolved during this period, and to draw 
attention to the materialistic conditions that influenced the formation of accountability 
relationships. 
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5.2. Brief Historical Development  
The Hellenic Railway Organisation (OSE) was established in 1970. However, the history of 
the Greek rail industry starts much earlier and dates back to 1855 when the ‘Athens to 
Piraeus Railway Company’ was established1. Until the early 1960s the rail industry in Greece 
was characterised by the existence of a large number of mainly private enterprises operating, 
maintaining and developing the rail network.  
‘‘The first trains in Greece belonged to private companies. The organisation of these 
companies was satisfactory: Detailed regulations determined each service activity with 
"military-type" discipline. This meant that thousands of people from different social 
classes, with different educational background and from different countries cooperated 
in harmony for many decades. Moreover, the railway growth led to the improvement of 
the post and telegraphic services that were related to trains’’ (www.ose.gr; trans.). 
Private companies had established a corporate culture mainly based upon a ‘military-type’ of 
discipline that allowed the successful implementation of the railway services and the efficient 
development of the railway network. This military culture influenced the patterns of 
organisation, between the various organisational roles in the OSE, till the late 19702, and 
resulted in the development of a technologically advanced rail network. As a senior manager 
stated (trans.): 
“SPAP as private company operating in order to maximise its profit had managed to 
develop in 1867 the Peloponnese rail network which until the 1963 was more advanced 
than the road network. The managers and employees emanating from SPAP had learnt 
to operate under conditions of economic effectiveness and they were more capable than 
those emanating from SEK [the state-own operator] that had learnt to operate as public 
servants” (Interview TK, 30 August, 2006). 
                                                 
1 In 1882 the ‘Piraeus-Athens-Peloponnese Railway Company’ (SPAP), was created in order to 
develop and operate the railway network in the southwest part of Greece, Peloponnesus. In 1884 the 
‘Thessaly Railway Company’ (THR) was established linking Thessaly’s network with the main track 
to Athens and Piraeus. Both these companies were private public companies whilst the first state 
owned company under the name ‘Greek State Railways’ (SEK) was established in 1920, the primary 
objective of SEK was to integrate all the peripheral railway companies and to reconstruct the Hellenic 
railway industry. In 1967 SPAP and SEK merged into a state-owned rail company that later in 1972 
became what is known today OSE. 
2 Between 1967 and 1974, for a period of seven years, Greece was not a democratic state, governed 
by an elected by the Greek people government, but it was ruled by a military fascist regime. For that 
reason the company’s governor was a high rank military officer.  
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During this first period (from the country’s liberation from the Ottomans in 1830 and the 
establishment of its independence and legal sovereignty) the imperative need for public 
infrastructures that would enforce an internal market and consequently industrial and 
agricultural production brought the progression of the rail network to the forefront of the 
Greek government’s plans. Many managers and employees as well as representatives of 
social groups who participated in the present research argue that the railway industry in 
Greece begins and ends with Prime Minister Trikoupis1, since no one before him or after 
him, managed to develop and implement any major railway project2. 
 
After the end of the Second World War, following the general trend in Western European 
Countries, the development of the Greek rail industry stopped being a priority for the Greek 
Governments which transferred the available resources mainly to the development of the 
road transport.  
5.2.1. The development of the rail industry in Greece: the period 1950-1970 
The shrinkage of the Greek rail network started in 1955. The Greek Government’s 
justification for that choice was the financial inefficiency of rail companies. However, the 
wider perception has been that this strategy was the result of the conscious strategies pursued 
by the Greek government to support the development of road transport at the expense of the 
railway. Since the 1950s the strategies that have been followed by the Greek governments 
were mainly orientated towards improvement of road transport3. As a result of the contempt 
shown to the Greek railway industry, by successive Greek governments4 a large number of 
urban and regional services in Athens and elsewhere were closed down. The powerful road 
                                                 
1 From 1875 until 1895, he served as a Prime Minister of Greece seven times.  
2 This is a common perception among OSE’s managers who emphasised during their interviews that 
the first serious attempt for the modernisation of the Greek railway industry, after Trikoupi’s era, took 
place after 1995 when the European funds, with the first, the second and the third European Support 
Frameworks, were made available 
3 It is useful to have in mind that this is a period after World War II when European countries depend 
upon the ‘‘Marshal Aid’’ for their reconstruction. The country’s financial dependency resulted in 
order that its formulated policies be in accordance with the advice of American consultants. It was the 
period when the US and other Western economies based their expansion upon the automobile 
industry.   
4 Under the exhortation of the US the Greek government directed the largest amount of money from 
the ‘Marshall funding plan’ (after the Second World War) towards the development of road and port 
infrastructure.  
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transport industry1 reacted furiously to any attempts to develop and expand rail services, and 
against any attempt to re-open suburban links such as those that the management attempted 
after 1989 (almost thirty five years since 1955). 
‘‘The situation in contemporary Athens, with its unbearable smog, third-world like 
infrastructures, traffic chaos and the lack of basic quality of infrastructure [this refers to 
the period before the Olympic Games that reinvented the Greek capital], has not 
emerged by accident. It was the result of many factors… such as the post-war 
dismantling of a highly developed network of mass communications based upon rail 
track. In particular, from 1953 to 1977, 127 km of tracks were stripped – the tram 
system was closed down following unlawful transactions and blackmail in the Piraeus-
Athens-Peloponnese Railway (SPAP) who were developing the line, as rail officials and 
top officers of SPAP stated at that time... What is quite tragic is that this well-designed 
network, considered as exemplary by many foreign pre-war transport experts, was 
destroyed… The only exception… was the expansion of the electricity rail network…’’ 
(Hellenic Association of the Friends of the Railway, 1991). 
It was not until the 1970s that the first plans for rail modernisation were introduced. This was 
a response to concerns over the oil crisis, the growth in pollution and the very poor 
conditions of the railways. Within that hostile environment the provision of rail services was 
transferred in 1962 from the private operators to the state. The next section of this chapter 
depicts the first efforts for the modernisation of the state owned rail industry in Greece and 
the establishment of OSE.  
5.2.2. OSE as an autonomous company: The period 1970 - 1983 
It was in 1962 when the private operator SPAP and the state owned operator SEK merged 
into one operator under the name of the Hellenic State Railways (SEK). However, it was not 
until the 1970, that SEK changed its status from governmental department to autonomous 
public enterprise known as what it is today (or at least what it was until the January, 1st 2007) 
the Hellenic Railway Organisation (OSE). OSE was founded as a public enterprise 
responsible for the provision of railway services, operating for the public interest, according 
to the rules of the private economy, having managerial and financial autonomy (Law, 
674/1970).  
 
                                                 
1 The development of road transport has been closely linked to the financial interests of the oil 
product industry (tyres, patrol, lubricant products etc)   
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However, turning the organisation to more commercial and consequently managerial 
directions remained an issue. The main quest for the new company was the development and 
expansion of the rail infrastructure, an objective, which was not necessarily perceived to be 
in relation to the company’s commercial and business aspects. This is an argument, which 
reflects the prevailing engineering ethos that influences the meaning of organisational action 
towards the construction of a technologically advanced rail infrastructure, and the provision 
of safe and time accurate freight and passengers rail services and which furthermore, 
indicates continuity in the patterns of organisational relationship, inherited by OSE’s 
predecessors (the private and state-owned rail companies). Whether the rail network would 
provide the necessary potential for the rail services to be profitable or to provide a return on 
capital employed or the time period required for the investment to be recovered, were not of 
a primary concern when investment decisions, concerning the expansion and modernisation 
of the railway infrastructure, were made. For that reason the new company remained 
orientated towards the technical dimension of its operation, reproducing already existing 
roles and relations of power between organisational actors and collectives.  
“…the plan1 lacked any quantitative set of operational objectives. The main focus 
was… on the modernisation of the railway infrastructure and on the works that had to 
be made in order to improve the quality of the rail services. Consequently, the role of 
the civil engineers, who historically had been considered as the ‘ruling organisational 
class’ remained central in the process of the development of the organisation. On the 
other hand the empowerment of organisation’s commercial divisions remained on 
paper. In addition, no particular pressure existed for the development of commercial 
objectives. These are the main reasons why, even today we have not managed to 
develop a rational policy orientated to economic and financial efficiency…” (Interview 
PI, 26 June 2006) 
Moreover, while that was not the initial intention of the strategic plan made (1966 - 1977), a 
vertically organized control system was developed that shifted away company’s managerial 
and operational functions, from what was perceived, as compatible with the particular 
geographic characteristics of the Greek rail network, operational and administrative 
organisation. This compatible organisation was based upon three functionally, semi-
                                                 
1 He refers to the 1966-1977 strategic plan made for the Greek Government by a French company. 
The plan suggested OSE should remain the decentralised organisation, inherited by SEK, and should 
enhance the commercial aspects of its business operation.     
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independent regional departments1. Nevertheless, the divisions remained operational, 
divisional managers’ powers were restricted, and their powers were transferred to the general 
manager and his assistant managers. An additional reason for managerial and operational 
centralisation was the pressure, exercised by non-engineering personnel for promotion to 
upper managerial jobs and the demand for better salaries in a state-owned organisation 
operating in very poor working conditions. This pressure mounted in the period after 1981, 
when PASOK came to power, and the role of the employees’ union became critical in the 
management of state-owned organisations.  
“The absence of any commercial orientation as well as the absence of any form of 
performance assessment did not justify the managerial over-concentration in the 
headquarters. That outcome was mainly the result of the concentration of railway 
knowledge in the headquarters and the formulated perceptions that central control of the 
projects for the modernisation of the railway infrastructure will be more efficient. 
Furthermore, the gigantism of the headquarters was the result of the pressure exercised 
by organisation’s trade union for better salaries. That was achieved by dichotomising 
the already existing departments. That policy caused organisational chaos. The 
headquarters gained total control, without having the responsibility for the actual results 
[these were still in the regional departments]. (Paradissopoulos, 1989). 
To sum-up, using a number of limited information sources2 available for the periods before 
1983, the above three sections aimed; first to show employees’ perception of the role of 
private rail companies in the development of the Greek rail industry. It is generally 
acknowledged that private rail companies managed to construct an advanced technologically 
rail network, and to provide successful rail services to the Greek citizens. For many 
employees and managers, the efficient operation of private operators was the outcome of a 
certain corporate culture, based upon strict and impressive rules. For that reason the 
argument to be made, is that the role of private enterprises in the Greek rail industry is a 
                                                 
1 OSE adopted SEK’s organisational structure based on three regional departments. The region of 
Macedonia – Thrace (northern Greece), the one of central Greece, and the one of Peloponnese (south-
western Greece) (see the rail map). The system was based upon the regional managers who had three 
business divisions under their surveillance: the ‘operational division’, the ‘track division’ and the 
‘rolling stock and materials division’. Regional managers were accountable over the day-to-day 
operations to the company’s governor (the term used at the period for the CEO), who had the role and 
obligation to exercise control over the performance of the regional departments. The managers of 
those divisions had as their responsibility the planning of the activities of their departments and the 
coordination of the employees’ action. 
2 The strategic plan for the period (1966-1977) was available to the researcher. 
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legitimate one. Using the argument made in Chapter 3, that structures of signification, 
domination and legitimation are inextricably linked, it is argued that the ability of 
organisational actors to make sense of the potential significance of the contribution of private 
enterprises, in the modernisation of the Greek rail industry, is a matter of the way that the 
institutional environment, and mainly the Greek Government and the European Commission 
realise their power while promoting such changes.  
 
The second aim was to make apparent the perception that employees and social groups, have 
over the role of the successive Greek governments in the development of the Greek rail 
industry. As was indicated the perception is that after 1950s the successive Greek 
governments intensively undermined the social and economic role of Greek rail industry. 
Consequently, the role of the Greek state is seen with suspicion, by employees and social 
groups. The articulation of that argument tends to indicate that any initiatives introduced by 
the Greek government for the reformation of the Greek rail industry will potentially cause 
increased conflicts and tensions in case they will fail to gain the trust of employees and 
managers over their objectives.  
 
Although, not mach evidence was provided, the above sections, and mainly the third one, 
attempted to indicate a contradiction, between what the 1966 - 1977 strategic plan foresaw, 
and what actually happened. Based upon the description of the formation of a centralised, 
vertically managed, bureaucratic organisation, the analysis in agreement with the argument 
made in Chapter 3, indicates that the process of the reformation of state-owned organisations 
is a multilevel one; potentially the outcome of the unintended consequences of the action.  
 
The socialisation of the control and managerial structures, which took place in 1985, was a 
critical moment in the company’s development that was aimed at formulating socially 
accepted corporate objectives and at enhancing independent collective management and 
social accountability.  
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5.3.  The socialisation era (1983 - 1989) 
The socialisation of the Hellenic Railway Organisation was the result of the 1981 general 
elections and the rise of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) to power. It was the first 
time that a non-conservative government was formed in Greece, and people’s expectations 
were very high. In 1981, the first PASOK government secured 48% of the votes, whilst in 
1985 it was re-elected with 45% percent of the votes. At the same time, 12% of the Greek 
population were voting for more radical political forces like the communist party. The 
socialisation of the public for benefit enterprises was a political promise made by the socialist 
party in order to meet the public demand for collective participation in decision making, and 
increased democratic control and accountability. To quote the governments recommendatory 
report (trans.): 
“With this draft bill, the government of PASOK… does not merely fulfil one of the 
most important conditions of its contract with the people. It also prioritises and puts 
forward choices of national interest in order to serve and benefit the entire people … 
The socialisation of the public sector aims at restructuring the sector on the basis of its 
strongest potential ... The state’s strategic policies promote efficient management, 
responsible and conscious efforts for increasing productivity, harmonisation with the 
environment, and links between employees and the production strata which constitute 
the companies’ customers” (Greek Government, 1983) 
The socialisation1 of the public utility organisations (for example railways, 
telecommunications electricity supply companies) became a legal act in 1983, codified in law 
                                                 
1 The socialisation of the public for benefit enterprises, banks and insurance companies means the 
participation in the management scheme and in the strategic and operational plan development of the 
following representatives: 
? State representatives; 
? Local government representatives; 
? Employee representatives and representatives of; 
? Social groups that are affected by their operation. 
The socialisation aimed: 
? To serve the national and social interest; 
? To establish employees’ active participation in decision making; 
? The reconciliation of their operation with the regional and local economic and social development 
plans; 
? The economisation of financial resources; 
? To increase organisational productivity and performance and the quality of the offering services 
to the public (Greek Parliament, 1983). 
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1365. Social control was attempting to establish a new form of accountability relationship 
within the organisational contexts of state-owned organisations and between the 
organisations and their institutional environment. The aim was to change the typical relation 
between the Greek government and the management of public utility enterprises. As stated in 
the Greek Government’s recommendatory report (trans.): 
“Socialisation is fundamentally opposite to rigorous state control… with its constant 
daily intervention and drowning of the initiatives taken by the appointed party 
administration. The confusion between strategy development and management, the 
extent of precautionary supervision has created a hypercentralised bureaucratic 
mechanism… with counterproductive functioning, limited or non-existent wider social 
and development goals, huge economic deficits, marginalisation and degrading of the 
employees themselves to the role of passive executor of the demands and exigencies of 
the bureaucratic hierarchy...” 
Prior to socialisation, the Greek public utility companies, although legally independent, in 
practice were operating as governmental departments. The Chairman of the board, the 
members of the board and the general manager were governmental appointees, with close 
political relationships with the ruling party (Papoulias and Lioukas, 1995: 280). This way all 
important decisions were in the government’s hands, empowering the ministers to maintain 
and reproducing relations of dependence, with the administration in these organisations, with 
negative effects upon collective management and social dialogue. This relation secured the 
reproduction of patrons-client relationships with the electorate and moreover (Liberaki and 
Tsakalotos, 2002: 99), the continuity of relations of power within the Greek society. 
 
Socialisation was a strategic choice that was aiming to bring institutional and structural 
reforms in Greek society. It was believed that the increased social control would enforce 
transparency and economic efficiency in the management of these organisations. The 
structures of social control, decentralisation and democratic planning introduced a dual 
rationality to the management of the state-owned organisations. The socialised enterprise 
aimed to secure its social obligations, but at the same time it had the responsibility to balance 
its operational revenues and expenses. For that reason it was introducing social objectives 
into the operational practice of state-owned organisations, along with their operational 
objectives (Lyberaki, A and Tsakalotos, E., 2002).  
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The next section discusses social control within the context of the OSE 
5.3.1. Social control mechanisms and social accountability  
Following the government’s political objectives for collective management, the 
administration council was established to assist the general manager in the company’s 
management (the administration council was constituted by the general manager and the 
assistant general managers). Social control was assigned to ASKE (Representative Assembly 
of Social Control), which was the company’s general assembly. ASKE was compromised of 
27 members1. These 27 members represented the state, employees, local government, and 
consumer groups. For the first time the company’s social and financial performance was 
attempted to be measured through the social and financial balance-sheets that were under 
ASKE’s scrutiny. Thus ASKE were responsible for approving the company’s annual 
financial balance-sheet and budget. Furthermore, ASKE comments upon and advises the 
government over the company’s long and medium-term strategic plans. According to 
presidential decree 59 of 1985, concerning the socialisation of the Hellenic Railway 
Organisation, ASKE’s responsibilities are summarised below (trans.): 
1. It participates in the formulation of the company’s financial and social plan; 
2. It decides over the company’s investment plan, and the tariffs, the annual needs for 
material and equipment supplies and matters concerning the employees and the 
work force.  
3. It advices the government over the company’s annual budget 
4. It approves the annual balance-sheet, the annual financial report and the social 
accounts; 
5. It is responsible for the assessment of the managerial performance and the 
implementation of the social and operational plan, while it reports to the 
government. 
The institutionalisation of ASKE established the participation of social parties, an act that 
acknowledged the multiplicity of interests concerning the operation of the railway company 
and the effects from it. As stated in the Greek Government’s recommendatory report (trans.): 
                                                 
1 One third of these members are governmental appointees, one third are elected representatives of the 
employees, and the last third represent the social groups. 
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“Socialising the public sector means firstly giving priority to the national, social, 
development and production criteria in all choices. The possibility of such quality and 
hierarchy of criteria and options is ensured with participation. The range and quality 
composition of this participation ensures the primacy of social and development 
criteria, as well as the consideration of particular interests ... In other words, a field of 
organised and effective democratic dialogue is being created ...” 
Additional to ASKE, PESKE (local assemblies of social control) and KES (Work Conditions 
Monitoring Committees) were introduced in an effort to improve work conditions and to 
enhance social control. Social control was further extended by the participation of the 
employees’ representatives on the board of directors. The BoD consisted of nine members, 
six of whom (including the general manager and the deputy general manager) were appointed 
by the government, whilst the remaining three represented the employees.  
 
Managerial transparency and efficiency became the main objectives of the reforms that were 
introduced through a complex set of relationships. For that reason, long-term economic and 
social plans, along with accounting mechanisms were introduced as the modes of mediation 
in an effort to communicate the meaning of the organisational objectives and to establish 
mutual accountability relationships between the organisational roles and between 
organisational roles and their institutional environment. The actual use of strategic and 
operational plans as interpretive schemes is discussed in the following section.  
5.3.2. The use of operational and strategic objectives within the socialisation 
structure 
In an effort to improve the organisation’s managerial and operational efficiency and to 
enhance collectiveness the then management (1982-1985) drew up a 15-year strategic plan 
(1983 – 1997) and in addition it foresaw the drawing of a five year operational plan that 
would particularise the general strategic objectives set. The actions described in the strategic 
plan were aiming to improve four main features of business activity: investments1 in rail 
                                                 
1 More particularly, the 15-year (1983-1997) long-term plan described the following business 
objectives and investments as essential for the improvement of network’s commercial exploitation: 
? Improvement in the operation of the departments and the provided services 
? Improvement in the system for informing the public 
? Full implementation of an electronic booking system 
? Supply of automatic ticket-issuing machines 
? Improvement in the cleaning system of trains 
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infrastructure and rolling stock material, operational reorganisation1, relations with the 
government and financing. For that reason, the objectives described were aiming to 
modernise and systematise the way that employees and managers were operating in their 
every-day actions (OSE, 1985). The deterioration, or even the elimination, of the financial 
deficit was the basic economic objective that was identified with the company’s strategic 
plan. However, as it is stated in the following quotation reducing the financial deficit was not 
considered to be feasible without state’s subsidisation. For that reason, the company’s 
management argued that the OSE’s performance could not be evaluated according to 
financial criteria, but rather according to its benefit contribution to the general public interest. 
As was stated in the 1983-1997 Strategic Plan, (trans.): 
“…following the socio-economic analysis, the economic target as it is defined in the 
15-year strategic plan, is for OSE to decrease or even to eliminate its financial deficit … 
[However] as it happens in the rest of the advanced foreign rail networks, the 
company’s objective is not its financial autonomy [the ability to fund its operational 
deficit and investment project]” (OSE, 1985) 
The view adopted in the strategic plan mirrors the perception of what constitutes the 
company’s social role and underlines the meaning of organisational action and managerial 
                                                                                                                                                       
? Increasing the company’s  share market 
As basic operational activities described were those of: 
? Market research; 
? Operational Research 
? Combined and mixed transport services 
? The creation of terminal services in the country’s main ports  
? Competitive tariff policy  
As far as the modernization of the rail infrastructure is concerned, the technical works concern the 
railway track between Patrai-Athens-Thessaloniki, as well as the peripheral rail networks. The 
modernisation of the network was setting the following actions: 
? New double rail-track; 
? The electrification of the network; 
? The establishment of modern electronic signalling; and  
? The use of systems of telecommunication concerning network’s management 
The completion of the networks was anticipated to have occurred by 1997. It was estimated that the 
network’s modernisation would reduce the journey from Athens to Thessaloniki from 7 hours and 30 
minutes in 1983 to 3 hours and 40 minutes by 1997. In addition, the modernisation of the rail network 
would make the train more competitive and, consequently, capable of gaining a larger share in the 
passengers and freight transport market. Moreover, the introduction of the new technology was 
expected to reduce the company’s operational costs. 
1 Aiming the restriction of financial deficits operational reorganisation aimed to change the 
relationship between operational revenues and expenses 
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objectives. It is a deep-rooted belief, widely shared by organisational actors that the railway 
organisation cannot become a profitable enterprise, due to the social dimension of the 
services provided, and due to certain technical conditions that restrict the company’s 
operational capabilities. It is the social dimension of organisational action that gives roles 
their substantial meaning and defines the accountability framework. Thus, as is argued in the 
plan made, control mechanisms should be orientated towards the evaluation of the social 
value added, and not towards the measurement of the company’s profitability (OSE, 1985). 
The Economic Agreement (Law 1485/84) made between the OSE and the Greek Government 
defined State’s financial responsibilities towards the organisation. With law 1485/84, the 
Greek Government took full responsibility of the company’s annual losses.  
 
Due to the absence from the organisation of a department responsible for the formulation of 
the organisational strategy, this task was assigned to two newly established groups. The first 
group, which was formed by experienced high rank managers, had the task of formulating the 
long-term strategic planning (Strategic Planning Team). The second group was composed of 
young and low-ranking employees who offered to help. Their task was that of the 
formulation of a short-term operational policy in order for the organisation to meet the 
demands emerging from the implementation of long-term planning. However, this second 
group never became active. Consequently, the operational plans that would have defined the 
necessary measurable actions in order for set objectives to be realised, were never 
formulated. The assumption made by a manager, who was a member of that second group, 
over the reasons this group never became active, was that the deputy general manager, who 
was responsible for the formulation and operation of these two teams, was appointed by 
another organisation and left OSE. However, such an assumption does not fully explain why 
the formulation of an operational plan that would had exemplified the strategies and the 
required financial resources for the efficient and effective implementation of the strategic 
objectives set, was abandoned.  
 
The formulation of strategic and operational plans was initiated by a group of senior 
managers in an effort to prioritise the investment and operational actions necessary for the 
modernisation of the company’s operational capabilities. Moreover efforts were made to 
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communicate these objectives to employees, the government and to social groups, in order to 
formulate a strategic vision for the future of the railway industry in Greece and to secure 
everyone’s commitment in its application. This is why ASKE’s approval was asked. 
However, OSE had neither the knowledge1 nor the capacity, in terms of resources and 
authority, to enter into long-term commitments with the institutional environment, the 
implementation of which presupposed the existence of trust between the various collectives. 
More importantly such long-term commitments with definite time, financial and operational 
targets, presupposed trust in the Greek Government’s commitment to fulfil the financial 
obligations in the ‘Economic Agreement2’. The implementation of the company’s investment 
project and the objectives set for the modernisation of the company’s network and the 
provided to customers services, was contingent upon the provision of financial subsidies 
from the Greek Government.  
 
However, the Greek government breached the economic agreement signed with the company 
in 1984, and did not keep its obligation towards the organisation. As a result, all investment 
costs burdened the organisation, further endorsing its financial position. The limited financial 
resources devoted by the Greek government to the development of the Greek railway 
network have concentrated efforts on the modernisation of the main ‘axis’ between Patrai 
(southwest Greece)–Athens–Thessaloniki to the northern borders with Skopje. The rest of the 
                                                 
1 The 1966-1977 strategic plan, foresaw the creation of a strategic and operational planning 
department. Even though, seven years (1977-1983) after the plan completed, still the company had 
not managed to create one. That indicates that planning was not part of the managerial action.   
2 The economic agreement (Law 1485/84) was attempting to explicitly establish the responsibility of 
the Greek government towards the organisation. The agreement secured for the OSE the existence of 
equal competitive conditions for all terrestrial means of transportation. Moreover, it required that the 
burden of expanding and maintaining the rail network and the communication and control systems 
was the state’s responsibility. Such a condition was necessary otherwise the cost would have been 
overwhelming for OSE. The ultimate purpose of law 1485/84 (defining the economic agreement 
between the company and the government) was to set boundaries within which OSE could operate as 
a profitable enterprise in a competitive market (the competition was understood between train and 
other modes of transportation, no between rail companies). Consequently, it attempted to establish the 
necessary provisions for OSE’s management to formulate operational policy according to profitability 
and performance criteria. If it was unprofitable for the organisation to operate particular passenger or 
freight services, then the management would have the ability to abandon that service. Otherwise the 
state would have to compensate the organisation for the provision of essential public services, a 
provision that would be projected by the EU directive 91/440, which was published 25 years later.  
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network was badly maintained causing delays and deviations from the travel schedule1 
(Paradisopoulos, 1989). Moreover, the emphasis on the modernisation of the main ‘axis’ 
Patrai–Athens–Thessaloniki, deviates from the organisational approach to the development 
of the national network, as that has been foreseen in the 1983–1997 long-term strategic plan. 
Such a strategy2 does not necessarily mean that it met the needs of a national rail network 
constructed and organised according to the transportation requirements of Greek society or 
the vision of the rail managers and employees (Sarigiannis, 1993). 
 
As with the development of the railway infrastructure, no specific policy relating to the 
supply of the rolling stock had existed in the organisation. The lack of investments had 
resulted in the maintenance standards of the rolling stock being very low, a situation related 
both to the outdated and poorly organised maintenance installations and to the extreme 
variety of the rolling stock equipment owned by the company. As the following citation 
indicates; almost every kind of rolling stock could be found in the organisation. It was not 
until 1989 that the railway organisation decided upon a particular type of rolling stock that 
would satisfy its needs. Until that time, the acquisition of rolling stock occurred through 
exchanging commodities3. For example, Greece was exporting agricultural commodities to 
Eastern European countries4, and in return these countries were supplying Greece with 
railway equipment (until recently no equipment construction company existed in Greece).  
The supply of the railway stock was subject to the needs of the country’s foreign policy 
and the needs for the promotion of the Greek agricultural production. The international 
                                                 
1 As a manager mentioned (trans.): Due to engine break downs (during the 1980s, he could not 
remember the exact date), once a train did the journey Athens – Thessaloniki in 16 hours (the average 
time to travel by train from Athens to Thessaloniki was 8 hours) (Interview HK, 22, August 2006).  
2 This focusing of development of the rail network in Greece around a single line substantially 
restricts the development of freight and passenger services in other areas that surround the rail ‘axis’ 
and, as a consequence, the possibilities for the development of commercial competitive strategies are 
limited. In addition, the existing rail strip has no connections with the main Greek ports of Piraeus 
(Athens’s port), Thessaloniki (north Greece, region of Macedonia), Patrai (southwest Greece, region 
of Peloponnese) and Alexandroupolis (northeast Greece, region of Thrace) (SAAS2, October 2005). 
3 It is significant that the availability in train engine (measured by the rate - Train engines available 
for use / Total number of trains) was 2/3 and sometimes below 50%, which means that the 50% or 
more of the train engines, owned by the company, could not be used. At the same time in other 
European rail networks the availability rate was 80% or more (OSE, 1995).   
4 Back then the division between Eastern-Communist and Western-Capitalist countries was still in 
use.  
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agreements resulted in OSE having 32 different models of rolling stock. The rolling 
stock’s ‘sample book’ constitutes one of the main reasons for the low quality and the 
high cost of the services provided as well as for the substantial increase of the annual 
deficit (TD Interview, 13 July 2006). 
Management was incapable of currying out basic tasks, like the management of the 
company’s commercial policy. The State remained in control of the supply of raw materials 
and rolling stock and even the supply of office equipment and stationery, whilst it regularly 
involved OSE in its petty politics, restricting its management’s ability to formulate 
organisational policy and strategy. Thus, organisational management did not change its 
image as governmental assignee, which was one of the major objectives of the socialisation 
of the Hellenic Railway Organisation. A former director general stated (trans.):  
“DEKOs’ notion was interwoven with governmental ownership and with the exercise of 
shareholder’s rights from each, usually per four-year period applied governmental 
policy.  This in combination with the adulteration of DEKOs’ corporate objectives, with 
the interests, and the political objectives of each governmental majority that in the bulk 
of the cases were opposite to the corporate objectives, provide the basic reasons for the 
failure of DEKOs’ administrative model. It has to be mentioned that despite the 
declarations from all governments that they assured DEKOs’ self governance through 
their constitutive provisions, in practice such self administration was never achieved” 
(Interview DK, 20 August 2005). 
The lack of managerial independence and the inability to implement the formulated strategies 
and set objectives, made the existence and operation of ASKE meaningless. ASKE, the social 
control assembly, has never practically managed to exercise its role, in the formation of the 
company’s strategic objectives and the assessment of managerial performance in a way that 
would justify management’s competency. The assembly’s formation was so complex that it 
allowed each party to control its operations according to its own interests. Every group, the 
government, the management, the employees’ representatives, the local communities and the 
consumers’ organisations, were trying to achieve short-term gains. As an employees’ 
representative in the trade-union and the board of directors stated (trans.): 
“ASKE never managed to form a quorum in order to reach a decision. The number of 
its members was too large and as a result the assembly was dysfunctional and 
considerations influential in policy making did not allow ASKE to implement its 
progressive and democratic role. The absence of social control also had negative effects 
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on the company’s financial transparency, since for a period of more than ten years the 
organisation was not publishing financial balance sheets… (Interview SK, 10 August 
2005) 
The formulation of a collective agreement on corporate, investment and modernisation plans 
was an impediment concerned all the Greek public utility companies. However, in many 
other state-owned organisations, ASKE’s representatives were in a position to discuss 
operational issues, and to deal with approving the annual balance sheets and budgets or with 
pricing issues (Papoulias and Lioukas, 1995: 282). In contrast in OSE for a period of 13 years 
(1984-1996) the organisation was not publishing financial statements. For that 13-year period 
(1984-1996), financial control was exercised by the Greek State through the annual budgets 
and the budget’s review at the end of the year. In addition, annual economic bulletins were 
issued concerning the main parameters of organisational action, such as the development of 
the organisational deficit. These bulletins concerned only the Minister of Finance.  
 
To recapitulate, the new patterns of relation were aimed at the formation of collective 
objectives according to the legitimate structure of socialisation that would promote the 
integration of the organisational system as a whole. Technical forms of control, like the 
financial and social balance-sheet, as well as the social and economic plans, as has already 
been argued, were supposed to be used to connect and regulate the different roles and to 
make explicit their social responsibilities. However the inability of the company’s 
management to enter into long-term commitments, and to gain trust over its competence to 
achieve the formulated objectives resulted in ASKE loosing its power and consequently, its 
significance as a democratic framework of social dialogue. For that reason instrumental 
forms of control like the formulated strategic plan and the social and financial balance sheets, 
failed to constitute interpretive schemes that established meaningful relations between the 
various roles.  
 
It is significant that the ability of the various collectives to make company’s management 
accountable for its actions remained even though ASKE was not functional. For example 
employees’ participation in the company’s board of directors and through the industrial 
action secured them the ability to negotiate with the management and the government. 
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However, such a negotiation concerned partial interests (like the improvement of working 
conditions and salaries) and not necessarily overall corporate objectives. This is indicated 
from the company’s inability to proceed to its operational and managerial modernisation. 
 
The turning point in the socialisation process was the deregulation and privatisation 
programme applied in the period 1990 - 1993, by the newly elected conservative government 
of ‘New Democracy’. As the following section indicates, in that process representative 
bodies were totally ignored. The reactions caused by the modernisation of the OSE according 
to profit maximisation criteria and the way in which accountability relationships functioned, 
are discussed in the following section.  
5.4. The period 1990-1993: Ideals, structural reformation and 
privatisation  
Using the OSE’s inability to modernise its business organisation and operational capacity1, 
as well as the increasing deficits of the railway company, as a pretext, the then (1990-1993) 
conservative government attempted to modernise the company’s organisation and its 
operational activities by appointing the English company ‘TR’ as a consultant. According to 
the notice given to the BoD (BoD article 03.11.1992), TR had the obligation to produce a 
business review and efficiency study concerning OSE’s operating patterns. More particularly, 
the BoD assigned TR the study and the organisation of the company’s ‘‘Financial and 
Administrative Programming’’. In an effort to make apparent the need for the company’s 
managerial and operational reorganisation the consultant made the following rather sharp and 
demonstrative statement of the poor operating conditions, existing in the organisation 
(trans.): 
“Our international experience makes us believe that the company’s operational and 
administrative standards are very low. We think that it will not be a tragic event if the 
company stops its operation. The market share it possesses will be easily absorbed by 
the other means of transportation” (TR, September 1992). 
                                                 
1 In 1990 the OSE had only 1.41% of the total share in the market of the transportation of freight, and 
goods, and 4.17% share in the market of the transportation of passengers and that share was manly 
concentrated on the rail axis between Athens and Thessaloniki.  
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The study argued that the company’s problems were the result of the established 
organisational culture, which was defined not by corporate characteristics but rather by those 
of the public sector. Using the lack of an inventory control system as an example, the study 
emphasised the total absence of management control systems. As they stated in their report to 
the BoD, no inventory of the rolling stock material had been carried out with the material 
stock been unrecorded, available to anyone.  
 
In the light of the application of the European Directive 91/440, the study proposed the 
company’s reorganisation in line with to the examples of railway companies in countries 
with social, economic, geographical and size population characteristics similar to those of 
Greece and based upon the business segregation between the infrastructure and the railway 
service exploitation (e.g. Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland). However, focusing upon the 
deterioration of the financial deficit, the study proposed the closure of many parts of the 
already limited existing network (mainly regional networks), and several train stations that 
were deemed inefficient and of low financial importance. For that reason it proposed the 
investments in the rail network to be limited to the main railway axis of Patrai-Athens-
Thessaloniki. Such a proposal deviated from the 1984 - 1996, strategic plan, and moreover 
awoke memories of the policies formulated and implemented in the 1950s by the then 
conservative government, which led to the deterioration of the Greek railway network in 
favour of the road transport industry. The emergent conflicts are discussed in the following 
section. 
5.4.1. Conflicting structures and effects upon the day-to-day action  
The suspicion about government’s role and intentions and the lack of social dialogue, in 
addition to the high politicisation that have characterised the status of the organisational 
relationships, resulted in TR’s study, being seen as an effort made by the conservative Greek 
Government to impose ideals (privatisation) contradictory to the social nature of the rail 
services. That perception also emanated from the fact that this (1990 - 1994) was the period 
when John Major’s conservative government was privatising the British railway industry – a 
venture that was underlined by the neo-liberal ideology and constituted a source of social 
conflict between the employees’ union and the Greek Government. This lack of trust over 
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TR’s role is demonstrated in the following interview with the then president of the 
employees’ union, given in a daily newspaper1 (trans:)    
“The government, and the leadership of the Ministry of National Economy in particular, 
which, under the pretext of covering economic deficits, fervently wishes to undermine 
the Railway and to privatize its profitable operational activities2, had assigned TR to 
publish findings which would not only strengthen its proposals, but also give them a 
scientific basis. TR proposes closing down most stations and lines of the regional 
network… we were informed that OSE’s General Management, who is also responsible 
for the company’s situation, despite having given its consent to cut spending as 
instructed by the Ministry of Finance, in reality does not agree with it.… the Transport 
Minister also keeps his distance… the main cause of OSE’s deficit is its serious 
structural and administrative problems… as well as tight monitoring by the state, which 
does not allow the company freedom to play its autonomous business role… it is also 
charged with the social services expenditure which should have been covered by the 
state according to the economic agreement (services of public benefit)”. 
The consultant’s damaged credibility is made clear by the fact that it was implicitly believed 
by many in the organisation that the study was serving the interests of the British railway 
industry at the expense of the Hellenic Railway Company. 
“It is said that, by serving the interests of British railways which are being upgraded to a 
high-speed network, they want OSE to develop at medium pace by buying material in 
the near future which is of no use to British railways” (Sarigiannis, 1993) 
The business plan had been fully identified as having been imposed in order to meet the 
expectations of the ministry of finance (not even the ministry of transport), whose policies 
were aimed of limiting the country’s public deficit by restricting the operation of financially 
deficient state-owned organisations like OSE. Besides the employees’ union’s opposition to 
the study’s outcomes, other social groups that have been actively involved in the promotion 
of the railway industry in Greece reacted furiously against TR’s proposals. In their report to 
the Director General and to the union of the employees (21 January 1993) the members of the 
non-governmental group ‘Friends of the Railway Association’3 (FRA) pointed out that the 
                                                 
1 Though I have the copy of the interview from the interviewee’s personal file I do not have the date 
that the interview took place.  
2 I have to emphasise that this is a widely held opinion, since no adequate accounting information 
exist that will evaluate the efficiency of the departments 
3 In Greek: “Σύλλογος Φίλων του Σιδηρόδρομου” 
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study1 has no particular orientation. As they emphasised in their report, the study can be 
characterised neither as a commercial and financial viability study nor as study focusing on 
the development and modernisation of the organisational structures. Furthermore, they 
questioned the validity of the report’s outcomes by explicitly stating that the time the 
consultant has taken was inadequate for such a complex study. Like the employees, the 
members of the FRA regarded the study as superficial and concluded that it was serving pre-
established objectives.  
“What is surprising, however, is the superficial and unjustified documentation, with 
respect to many issues, which leads to the conclusion that the outcome of this study is 
predetermined. It may be the case that those wishing to wipe out Hellenic Railways 
would want to ensure at least one scientific-like death certificate. It is unheard of for the 
State to abandon the railways for so many years... and later abandon it again for not 
being cost-effective. It reminds me of the Italian movie “Seduced and Abandoned”, 
where a great Sicilian lover raped a girl and then refused to marry her because she had 
been raped” (Friends of the Railway Association, 1993) 
The study forecast the saving of almost €85 million (29.1 billion drachmas) from an increase 
in productivity. However, since TR did not support any form of network development that 
would increase the revenues from network’s commercial exploitation (they did not even 
make suggestions concerning the network’s electrification2), cost saving would had been the 
result of a reduction in employees’ numbers from 12,000 to 4,000. This means that the 
suggestion to the company’s management was for them to follow an aggressive policy of 
sacking more than 60% of employees3 within the next few years. Furthermore, the study 
anticipated a further reduction of the operating deficit by €126 million (42.7 billion 
drachmas) from the reorganisation and modernisation of the factories and workshops by 
                                                 
1 These reactions are based on summaries of the report. The Ministry of Finance probably leaked 
parts of the study in an effort to tailor the reaction. I did not manage to find out whether the full 
content of the study was ever revealed to the public and the interested parties.     
2 It has to be stressed once again that the sources concerning the study’s content are internal notes 
between the consultant and OSE, the contract between the two parties and the description of the 
responsibilities of each party, a summary of the report made by the consultant and two studies; the 
one made on behalf of the employees (Sarigiannis, 1993) and a second made by the ‘‘Friends of the 
Railway’’. However, I do not have in my possession the main body of the study made by TR. Perhaps 
no one has, apart from the ministry of finance.     
3 In 1992 employees’ cost as a percentage of the company’s operating revenue was 153%. In other 
European rail networks the ratio of employees’ cost to total operating revenue was 50% to 75% (OSE, 
1994). 
  107
outsourcing the maintenance of the infrastructure and rolling stock material to private 
companies. Still, it provided no estimation of the cost that the organisation would have to be 
remain in outsourcing its factory activities. It was also predicted that the organisation would 
only save €1.6 million from abolishing the operation of the proposed parts of the railway 
network (Sarigiannis, 1993). 
 
The proposed strategy raised concerns in local communities as well. On the 20th of January 
1993 in a region1 for which the study proposed the closure of the network the citizens 
declared their opposition to the proposed policies. They argued that, the propositions were 
the result of the pressures exercised by the owners of the intercity buses, whose interests 
were in competition with those of OSE. The sort of policies TR were emphasising, were in 
conflict with the interests of citizens and local communities. As a result, they lobbied against 
the proposed closure of the railway network.   
“After all this, it is difficult for the inhabitants in the area to believe that the 
government, using the argument of the doubtful savings of a few millions [Drachmas2], 
will satisfy the very few public bus service operators [KTEL] who, as is understandable, 
are interested in and are pushing for the abolishment of the train line in question, and 
instead the totality of inhabitants. Such a proposal would undoubtedly lead to upset 
social upheaval, which is desired neither by the inhabitants in the area nor by the 
government of course” (Municipality of Stylida, 1993) 
The reaction against TR’s study, as expressed above, is underlined by the fundamentally 
different approaches to what had been perceived as a rational railway strategy. The first 
rationality has been underlined by the concept that the activities of the railway industry must 
be serving social, national and environmental purposes. This is why the expansion of the 
network and the creation of suburban railway services, has been considered to be the most 
important factor for OSE. The need for financial performance, but more importantly for 
financial feasibility, was not underscored. However, the commercial aspects relating to the 
formation of strategic objectives were downgraded in comparison to the national, social and 
environmental objectives that, according to that dominant rationality, should shape the 
formation of the railway strategy. For this reason, they attacked TR’s study on the grounds 
                                                 
1 This refers to the municipality of Stylida in the region of Fthiotida in central Greece. 
2 From 1832 until 2001 when it was replaced by the Euro, GRD was the Greek national currency.  
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that it did not take into consideration the taken-for-granted aspects of this operationally 
orientated rationality. As mentioned in the report prepared by the Friends of the Railway 
Association (trans:) 
“A need for multiple criteria: 
While the railway project is multifaceted, those engaged in it are only focusing on 
economic criteria (they were probably given such instructions by the supervisory 
service) and ignore the following inflexible elements:  
Social criterion: 
An example of this is given in the case of villages in Arcadia and Messinia [prefectures 
in the Peloponnese] which are completely cut off because of extreme weather 
conditions and deprived of alternative transport...  
National criterion: 
This should not be an issue, especially for stations in Macedonia and Thrace. Will we 
stop running the train in Ormenio [in Thrace, near the Greek-Turkish border] for 
example? It’s not possible!” (Friends of the Railway Association, 1993) 
TR’s intentions were made apparent in the introductory statement of the company’s 
operational and financial conditions and its prospects. The predefined objectives of the study, 
called into question its accuracy. However, questions emerged about the cooperation between 
OSE’s management and the consultant. One of the proposals made by the latter was the 
closure of 217 from the total of 420 train stations TR claimed in their study were in 
operation. However, the total number of the train stations at that time was actually 255. Of 
these, only 168 were operational (OSE, 1993). This clearly shows that there was a gap in 
communication between the consultant and the management of the OSE. That gap was 
extended to the absence of any particular form of direction from the management to the 
consultant. Formally, it was the company’s management that had assigned the contract to the 
consultant. However, in practice, it was clear that the consultant was operating under the 
instructions of the Ministry of Finance. The main objective of these instructions was the 
reduction of public spending, regardless of any operational and strategic objectives that the 
organisation had.   
 
This resulted in the resignation of the then Director General (it is significant that he was a 
representative of the employees in the board of directors and a member of the conservative 
ruling party at the same time), who was reported to disagree with the intentions of the 
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ministry of finance and with the study’s content. His resignation caused political turmoil 
between the government and the employees union in an effort made by the employees to 
block TR’s proposals. In the following press release (made by unionists1 who politically 
were attached to the ruling party), the conflict existing between the organisational context 
and the Ministry of Finance is clear. It was a political conflict that reflected the political 
dimensions of the operation of the organisation with the unionists asking for the Prime 
Minister’s mediation. Furthermore it revealed the important role of the syndicate as an 
institutionalised form of organisational structure in influencing the day-to-day accountability 
relationship (trans:). 
“We were surprised to be informed… that the General Director and elective member of 
DAKE announced that he submitted his resignation to the government so that he could 
“make its work easier”.  
 
Regardless of the acceptance of his resignation by the government, DAKE… is not 
accepting it and calls on both the General Director and the government to clearly state 
which, is the project in question whose removal would accommodate the government.  
 
We clearly state that if this project involves limiting the railway network or the railway 
staff, then DAKE will defend with all its means both the integrity of the Organisation 
and the work of its staff…”(DAKE OSE, 1993). 
5.4.2. Conflicting interests and patterns of integration  
Drawing from the theoretical concepts developed in Chapter 3, the patterns of agents’ 
interaction are influenced from certain configurations of power and conflicting interests. This 
is why we have examined the effects of the study made by TR; to show how these patterns 
have been formulated, to identify the conflicting interests and to depict how these factors 
affect the patterns of organisational integration.   
 
The coerciveness of the external environment has formulated patterns of interaction that are 
based upon dominant relationships. In such forms of relationship, accountability as a concept 
becomes irrelevant, since interaction and interdependence are not based upon mutual 
understanding. In structures of interaction that are based upon dominant relationships, 
accountability is defined as the power to keep others accountable for their actions. However, 
                                                 
1 “DAKE” 
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it has emerged that common knowledge (that has the power to formulate common 
perceptions over the role and the objectives of the railway company) shapes the action of 
different social actors (the Director General, the members of the syndicate, the members of 
non-governmental group and the local community). These common perceptions managed to 
define common action and, as a result, they formulated a nexus of accountability 
relationships.  
 
Accountability established a rule-following aspect of action according to the historically 
developed stock of knowledge. The common shared perception of what constitutes 
appropriate railway strategy is reflected in the Director General’s reaction. Accountability 
constituted the boundaries of organisational action and consequently led that key actor to 
resign from his position in an effort to further mobilise social reflections against the proposed 
policies. Accountability defined organisational membership and formulated common 
objectives. The collectives were aiming to make the Minister of Finance accountable for his 
real intentions relating to the introduction of such rationalities to the management of the 
railway company and thereby to restrict his action. Integrated and interdependent actors were 
able to resist the coercive power of the Minister of Finance, whose role was regarded as 
promoting private interests such as those of the owners of the intercity buses.  
 
On these grounds, the company’s financial deficit,1 was considered as the result of the 
government’s inconsistency concerning its financial obligations towards of the organisation 
as these were determined in law 1485/84. Only in 1993 the financial obligations of the Greek 
Government towards the OSE, for the provision of unprofitable services and for maintaining, 
and managing the railway infrastructure, increased by €882 million (30 billion drachmas). As 
a result in relation to other European rail companies OSE’s long-term liabilities in 1993, 
reached the 34% of its total assets (see figure 5.1). The lack of the state’s financial support 
led the organisation to borrow long-term funds in order to finance its annual losses.  
 
                                                 
1 At the end of 1993 the company’s total deficit reached 800 billion drachmas or €2.4 billion. 
2 Approximately.  
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Figure 5.1: Non-Current liabilities as a % of Total Assets in European Rail Companies 
(Source OSE, 1994) 
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The lack of investments on the Greek rail industry resulted in order for a period of ten years 
(1983-1993) the company’s operating revenue from its commercial activities to remain 
stagnated, with the company accumulating year-by-year financial and operating deficits. 
However, as was seen in Chapter 41, the poor financial performance of the Hellenic Railway 
Organisation is not an extraordinary situation, but rather a general trend characterising many 
railway companies, especially in Europe. What makes OSE a unique and extraordinary 
situation is its very low productivity. A situation which is the immediate result of the 
inefficient and problematic management exercised plus the outcome of the small size of the 
rail network and rail infrastructure that makes it difficult for the company to increase is 
market share. Productivity as an indicator in the railway industry is the quotient of the total 
passengers-kilometres plus freight in tones-kilometres divided by the number of the 
employees. This indicator varies within the EU according to geographical segments with 
Balkan countries been those with the lowest productivity rate (310,000 kilometres per 
employee) at almost half from the European average (660,000 kilometres per employee). 
OSE had a productivity rate at that time (1991-1993) equal to 209,000 of kilometres-units per 
employee, only 30% of the European average, below the average of the Balkan countries 
(source OSE, 1994).  
 
                                                 
1 Section 4.2. 
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However, the resulting integration of the different institutional elements did not manage to 
form common policies and objectives that would modernise the company’s organisation. As 
was demonstrated, the main reason for that is that the necessary discourses over the 
modernisation of organisational structures had been charged with negative and predefined 
meanings. More important, however, was the fact that they did not give reference to any of 
the organisational structural relationships (they ignored ASKE, the industrial union, the 
Director General and, consequently, the board of directors, as well as the social groups and 
local communities). The force exercised by the Ministry of Finance for the 
institutionalisation of certain practices ignored the true needs of the organisation at all 
hierarchical levels. Governmental interference caused a series of problems that did not allow 
the organisation collectively to evaluate the ongoing action and to introduce the necessary 
changes where inefficiencies occur. As a result, structural changes that might have had 
positive effects, such as the accounting separation between the infrastructure and commercial 
service units, promoted by European directive 91/4401 are treated with suspicion and cause 
reaction and conflict.  
“A characteristic example is the much discussed distinction between network 
exploitation and operation. In other countries, this distinction may constitute a 
tool for better economic relations with the state, but in Greece it may constitute 
a way of handing over the profitable parts of the network to private initiative...” 
(Interview EG, 29 June 2006).  
The Ministry’s perception that privatisation had the necessary social acceptance and was 
regarded as essential for the structural modernisation of the railway company, led to the 
formation of social coalitions that based their cohesiveness upon an established 
organisational rationality that was fundamentally opposed to privatisation. At that level, 
social and political conflicts concern ideals and not structures, roles or control mechanisms; 
while roles and practices gained their substantial meaning (according to the objectives they 
pursued), at the social level, any inefficiency derived from the way they had been operated, 
managed or controlled remained unquestioned2. It was a conflict that had at the centre of its 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 4, section 4.3. 
2 As a result of that dispute and the lack of a coherent plan with formulated strategies and objectives 
concerning the company’s modernisation targeting to improve operational efficiency and to advance 
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dispute, not the modernisation of the existing normative environment, but rather the nature of 
the Hellenic railway industry itself. More particularly, the dispute concerned the use of the 
allocated European funds. The employees and the social groups were afraid that the main 
governmental strategy was to allocate European resources to the road-network1. For this 
reason, managers and employees perceived that the proposed strategy aimed to create a small 
and privatised railway network. In contrast to governmental intention and to the suggestions 
made by TR, organisational proposals concerning its investment plan were based upon the 
objectives included in the 1983-1997 strategic plan.  
 
The social reaction to the objectives of the Ministry of Finance was such that the newly re-
elected government of PASOK (1994-2004) based its efforts for the modernisation of the 
railway industry not on privatisation, but on managerial accountability reforms.  
5.5. Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to depict the elaboration of the formal managerial and 
financial accounting structures of interaction in the ongoing organisational action. For this 
reason, the above section divided OSE’s structuration process into three chronological 
periods. The first period was SEK’s transformation from an operating department of the 
Ministry of Transport becoming OSE, an independent state owned enterprise. The second 
period is that of the socialisation era and the introduction of social control. The last period 
was the one characterised by the first efforts for the establishment of managerial and business 
objectives.    
 
The structuration process and the role of the agency in that process show that the efforts for 
the structural modernisation failed to alter the way that organisational action was taking 
place. Imposed changes failed to alter the way that senior, higher and lower managers, 
                                                                                                                                                       
the company’s business capabilities, the company’s accrued deficits by the end of 1994 that reached 
9,371 ECU or 1.1% of the total GDP. At the same time its share in the transportation market for 
freight and passengers customers further declined reaching 0.64% for freight customers and 2.49% 
for passengers. 
1 It has to be emphasised that an additional effort to decrease public spending was to reduce public 
investment. In the 1991 National Investment budget the public spending concerning OSE was 
reduced by 40%. As a result, the company did not have adequate funding to implement the co-
funding investment projects by the EU and the Greek State.    
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employees and social groups and the government were interrelating. The introduced 
modalities failed to regulate the new organisational roles and to become part of the ongoing 
accountability mechanism. Seniors management’s role has traditionally been linked to that of 
the governmental representative, drawing its power and legitimation from an ability to 
impose its will either through a military type of discipline (in the first period), or through a 
political type of discipline (in the second period). While formal structures were adapting to 
the institutionalisation pressures in order to gain the necessary legitimacy, organisational 
roles remained part of a wider political game that allowed governments to use the 
organisation to pursue their objectives. For that reason, the neo-introduced modalities failed 
to regulate organisational roles. Consequently, they failed to enforce the necessary trust and 
interdependence and, as a result, the formation of responsibility.  
 
Accountability as an ongoing action has a practical meaning when it allows mutual control 
between super-ordinates and sub-ordinates. Modalities gain a substantial significance when 
their use makes that process meaningful. In any other case, actors will attempt to restrict the 
super-ordinates’ power by using other forms of interaction and interdependence. In the case 
of OSE, it was clear that the formation of strategic objectives did not manage to regulate day-
to-day action. The latter was formulated on another level between senior management and 
governmental officials without the involvement of other institutional groups. This is why, as 
the third period indicated, organisational agents attempted to control governmental decision-
making through their industrial action by exercising political influence. That as will be 
shown in the next chapter, had major effects upon the evolution of organisational systems 
and structures of interactions, since pre-existing configurations of powers and patterns of 
integration remained unchallenged. As a result, organisational objectives failed to elaborate 
the operational requirements of ED 91/440. 
 
Under these conditions, the Greek government introduced a second critical change in 1996, 
concerning the modernisation of OSE’s structural elements according to the NPM model. 
The way accountability relationships were influenced is discussed in the following chapter.    
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6. Chapter - Initiation of managerial accountability reforms in 
the context of OSE: effects upon patterns of interaction and 
interrelation  
6.1. Introduction  
The coercive influence of the Minister of Finance, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter, resulted in TR’s strategic and operational plan1, being seen by OSE’s employees2 
and managers as a ‘scientific-style death warrant’ for the company’s public and social 
character. Employees, managers and other social groups perceived that the company’s 
disaggregation was founded in the conservative government’s3 ideological objectives. As a 
result awareness of any potential financial and operational benefits that might emerge from 
the accounting separation of the company into infrastructure management and service 
operator was lost in an ideological conflict. On the one hand there was the neo-liberal desire 
for less state participation in the country’s economic activity supported by the Government of 
the day. On the other hand there was an established organisational and social culture that 
demanded more active financial support from the Government for the development and 
modernisation of the OSE’s capital assets such as rail infrastructure, rolling-stock material, 
etc. This conflict resulted in a failure of employees and managers to apply those strategies 
that were intended to reorganise the company according to the requirements of the European 
Directive 91/440. 
 
However, the demand of the European Committee for transparent and efficient use of the 
available European funds for the company’s managerial and operational modernisation, in 
addition to the need of the Greek Government to control and restrict the company’s 
accumulated financial deficit and annual operating losses, made imperative the need for 
changes in the company’s business administration and operating strategies. The application 
of managerial accountability reform (which in the Greek social context gained a more 
holistic character after 1996, with law 2414), and the incorporation of business plans as 
accountability frameworks in the organisational context of the OSE, are examined in relation 
                                                 
1 Aimed at the OSE’s reorganisation, according to the European Directive 91/440, and the segregation 
between railway infrastructure manager and service operators - freight and passengers 
2 See section 5.4.1. 
3 Period 1990-1993. 
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to the general changes taking place in the European context,1 and the efforts made by the 
European Community to introduce rationalities that will have direct social and economic 
effects on the public policy of the member states. More particularly, reforms in the Greek 
railway industry are associated with the momentum of the single European rail market 
imposing deregulation, corporatisation and managerialism in an effort to promote 
‘pragmatic’, technocratic leadership according to the spirit introduced by the European 
Directive 91/440 (see Chapter 4). In addition, reforms are associated with the country’s effort 
to join the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and the following demand to meet the fiscal 
restrictions of the Maastricht Treaty2.  
 
The following analysis concerns the period 1998-2002. It focuses upon the efforts of 
organisational actors and collectives in the context of the OSE to formulate common business 
objectives, and to establish mutual responsibility and trust within structures of organisational 
action mainly defined by the Greek government and the EU by two different, but at the same 
time interrelated, social contexts. The analysis examines the use of the formulated strategic 
and operational plans in that period as modalities introduced in order to establish managerial 
authority, and to formulate the relationship between the company’s administrative manager, 
who had been assigned the key role in the process of the company’s financial and operational 
modernisation with his inner and outer organisational contexts.  
 
Specifically, the following chapter splits the analysis into three sections. The first section 
aims to depict the objectives and intentions of the European Committee’s strategies and how 
these affect the organisational context and influence the role of the administrative manager. 
The second section aims to depict the materialistic conditions that characterise the 
organisational context of the OSE and restrict the role of the CEO in applying pragmatic 
technocratic leadership according to the characteristics of the dominant rationality of 
managerialism. The third section of the present chapter aims to depict the way in which the 
                                                 
1 It is not the purpose of this thesis to devalue the impact of other international organisations such as 
the IMF on the Greek governments’ policy. The impact of the EU is more direct; through, the 
economic agreements and objectives and the imposition of directives and regulations, the European 
Community defines the strategies of its member states. 
2 The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and it constitutes an agreement among the participating 
states of the European Union to adopt a single currency and monetary system. 
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operational plan of 1998-2002 was used by the first CEO, appointed in 1997, in order to 
accommodate the expectations of the institutional environment, to influence the patterns of 
organisational interaction and to manage and control managerial and operational action. 
6.2. Managerial accountability reforms in the Greek railway industry 
and the role of the European strategies 
As the introduction emphasises, it is important to understand managerial accountability 
reform in the OSE in relation to two interrelated social contexts: first in relation to the 
context of the European rail industry and the changes introduced to it (see Chapter 4); and 
second, in relation to the Greek context and the strategic choices of the Greek Government, 
the economy to meet the fiscal restrictions defined in the Maastricht agreement, and Greece 
to join the EMU. Without the increased influence of the European Union, in these two 
different but at the same time interrelated and mutually influenced social contexts 
characterised by the present analysis as the “micro” one, identified with the reform in the 
European rail industry, and the “macro” one, identified with the country’s participation in the 
common European market, and the adoption of Euro as a single hard currency, such 
structural changes, in the Greek social context, probably would have been difficult to 
initiate1. The next section discusses the influence of the changes European Union at micro 
level. 
6.2.1. The effects of European strategies on the context of the OSE 
European Directive 91/440, which constitutes the first step towards the direction of market 
deregulation and corporatisation of the European rail industry, initiates major changes that 
target the reform of the European rail industry according to the organisational characteristics 
of other sectors in the Transport Industry, like the aviation sector2. The aim of European 
Directives3 is to integrate the European rail market by lifting any technical and regulatory 
barriers that restrict competitiveness between rail companies. For that reason the European 
Union finances investment in rail infrastructure in member countries.  
 
                                                 
1 See the analysis made in Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
2 See Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
3 See Chapter 4, figure 4.1 
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Aiming to secure transparency in the use and management of the funds made available with 
the Community Support Frameworks (CSF)1, the European Committee imposed changes on 
the OSE that had a dual dimension: to initiate the modernisation of managerial and 
operational control systems, and to enhance managerial and financial independence from the 
Greek State. The European Commission believed that the OSE had not ensured even the 
minimal requirements of efficient and transparent use of the available funds with the CSFs 
(Chaicalis, 1997). It is significant that the lack of adequate financing from the Greek 
Government led the company to intentionally underestimate the cost of the investment 
projects in order to increase the number of investments that would secure financing from the 
2nd and 3rd CSF2 and to complete its investment plan (ΔΟΜΠ3, September 1998).  
 
Thus in 1996, the European Commission imposed the establishment of the first subsidiary 
company, ERGOSE S.A. The European Commission insisted on establishing “ERGOSE”, so 
that the responsibility of tendering for projects would be lifted from OSE. It was thought that 
separating ERGOSE from OSE would successfully address inefficiencies, like the 
determined under-costing, and the fragmentary planning4 of the investment projects that were 
                                                 
1 The European Union together with the Greek Government are the main sources of funding for the 
development and modernisation of the Greek rail industry. The necessary financial resources for the 
modernisation of the Greek railway infrastructure and superstructure were first directed to OSE in 
1989, the outcome of the First (1st) “Community Support Framework”, and the “Cohesion Fund”. 
Since 1989, three CSFs have been introduced aiming to support Greece in the development of the 
country’s infrastructure: 1st (1989-1993), 2nd (1994-1999) and 3rd (2000-2006). 
2 During the 1st CSF, 70% of the necessary funds were provided by the Greek Government and 30% 
by the EU; later, that became 50%-50%. 
3 In Greek: Διεύθυνση Οργάνωσης, Μελετών και Προγραμματισμού; In English: Directorate for the 
Organisation of Projects and Planning. 
4 Believing that a single contractor would result in greater benefit and efficiency for the organisation, 
and taking advantage of the initiatives provided for the cooperation between private and public 
companies, in 1989 (it was a decision concerned the projects financed by the A’ CSF) the 
management made the strategic choice to develop the railway infrastructure from Athens to 
Thessaloniki by contracting a single international consortium of constructors. The purpose was for the 
project to be financed by private and public funds and for the consortium to provide the know-how 
that the small Greek construction companies lacked for such big projects. However, the Greek 
Government’s aims and those of the Technical Chamber of Greece, as well as those of the unions of 
the Greek construction companies, imposed the sectional implementation of the investment. Their 
argument was that by splitting the project into small contracts, the time needed for the investment’s 
implementation would be narrowed. The result, however, was that while in 1989 OSE’s managers 
estimated that they would be able to finish the rail track’s modernisation (given that the funds were 
available) six years later, the work for its development is still taking place – and will continue for at 
  119
perceived as the main causes of the inefficiencies in the completion of the company’s 
investments plans (OSE, September 1998). The aim of the European Commission was to 
increase transparency and control in managerial action via the separation of the financial 
accounts and management responsibilities between OSE and ERGOSE.  
“The EU provides some money and it wants this money to be secured in a certain 
way… In particular, when public companies such as OSE have economic problems they 
may, instead of using EU funds to carry out projects, cover various expenses outside 
these projects, thus spending EU money without any result. I believe that, since the EU 
provides funding in order for it to be used on projects, they would encourage us to 
establish an independent body to ensure transparency of transactions with OSE. The 
main reason… is the general principle of transparency of transactions” (PX1, 18 March 
1996). 
ERGOSE was an attempt by the European Commission to change OSE’s managerial and 
operational context, which was seen as inefficient and dysfunctional. ERGOSE was the first 
“praxis” towards the application of NPM principles in OSE’s organisation. It was the first 
implicit attempt (since ownership and management of rail infrastructure remained an OSE 
responsibility) to disaggregate the rail infrastructure from service provision departments, an 
operational strategy required by the ED 91/440. The foundation of ERGOSE meant that the 
company’s management and the Greek Government accepted the European Committee’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
least two more years (the Ministry of Transport and the company argue that the work in the 
infrastructure will be ready by 2010, even though many managers disagree with that forecast). The 
fragmented investment project in the rail infrastructure is regarded as a major obstacle and cause of 
delays and inefficiencies in the railway investment projects, as well as the main obstacle in 
management’s effort to develop an efficient operational strategy. The above mentioned becomes clear 
in the press conference (03 February 1989) that the General Manager of OSE gave about the 
company’s investment proposal/ The General Manager of OSE gave a clear account of this in the 
press conference (03 February 1989) concerning the trans-European high-speed rail network and the 
modernisation of the Greek railways (trans.): 
When asked by a journalist: “you mentioned self-funding. You are aware that the government more 
or less seems to have rejected that. You also mention that there must be one contractor and that 
funding should not be done sectionally. But this contradicts Greek interests. The Technical Chamber, 
as well as contractors, talk about sectional contracting and construction, because this would minimize 
construction time and financial return.” 
The General Administrator answered: “…we are aware of the small size of Greek contractors [in 
terms of business size and technical capabilities]. They have a problem with completing big 
projects… experience tells that in small projects, competitions [in investment projects] are frequently 
repeated and there are many delays [because of objections to competition results filed by 
participants]…” 
1 Chairman of the Board 1996-1998 
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rationale which, argued that giving OSE the responsibility for the modernisation of the 
railway infrastructure had deflected its management from their main objective, which was the 
provision of efficient and commercial orientated rail services for passengers and freight 
customers.  
“One of the structural problems of the organisation is the existence of construction 
works, which is an activity different from transport services and therefore results in 
undermining its railway activities… (Interview KS1, November 2008)” 
It was believed that, by allocating the responsibility of supervising the construction of works 
concerning railway infrastructure to ERGOSE (the formulation of plans, the setting of 
objectives, as well as the definition of technical and operational characteristics of 
investments remained OSE’s obligations), the ability of OSE to formulate the necessary 
strategies for the provision of competitive (in relation to the other modes of transport) 
services to customers would be reinforced. Thus, the objective of financial transparency 
gained increased importance in the managerial modernisation of the Hellenic Railway 
Organisation. Through financial transparency, in addition to the securing of the efficient and 
effective use of the financial resources made available for the modernisation of the rail 
infrastructure (e.g. the rail network) and superstructure (e.g. the signalling system), the 
European Community aimed to sift rail culture from its technical orientation towards a 
business culture2.  
“…it must be noted that the organisation did not have a complete plan on how these 
investments would increase its efficiency and profits. In other words, no plans existed 
for the economic efficiency of projects [investment projects on rail infrastructure] and, 
what is outrageous is that no plans existed for the commercial development of the 
railways. This means that we are constructing the rail route between Athens and 
Thessaloniki and there are no plans or studies concerning rail track’s capacity… or train 
specifications…” (Interview PI3, 30 June 2006; trans.) 
For that reason, the European Committee imposed upon the organisation the formulation of 
business plans that would define the company’s financing, operating and investing activities.  
                                                 
1 Ex-member of the BoD 
2 This is a conclusion also reached in Chapter 4 (see section 4.3) 
3 Former General Manager responsible for the company’s business planning 
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“…the implementation of a business plan for OSE was required by the European 
Regional Development Fund as a prerequisite for funding railway works from the 2nd 
CSF…” (OSE, 1998:20)  
The provision of European funds from the 2nd and 3rd CSFs for the implementation of OSE’s 
proposed projects became contingent upon their financial viability and social contribution, 
and - moreover - contingent upon their alignment with the wider strategies developed and 
enforced by the EU in relation to the development of Trans-European rail networks (COM, 
1991; 1996 and COM, 2001). In practice, the purpose of the European Commission has been 
to control whether the funds provided by the Committee are directed to the commonly agreed 
strategies with the Greek Government and the organisation with the aim of turning OSE into 
a financially independent, competitive and customer-orientated Rail Company.  
“The operational plan aimed to implement in the commercial (operational) technical, 
social and financial management goals of OSE and is harmoniously connected to the 
medium and long-term strategies of OSE, i.e. higher share than today – in passenger 
and freight transportation, more active development in the National Development 
policy… higher servicing of imports and exports, improvement in the quality of services 
offered, increase of revenues, reduction of operating expenses , marketing and social 
dimension of railways, implementation of technical and operational modernisation, 
development and expansion of the network and broadening the cooperation with other 
national and foreign enterprises” (Operational Plan Railway 1994-1999: 5). 
The application of new control procedures was based upon the formulation of strict rules that 
defined: a) the necessary conditions for an investment (concerning railway infrastructure and 
the company’s managerial and operational reorganisation) to become selectable and to gain 
financing from European funds, b) the control process and c) the transparency mechanisms 
and information to the public. These conditions were not satisfied by the previous control 
relationship, restricted between the government and OSE.  
“…prior to the regulations imposed by the European Committee, tenders were 
announced together with preliminary project plans, and planning was finalised during 
the construction. The contractor completed the plans; however this ended up increasing 
costs because it included costs that were not calculated before and this led to excess in 
the total cost... Nowadays there is no chance of getting permission to tender for a 
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project [she means from the EC] if you have not completed the plans…” (Interview, 
HL1 4 September 2006; trans.). 
Through the establishment of ex-ante, mid-term, and ex-post controls, the European 
Commission aimed at keeping OSE and its subsidiary ERGOSE directly accountable for the 
efficient implementation of project funding. For that purpose performance indicators2 
relating to the effectiveness, management and financial implementation of the investments 
co-funded by the European Union and the Greek Government, (included in the company’s 
investment plan, approved by the Greek Government and the European Committee) were 
incorporated. The control process concerns both the time and cost efficiency of the 
investment plan, implemented by OSE and ERGOSE. OSE as the final beneficiary is 
accountable for the efficient implementation of this, to the EU and the Greek Government. 
Both companies prepare monthly bulletins with all the necessary information concerning the 
performance indicators that are directed to the Managing Authority3, which is responsible for 
monitoring the efficient implementation of the OSE’s investment project and making the 
necessary ground inspections. Using this information, the European Committee can assess 
the efficiency, in terms of cost and actual implementation, of the funded projects and it can 
make suggestions, to the Greek Government relating to the improvement of the 
implementation process.        
 
The European strategies reveal the lack of trust in the patterns of integration and 
interrelationship between the company’s management and the Ministries of Finance and 
Transportation (the ministries responsible). European strategies have been established upon 
the deeply held belief dominant in the European Commission that the historically developed 
                                                 
1 ERGOSE manager who has been transferred there from OSE. 
2 ABSORPTION PROGRESS INDICATOR (API): defined as the quotient (disbursements / 
approved budget). REALISATION PROGRESS INDICATOR or PHYSICAL COMPLETION 
INDICATOR (PCI): defined as the quotient (payments for works performed) / (total projected cost). 
EFFECTIVENESS INDICATOR: defined as the quotient (disbursements) / (total programmed 
commitments for the period 2000-2002). PERFORMANCE INDICATOR: defined as the ratio of the 
physical completion indicator (PCI) to the absorption progress indicator (API). 
3 Managing Authority (MA) of the Ministry of Transportation’s Operational Plan: “Railway-Airports-
Urban Transport” financed by the C’ CSF; In Greek: Διαχειριστική Αρχή Επιχειρησιακού 
Προγράμματος Υπουργείου Μεταφορών και Επικοινωνιών: “Σιδηρόδρομοι- Αεροδρόμια- Αστικές 
Συγκοινωνίες”. The MA was established in accordance with article 37 of EC Council Regulation 
1260/1999. 
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patterns of accountability between the railway organisations and the Greek government 
disorientate the former from the provision of financial efficient and commercially orientated 
railway services; a perception also shared by both employees and managers in the 
organisation. The majority of the interviewees believe that inefficiencies1 and bad 
management in the process of drawing and implementing the company’s investment plan 
were the result of the explicit intervention in the company’s ongoing managerial activity of 
“local” institutional and non-institutional interests (private companies implicated in the 
company’s investment plan), and mainly the result of the increased political influence 
exercised by the political parties and the industrial union upon the organisation’s day-to-day 
management.  
 
The aim of the European strategies has been to alter the established patterns of relationship 
between the management of the railway company and the Greek Government, and the control 
mechanisms that have formulated that relationship. The reforms introduced were an attempt 
to modify the company’s management and operational control systems by initiating radical 
amendments to the way that decisions were made, justified, reported and controlled. More 
important, however, is the fact that the European Committee has developed policies and set 
strategic objectives2 that aim to support the European rail industry, and to increase its share 
in the transport market. For that purpose, it finances the modernisation of the rail 
infrastructure in the member countries of the European Union. Thus, the influence exercised 
by the European committee is seen by organisational actors and collectives as positive. Thus, 
while many managers and unionists disagreed with the establishment of ERGOSE, and raised 
their concerns and fears that the subsidiary’s establishment would cause increased 
inefficiencies and delays in implementing and completing the investments on the rail 
infrastructure (BoD articles, 18 March 1996), the need for the organisation to secure the 
                                                 
1 The lack of financing from the Greek state, which, as mentioned earlier, led to the intentional 
underestimation of the cost of the formulated investment plans, the fragmented character of the 
implemented investment projects, the deficient legal framework of the tendering process concerning 
public investments and the aging personnel are perceived as the primary causes of the company’s 
planning and control inefficiencies, as well for the many time delays, in the implementation of the 
company’s modernisation process. 
2 See section 4.3. 
  124
European financing and to fulfil its investment objectives resulted in an inner-organisational 
truce. 
 
The demand of the European Committee for managerial independence of the OSE from the 
Greek Government, and the faith that instrumental forms of control would enhance 
transparency and trust in the use of the allocated European and National funds, gained a more 
holistic character, with managerial accountability reform introduced by Law 2414/19961. The 
next section discusses the effect of the strategies pursued by the Greek Government on the 
context of the OSE. 
6.2.2. Effects on the OSE from the objectives pursed by the Greek Government 
at macro level 
Using as its main political slogan the word ‘modernisation’, the re-elected, ‘Socialist’ party 
in government in 1996 attempted to institutionalise structures of social and economic 
organisation, based upon the predominant neo-liberal idea, as that is promoted by the 
European Committee, of the ‘less’ and more economic effective state. According to 
governmental intentions, as underlined by the expectations of the European Committee, the 
managerial accountability reforms applied aimed to reverse the problems of centralism, 
bureaucracy and favouritism which dominated and bedevilled the Greek public sector, and 
were responsible for the increased operational inefficiencies and corruption in public 
administration2. It became a central strategic choice of the then Greek Government to restrict 
its role in the country’s economic activity, aiming to control public deficit, and to join the 
Economic Monetary Union (EMU), a decision which led to the adoption of the NPM model 
in public administration. As the first CEO, appointed in June 1997, said (trans.):  
“My involvement with the railway company came in the period of the country’s efforts 
to join the EMU. During that period, and upon demand by the European Community, 
considerable efforts were made by the government in order to limit DEKO’s fiscal 
deficits, which was the main reason urging me to get involved with OSE. In this attempt 
to limit deficits in DEKO, Law 2414 was passed, which stipulated what was self-
evident, that is, the creation of strategic goals and business plans which determine the 
necessary actions for meeting strategic goals and employing those capable of 
                                                 
1 And after 2005 by Law 3429, which amended law 2414/1996 
2 See Chapter 2. sections 2.4 
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implementing such plans. In my view, the law was so simplistic that I called it a prayer 
book in one of my articles at the time. The new law voted by parliament, Law 3429 of 
2005 [the one amended 2414/1996] also resembles a prayer book. Both laws constitute 
a cry of desperation by Ministers, first for the EMU, and now for the country’s fiscal 
supervision by the European Community” (Interview MI1, 06 July 2006).  
Through the reform, the Greek Government sought to distinguish between the strategic role 
of the government in the formulation of a framework within which OSE will operate, and the 
company’s operational management. Thus, central to the reform was the concept of 
managerialism, and the faith that technocratic, profit-orientated managers would do the ‘right 
thing,’ and they would manage to modernise the managerial and operational control 
procedures in the OSE according to the demands of the European regulations, and, moreover, 
to restrict the company’s financial deficits. In order to secure administrative management’s 
authority and CEO’s status as a competent agent, it became critical for the Greek 
Government to alter the formulated perception of administrator managers as individuals that 
hold their positions as a result of personal and political friendships with the ministers in 
power. Thus, with law 2414/1996, criteria aiming for the meritocratic selection of business 
managers were institutionalised.  
“Procedures of meritocratic selection of managerial administration bodies are 
established. In order for the modernization of DEKO to have positive results, the 
management methods have to change. What is required from management is strategic 
thinking, contemporary business knowledge, imagination, sensitivity to social 
developments, flexibility, ability to mobilize the human factor and strong will in 
decision-making. Management should enjoy wide acceptance and increased status…” 
(Greek Government, 1996). 
As can be seen from figure 6.1 which follows (and which constitutes the guide to the 
subsequent analysis), managerial accountability reform in the Greek social context has 
adopted all the norms and rules which, according to NPM’s legitimate structure, would 
efficiently formulate the accountability relationship between the CEO, the Government, the 
EU, and the company. The incorporation of a managerial contract that would regulate the 
relationship between the government and the company’s CEO, as well as the 
                                                 
1 First appointed CEO. Even though, he was appointed for a five year period, as it will be explained 
later in that chapter, he only remained at his position for a period of almost three years (June 1997 – 
June 2000)  
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institutionalisation of performance objectives, for both the CEO, and the company, the use of 
which aims to control and evaluate managerial and business performance, represent all the 
established perceptions over the ability of mechanistic forms of control to impose the 
necessary transparency on agents’ actions and intentions, and to establish the crucial trust 
between the CEO, the inner (organisational) and the outer (the Greek Government and the 
European Committee) contexts. 
 
Figure 6.1: Conceptualisation of the structuration process as this is governed by the 
principles of managerial accountability reform 
 
However, because of the existing relations of power and the contradictions characterising the 
Greek social context and the organisation in particular, the executive’s authority to 
reorganise, control and coordinate organisational action was explicitly defined (by law 2414) 
to be contingent on the executive’s ability to motivate, mobilise and cooperate with his 
subordinate managers and employees towards common organisational objectives, and to gain 
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their trust over his competence to modernise the company, which remained under social 
control1. The participation of employees’ representatives in the BoD indicate the increase in 
power and ability that the subordinates have in influencing the company’s operational 
strategies and restricting CEO’s ability to dominate the organisational context, and to enforce 
operational strategies unilaterally, like those related to the company’s disaggregation 
between rail infrastructure and service operating business units. This is an argument that the 
case of the first nominated CEO provides. 
 
The candidate who had been proposed by the Ministry of Transport2 attempted to position 
himself in opposition to the inner organisational environment, and more particularly, in 
opposition to employees’ industrial union, which was opposed to the suggestions and 
strategies made with the previous business plan (period 1990-1993) aimed at the financial 
rationalisation of the company’s operating activities through the abolishment of unprofitable 
services and parts of the rail network (see chapter 5). The nominated CEO attempted to 
emphasise his ability and commitment to alter the organisational context and the already 
established patterns of action and power relations, justifying in this way the legitimacy of his 
role as a powerful and rational-market orientated agent - characteristics that he was supposed 
to represent. This was made evident in the answer he gave to one of the questions posed by 
members of the responsible parliamentary committee3 about the way he perceived his role: 
when he was asked about how he would deal with interests in the organisation, he said that 
he would put his foot down, and added: (trans.): 
“…Of course, I am only 5’6’’, but when you hit the leader of the ants on the head, they 
disperse” [he means the employees]. Furthermore… he said that he would decrease the 
huge financing deficit of the organisation with organisational changes, firing the ravens 
[the employees] which contaminate the organisation, and punish misconduct…” 
(Zagorianitis, 1997)  
                                                 
1 Social control was exercised by the BoD which was consisted of nine members: eight non-executive 
members and one executive - the CEO. Apart from three members of the board that represent 
employees and social groups, the remaining members are appointed by the government. 
2 In 1997. 
3 In an effort to secure meritocracy, the law (2414/1996) foresaw the nomination to be made by 
independent consultants, and the candidates to be examined by the responsible parliamentary 
committee before their appointment as CEO in a public utility organisation. 
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However, his effort to launch himself as an agent capable of exercising “pragmatic” 
leadership raised the concern of the members of the Greek parliament and the employees’ 
union, who demanded that the Ministry of Transport reject this candidate, a demand that was 
fulfilled in the end. While the Greek Government’s aim was to enforce managerial 
independence, stability and motivation through the provision of financial incentives to 
management (the Chairman of the BoD and the CEO), the image of the powerful and 
dominant agent whom the nominated CEO had tried to launch, was beyond the Greek 
Government’s explicit expectations; or it was beyond its power to impose such a status on 
the Greek Society.  
 
It has become apparent that the expectations of the inner and outer contexts influence the 
norms and rules that give meaning to organisational roles and intra-organisational 
relationships. This is why they also shape the substance of the strategic and operational plans 
as modalities of organisational interaction and interrelationship, influencing the rationale of 
the ongoing operational and managerial action, and consequently, the tensions that generate 
accountability. The way in which the strategic and operational plans for the period 1996-
2002 were incorporated as interpretive schemes, norms or facilities (see Chapter 3), in order 
to regulate the relationship between the CEO, his subordinates, the Greek Government, and 
the European Union, is discussed in the subsequent section. The central theme in the 
following discussion is the elaboration of the requirements of the European Directive 91/440, 
imposing the OSE’s disaggregation between rail infrastructure manager and service 
operators.  
6.3. The incorporation of business plans in the period 1996-2002: 
patterns of continuity and change in organisational interaction 
6.3.1. Factors restricting the ability of the CEO to control and coordinate 
organisational action 
Locating actors within organisational contexts means that their actions, intentions and 
objectives are bounded by pre-existing beliefs and configurations of power that was one of 
the arguments made in Chapter 3. In the preceding section, the analysis argues that the ability 
of the CEO to exercise his authority to control and to rationalise organisational action 
financially is not based upon projecting an image of a powerful, rational self-interest, 
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motivated agent, dominant in the private sector; rather, it is based upon the formulation of 
mutual understandings and trustful relationships with subordinates. Yet the existing planning 
and control organisational systems were totally inappropriate for the formulation of 
operational and business objectives that would be based upon common organisational 
perceptions and practices. In addition, they were totally ineffectual in their use as 
performance evaluation and coordinating mechanisms. As a manager forcefully argues 
(trans.): 
“…there are no serious mechanisms in our company for controlling the purpose of 
expenses… There is no monitoring mechanism which makes you accountable every day 
for the actions or omissions of every department. Nobody bothers to check what you did 
and how you did it. The French economic principle ‘‘laissez-faire’’ is the applied rule 
here [he is sarcastic]. I will give you an example. When I worked [during the period 
under discussion] in the supply department, there were two employees who were not 
doing their job properly. Lack of a monitoring mechanism meant that the organisation 
had signed contracts for the supply of materials, had paid for them but had not received 
them for a year… there were contracts that had expired many years ago, maybe as many 
as ten, and we had never received the materials. For, if you don’t press charges against 
your supplier within 6 months, enforcing the contract, you lose your claim. We have 
suffered many losses because of that. Each department places orders without knowing 
its precise needs. OSE has many similar inherent weaknesses… expenses are neither 
assessed nor justified at any stage. The organisation is supplied with materials worth 
millions, which are useless. It is a perpetual waste of public money” (Interview TG1, 23 
August 2006). 
A very interesting contradiction that characterised the organisational context of the OSE, was 
that while most contemporary management control functions (financial and cost accounting; 
budgeting; internal control; operational and strategic planning) have been incorporated into 
the company’s formal organisation, and competent departments exist, the importance of 
management control and accounting information in the day-to-day management, and - more 
important - in the formulation of business strategies, was not understood. As the following 
citation the CEO appointed in June 1997 indicates, accounting as an organisational control 
function, failed to implement its basic role, as a recording system of financial transactions. 
“When I signed my management contract [1998] with the organisation, I realised that I 
was not allowed (due to the conditions existing in the organisation) to submit the annual 
                                                 
1 A finance department supervisor. During that period he was in the supply department 
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balance sheet according to law and within the time period required by law. I had to 
submit the balance sheet of the previous year [1997] which should have already been 
signed 6 or 8 months, maybe even a year, before. So, I realised that the organisation’s 
accounting system had certain limited potential that was insufficient because the 
organisation was not monitored in the classic meaning of the term. Accounting 
information was not exercised for administration purposes and it did not interest anyone 
to find out whether these elements existed... the accounting information system was 
insufficient in its way of receiving information. For example, Thessaloniki [the city’s 
train station] sent the receipts [from ticket sales] to us every 6 months, while these 
receipts had to reach the OSE accounts department daily so that they could be recorded, 
and the monthly accounts had to be disclosed within the first 15 days of the following 
month according to law. The second major problem with the accounts department is the 
absence of computer based system. The organisation has been supplied with a 
computerized system which carried out general and analytical accounting, salary 
payments and some other basic applications which were nevertheless not used. They 
[employees] used an older software application because they were more familiar with 
its application, which covered only salary payments” (Interview IM, 6 July 2006; 
trans.). 
Significant to that argued, over the absence of an appropriate and effective accounting 
information system is the fact that the organisation did not have full records its operating and 
non-operating assets. As a result various public institutions (mainly municipalities) and 
individuals were taking advantage of the OSE’s property (mainly land-fields the organisation 
owns) and they were exploitating these for personal benefit. At the same time the 
organisation was not in position to develop the necessary business activities and to efficiently 
use its assets in order to financially contribute its rail activities. The relevant department (the 
“Real Estate department”) employed four members of staff, a number not appropriate for the 
efficient control of the company’s property (OSE, 1995), while no cooperation and 
coordination can be assumed between the relevant departments implicated in the process of 
monitoring the company’s operating and non-operating assets; the real estate department, the 
accounting department, and the legal department. Significant to that mentioned is that the 
accounting department was notified on changes in the company’s assets from the amounts it 
received or paid from transactions related to purchasing and selling assets. As a result 
financial accounts did not prudently disclose the company’s financial position and the value 
of its assets (Interview PT, 12 September 2006).  
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Apart from the accounting department’s inability, for a period of ten years, to disclose OSE’s 
financial accounts (discussed at section 5.3.2.), OSE had only limited capabilities in 
analysing, processing and communicating cost related information. Despite the fact that OSE 
had a cost accounting department, this has not been functioning properly and it has been 
understaffed. As the manager of the cost accounting department pointed out, administrative 
managers have never been interested in realising whether or not the cost accounting 
department was functioning properly.  
“Cost Accounting was introduced experimentally in 1970, but has been systematically 
applied since 1997… while it is envisaged by law, it is of no concern to anyone if it is 
applied or not” (Interview SL1, 28 August 2005). 
An additional example constitutes the preparation of the annual cash budget, which was seen 
rather as an obligation to be fulfilled, and not a substantial control process, restricted, as the 
following quotation makes apparent, at the level of political negotiation between the 
administrator manager, and the Ministries of Transport and Finance. The annual budgeted 
figure usually exceeded the company’s actual operational needs because the managers knew 
that every year they would get less than the amount asked, not according to their true needs, 
but according to a political decision made by the Ministry of Finance, based on the country’s 
macro-economic objectives.  
“Most times, expenses are increased intentionally because when they are approved by 
the Ministry, they are cut down, which results in the organization not being able to 
function. It is like a game of cat and mouse. The amount that we declare in our budget 
is larger so that we can negotiate with the Ministry and ensure the functioning of the 
organisation. As you see, the budget as a mechanism of monitoring the functioning of 
the organization and as a means of appointing positions of responsibility is not 
effective” (Interview SR2, 02 August 2006). 
The management’s dysfunctional characteristics, the lack of management control systems 
and the absence of cooperation and coordination between the vertically organised 
directorates and departments, were the outcome and reflected the nexus of organisational 
relationships as these were influenced by the institutional environment. The allocation of 
                                                 
1 Supervisor of the cost accounting department.  
2 Finance Manager. 
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responsibility to agents was not based upon merit, subject to their competence to perform the 
tasks and obligations emanating from a particular role acting within the organisational 
system, but rather upon political criteria, through a bargaining process between the 
administrator, who was an individual appointed according to political criteria, and the 
industrial union, and anyone else, mainly ministers and members of the Greek parliament, 
who could access and influence decision making.  
“…the organisation needs loans to fulfil its current needs… when I asked the economic 
directorate to calculate the amount we will need to borrow to cover the organisation’s 
funding need, the person in charge suggested 35 billion drachmas [almost €103 
million]. During the process of control I realised that there is a false perception of how 
the organisation’s current obligations and its funding needs were determined. This 
amount included the management’s estimates of what we would need in order to fulfil 
our obligations. At that point I had to explain that what we need is to determine the 
organisation’s short-term liabilities… the amount in question went from 35 billion 
down to 14 billion drachmas. At a subsequent stage of control I realised again that the 
term was not fully understood… the economic director at the time could not fully grasp 
the term. This probably happened because he had neither the knowledge nor the ability 
to do it; what is most likely is that he did not know because nobody had asked him 
about it before” (Interview MI1, 06 July 2006). 
The interference of political criteria in the ongoing managerial action was such that each time 
the government, the company’s administrator, or even the Minister of Transport changed and 
new persons were appointed in those positions, managerial tasks, at senior, and even more at 
junior level were taken away from those managers performing these tasks, and they were 
allocated to others who were perceived to be friendly to the interests of the new 
government/minister/management.  
“When I joined OSE, I found about 20 managers “in the freezer”. This means that they 
supported a political party different from the one in government and therefore were left 
without any authority. Such individuals… were placed in such a position so that they 
would not be able to intervene anywhere and they were simply sitting around. So you 
establish a directorate/department without any authority and these people are just sitting 
around. With the succession of parties in power, such a practice is regarded as normal” 
(Interview MI, 06 June 2006). 
                                                 
1 provided by company’s first CEO, appointed in July 1997 
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This situation led to employees and managers being undermined, which resulted in the 
formulation of methods of individual action that were not conventional to what can 
commonly be perceived as accepted corporate action, based upon commonly shared business 
objectives and strategies1. As a consequence, roles and responsibilities were frequently 
undertaken by incompetent agents, with negative effect upon the company’s modernisation 
process and its efficient management. 
“…state intervention, lack of employee specialisation, lack of utilising competent 
employees and a large degree of intervention by trade unions do not allow the 
introduction of private economic criteria. Values are undermined in all levels and there 
is no meritocracy” (Interview SD2, 23 June 2006). 
The level of the influence of external factors upon employees and managers, and the 
increased pressure exercised upon executive management to satisfy their demands, limits a 
CEO’s ability to control and coordinate organisational process, and moreover to influence the 
behaviour of subordinates. As the following quotation indicates, the existing conditions and 
factors influencing the action of organisational actors caused the first appointed executive in 
charge to distrust both his subordinates’ competence to perform the responsibilities allocated 
to them, as well as their intentions and morality in relation to the company’s business 
objectives, and their relationships with their superiors.   
“The suitability of personnel, their training, and the provision of incentives, willingness 
and focus on organisational aims are essential parameters for the successful 
implementation and materialisation of any business objectives. In this respect, the 
organisation is highly dysfunctional… and this dysfunction is linked to the great 
influence of trade unions and political factors in everyday management. Interventions of 
this kind have given employees a mentality that does not help them fulfil their personal 
ambitions through business activity, but by seeking political or trade union support in 
order to influence the source of decision making. This is an unwritten rule… over time, 
this situation contributed to the eradication of meritocracy and to the erosion of the 
                                                 
1 It is indicative of the above quotation that a large number of the interviews conducted for the 
purposes of the present thesis took place outside the company’s offices, because the managers either 
did not have an office or no one was interested in realising if they were in their offices. In other 
occasions when interviews took place in offices, some of the managers were sitting there without 
doing anything; they were just reading newspapers, chatting, moreover in an extreme (?) occasion, 
one manager had a small TV in his office, watching the national basketball team of Greece playing in 
the 2006 World Cup in Japan. 
2 Manager at the level of supervisor in the finance department  
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system… consequently, you find yourself in a working environment where people try to 
stab you in the back, or they may have good intentions but their actions are wrong…” 
(Interview MI, 06 July 2006). 
Nevertheless, the company was obliged by the European Committee (in order to finance the 
projects in the rail infrastructure) and the Greek Government (with law 2414) to formulate 
business plans aiming to specify the company’s corporate mission and values, to analyse the 
new conditions in the rail industry, as these were influenced by the European Directives 
91/440, and the forthcoming directive 2001/12 (with the first rail package1), and to define its 
strategic objectives as well as the operating, investing and financing activities necessary to 
meet the formulated corporate targets (agreed as being very important with the Greek 
Government and the European Committee).  
 
This is why the modernisation of the company’s management control systems became central 
to the CEO’s efforts. It was the CEO’s explicit intention to give substantial meaning to intra-
organisational relationships and to reinforce the accountability relationships that had been 
flagged and, furthermore, to overturn the total absence of adequate control and reporting 
mechanisms from the ongoing action that had resulted in the diffusion of responsibility, with 
devastating effects on managers’ ability to perform their role2.  
“…my first concern therefore was to restore relations of trust with the different 
managers to be able to cooperate with employees with an underlying message of 
meritocracy concerning our choices…” (Interview MI, 06 July 2006). 
The application and efficient employment of control mechanisms aimed to regulate 
organisational roles and to assign responsibility, in order to designate the attached 
responsibility to those managers competent to perform organisational roles, and in order to 
secure the implementation of the objectives laid out in the business plan. That was a critical 
issue for the CEO since, in contradiction to the company’s previous business plans (those 
discussed in Chapter five), under Law 2414/1996, the formulation of the new 1998-2002 
business plan gained increased importance, since it defined the responsibilities of OSE and 
                                                 
1 See section 4.3. 
2 See the analysis made in the section 6.3.1. 
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the company’s CEO towards the Greek Government and the European Commission. The 
incorporated business objectives would be used by the government in order to assess the 
company’s modernisation process and its ability to increase its productivity and business 
income, as well as its capacity to use its capital assets effectively. The compensation of the 
company’s CEO and of the Chairman of the BoD, was based upon the satisfactory and 
efficient implementation of the business objectives incorporated into the managerial contract.  
 
In addition, the business plan and the incorporated business objectives defined the mutual 
obligations and responsibilities towards the European Committee for all the three parties: the 
government, the company and the company’s CEO. Thus the application of an efficient 
control system that would monitor the effective implementation of the formulated strategies, 
and the transparent use of the financial resources made available by the Greek Government, 
and the European Community Support Frameworks (CSF), was crucial for the CEO and for 
the company in order to gain the trust of the institutional environment that they are 
competent to perform efficiently and transparently the company’s financial and operational 
modernisation.  
“The state approves the business plan and draws up… the management contract with 
quantified objectives, which would allow the ex-post and essential corporate control… 
[Moreover] the business plan does not only constitute a joint Ministerial Decision 
[between the Ministries of Finance and Transportation] but it is also a document on the 
basis of which we are assessed [the Greek Government and the OSE] by the EC” 
(BOD’s Article 362, 11 November 1998). 
The use of the 1998-2002 business plan in the effort of the CEO to formulate future actions 
towards the company’s financial rationalisation is discussed in the following section. 
6.3.2. The 1998-2002 business plan as norm aiming to legitimise CEO’s 
authority 
The 1998-2002 business plan initiated changes towards the company’s financial and 
operational rationalisation. The accounting department was reorganised, and the company 
began to publish annual financial statements again1. Cash-flow management was introduced, 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 5 it was mentioned that the company had not published annual financial statements for a 
period of thirteen years. 
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while policies that were directed towards improving customer profitability were applied. The 
profitability in these services was inextricably linked to the reduction of trip duration, and 
specific journey time-targets were set. This had two main effects: the first was that the 
necessary works on the rail infrastructure were prioritised and the time horizon for their 
completion was planned and controlled, whilst the quality standards set in order for the train 
services to attract more customers managed to improve the quality of the provided services 
and punctuality. In that sense the company’s strategic plan concerning its investment 
activities, which pre-existed to his appointment, became part of the formulated 1998-2002 
business plan. Moreover, the management controlled the costs generated by the rail services 
provided, and managed to improve the productivity rates1. Hence, changes in the traffic 
regulations of the itineraries were implemented, which rationalised the operational cost of 
train itineraries, whilst the implementation of marketing strategies also began (OSE, 1998). It 
is significant that in the financial years 1998 and 1999 the employees cost (salaries, fringe 
benefits etc) as a percentage of the total operating cost declined significantly (Kioulafas, 
2000). That was the result not only of the decline in the total number of employees but 
mainly the outcome of the intention of the CEO to control labour cost. In that direction Law 
2671/1998 initiated major changes on the way employees’ salaries and fringe benefits were 
estimated. This is why, in the financial years 2000 and 2001, the company managed to 
control, and even more, to decrease (inappreciably) the annual operating losses (OSE, 2000; 
2001; 2002; 2003).  
 
Aiming to secure the trust of the institutional environment, the CEO’s key objective was to 
rationalise financially the company’s operations. The company’s financial rationalisation was 
the objective that gave true substance to his role. In practice, the only unambiguous 
directions given by the Greek Government to the OSE’s administration were those provided 
by the Ministry of Finance; these concerned the reduction of the organisation’s annual 
                                                 
1 Productivity is a crucial indicator, whose improvement should be a priority in the effort for 
improved performance in inefficient, high deficit SOEs like OSE. Year 1999 was a turning point for 
the organisation’s productivity rates, which after a period of almost ten years managed inappreciably 
to reverse the declining productivity rates (Kioulafas, 2000). That was the outcome of the reduction in 
the number of employees in addition to a small increase of the total passengers and freight in tonnes 
kilometres.   
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operating losses in order for the country to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. This is where the 
business plan gained its substantial meaning involving all the constituent roles (ministers, 
CEO, managers, employees) in the process of reproducing the organisational system through 
the formulation of specific actions. Thus, as one senior manager pointed out (trans.): 
“…the operational plan [1998-2002] constituted an administrative paradigm towards the 
right direction… we were all implicated in the effort to rationalise our business 
operation financially and to contribute to the country’s effort to join the EMU” 
(Interview EG, 23 June 2006). 
The CEO’s business strategy was compatible to the characteristics assigned to his role as 
these were defined mainly by the expectations of the Greek Government and its target to join 
the EMU. By analysing the effects of alternative strategies on the company’s efficient 
operation and the managerial objectives, the business plan was aiming to provide a basis for 
the formulation of rational strategies, in terms of financial efficiency and economic 
effectiveness. Thus, the operational strategy selected by the CEO concerning the company’s 
disaggregation according to the European directive 91/440 for the period 1998-2002 was 
formulated on the basis of the accounting segregation between the service divisions and the 
railway infrastructure division as the most financially effective and appropriate for the OSE 
operational strategy. As the CEO of the period pointed out (trans.): 
“The strategic choice of not distinguishing between infrastructure manager and service 
operators allows the organisation not to focus entirely on a modernising “purifying” 
procedure, which would lead to further costs, as it has everywhere, and organisational 
dysfunctions (complexity in company relations, multiple accounting departments, 
unclear responsibilities) with undetermined aims and consequences. Simple 
organisational patterns are much more cost-effective and efficient...” (Interview MI, 06 
July 2006) 
Based upon the experience of other national rail companies in Europe with characteristics 
similar to the Greek one (see Chapter 4), the plan foresaw the establishment of four business 
units1 with separate marketing, commercial, and accounting departments. The demand by the 
                                                 
1 One business unit responsible for the provision of services to the passengers; one responsible for the 
provision of freight services; one responsible for managing the rail infrastructure, and finally one 
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European Directive 91/440 for transparency in the company’s financial relationship with the 
Greek government was perceived to be secured by reporting each business unit’s financing 
activities on separate financial statements (income statement and balance-sheet). The 
Government’s financing liabilities (as these were defined in the economic agreement) 
emerging from the provision of social services, and the cost of maintaining and operating the 
rail infrastructure, were recorded and disclosed on the social balance-sheet, whilst they were 
defined in law 2671/1998.  
 
The 1998-2002 operational plan strategy which was adopted concerning the company’s 
accounting separation between infrastructure manager and service provision business units 
was intended to have the least1 operational and financial effects on the patterns of 
organisational action. The materialistic conditions defining operational action in the OSE, 
and more particularly the lack of financial resources for the necessary investments for the 
company’s managerial and operational modernisation, has resulted in order organisational 
knowledge not to be codified, in the sense that no detailed job descriptions existed. 
Organisational knowledge in the OSE is rather transferred from senior to junior managers 
through common practices and the day-to-day interaction. 
“Detailed regulations and tasks’ descriptions related to the company’s operating 
activities do not exist. In order to create such regulations and job descriptions, a huge 
amount of human effort and financial resources is required, which the organisation does 
not have available to dedicate. This is why while in the other European rail networks 
detailed plans and descriptions exist, for example, for laying the rail track, in the OSE a 
tradition exists that is transferred from generation to generation. Few of the Chief 
Engineers have tried to codify operational knowledge but any effort was fragmented…” 
(Interview RT, 27 June 2006) 
The aim of the CEO was not to cut off organisational managers and employees from the 
practical knowledge, synergies and coordinative activities that were defining their ongoing 
action by operationally distinguishing service provision from infrastructure operation 
                                                                                                                                                       
responsible for maintaining the rolling stock material and providing technical support to the rail 
operators. 
1 According to the ED 91/440, the accounting disaggregation of railway infrastructure from the 
service provision was compulsory, while the business segregation remained optional. 
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business units, and to make the operational system1 expensive to run with increased 
administrative costs. The decision of the accounting segregation reflected the fear of the 
organisational actors and collectives that a possible institutional division of these two 
activities would have negative effects upon the company’s operating capacity and its ability 
to perform efficiently its operating activities. The belief (shared by the CEO and his 
subordinate managers) that the changes and proposed business segregation of the state-
owned rail organisations imposed by the European Directive 91/440, had not been 
thoroughly planned was dominant in the organisational context, whilst their application could 
have had devastating effects upon the OSE.  
“Organisations such as OSE have very slow decision-making procedures. Such 
organisations have an advantage; they can draw on the experiences of organisations that 
have passed to different development stages… OSE was late in acting and therefore it 
was concluded that accounts separation was better than institutional separation… so I 
believe that this inactivity is not negative, but rather that the system selects it itself. It 
does not constitute weakness on the part of the humans in the system, but instead it is 
normal human behaviour when people realise that such changes may have uncertain 
results if they are not thoroughly planned. Therefore, inactivity… constitutes a 
conscious choice made by certain company employees who have both the knowledge 
and experience to see that the implementation of European Directives would have 
disastrous effects for the organisation… I do not believe that inactivity constitutes a 
random state; instead it is an action…” (Interview LM2, 4 October 2006).  
As the following quotation indicates, the CEO considered that the changes in the patterns of 
the managerial and operational action required by the European Directive 91/440 should be 
gradual in order for employees and managers to learn and understand the new conditions of 
operational action, in order to restrict any unintended consequences upon the competence of 
business organisation to provide operational efficient railway services. It has to be 
emphasised that, as a result of the restrictions imposed by the government in the appointment 
of new personnel, the average age of the company’s workforce was reaching 45 years. Aging 
personnel was a condition that made it difficult to initiate new patterns of operating action. In 
addition the decision for the company’s accounting segregation was reflecting the fear of 
organisational actors that business segregation might lead to the privatisation of the rail 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 4, the case of the UK railway system and the effect privatisation had upon the operational 
functions are described. 
2 During the period in which the plan was made he was a senior manager. 
  140
operator. The provision of railway services and its inextricable link to the public character of 
the railway company (at least in the European context) is a common perception, a common 
belief that underlines the behaviour of organisational actors, and their action. Consequently, 
as the analysis in Chapter 5 also indicates, it defines the boundaries of the accountability 
relationship1. The selected operational strategy of the accounting segregation secured the 
company’s institutional rights as administrator of the railway infrastructure, as well as the 
responsible institutional body for allocating infrastructure capacity, and for granting 
permission to other railway companies to access the Greek rail network (OSE, 1994). 
“The restructuring and rebuilding of railways must take place during times of political 
calmness and with procedures of communication and consensus. Efficiency is 
impossible when you initiate major changes in a negative environment. Regardless of 
organisational structure, responsibilities and competencies must be clear and dependent. 
Safety [in transportation services] is not only ensured through procedures, technology, 
systems and standards but mainly through individual competence and responsibility. 
Complete and immediate change is a source of failure. Employees need time for 
learning and adjustment. If no organisational, administrative standards and guidance 
exist, then the system will undoubtedly become unstable and dangerous” (Interview 
MI2, 06 July 2006).  
The newly appointed CEO, in June 1997, wanted to avoid any disputes and conflicts with his 
subordinates over the issue of the public character of the rail company that would limit his 
ability to control organisational action and the behaviour of his subordinates’. Trying to align 
his objectives and intentions with those already established, and shared by his subordinates, 
the CEO attempted to become part of the organisational system, and to keep employees, and 
managers accountable for their actions and their objectives while formulating the necessary 
coalitions that would allow him to implement changes.  
“The successful implementation of organisational changes… must take into account any 
negative powers and resistance due to… uncertainty of employees, interest groups, 
managers, workers… team inactivity… which is why it should ensure the support of 
centres of authority (trade unions, government)… to envisage the establishment of a 
team of “agents of change”… the participation and involvement of staff to a 
                                                 
1 This is an argument clearly stated in Chapter five, where the analysis indicated that in the period 
1990-1993, the then administrative manager resigned from his position in an effort to trigger 
opposition to the plans of the Minister of Finance. 
2 The company’s first appointed CEO  
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coordinated transformation of systems/structures of organizational culture and abilities 
… (OSE, 1998: 17) 
The decision for the disaggregation of financial accounts between the infrastructure manager 
and rail service operating units was seen as a learning process, aiming to distinguish and 
individualise the responsibility for which one would remain accountable1. Individualised 
responsibility and the need for agents to reduce uncontrollable risks and costs, in addition to 
the sanctions concerning the efficient implementation of the formulated targets, is expected 
to introduce the need for the business separation between the infrastructure division and rail 
service divisions. This is why the vertically organised business units and the provided 
managerial independence to the business units that the operational plan foresaw, were 
intended to be used as a first step towards the company’s business disaggregation. As stated 
in the suggestions, directions for the efficient implementation of the five year operational 
plan (1998-2002) were made by the contracted management consultant to the CEO and the 
BoD, as follows:  
“…the organisational structure suggested by the business plan [1998-2002] may be used 
as a first stage for the possible separation [business] between infrastructure manager 
and rail service operators [freight and passenger]” (OSE, 1998; trans.). 
Hence, the present thesis argues that the business separation between service provision and 
infrastructure management was, in practice, postponed until after 2002. According to the 
business plan made and the objectives set, it was expected that the company’s modernisation, 
and more particularly the modernisation of its accounting and administration departments, 
would have been completed by then. The CEO expected that the new rationality in the 
company’s management would introduce the necessary changes in the patterns of the 
business action, whilst the application of a modern control system, based upon performance 
evaluation, would secure the efficient cooperation and coordination of the established 
business subsidiaries.  
                                                 
1 As it was discussed in Chapter 4, this constitutes an objective of the European Commission, 
characterising the reforms in the wider European rail industry. 
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“…what is imperative for achieving management through performance objectives is an 
accounting and cost accounting system which would produce reliable results, and it will 
make available the necessary information for income, costs and profitability generating 
activities… the effort of [business] restructuring could lead to a future [business] 
separation of activities of infrastructure manager and service operators… the results, 
conclusions and suggestions for implementing a business plan are governed by the 
philosophy of such a separation [business]” (OSE, 1998). 
It has become apparent that the five-year (1998-2002) operational plan aimed to legitimate 
CEO’s position within the organisational system, and to enhance his capacity to control 
organisational activities and implement the objectives, and targets in the managerial contract. 
Nevertheless, the lack of trust in the competence of his subordinate managers and over their 
intentions (see the analysis in section 6.3) was used as an argument by the CEO in order to 
overcome the operational strategies formulated with the 1998-2002, operational plan, which 
foresaw the company’s accounting segregation and its separation into four, managerial 
independent business units. As the following quotation1 indicates, the argument articulated 
by the company’s CEO was that it would have been impossible for him to manage and 
control the function of these four independent business units. Thus, contrary to what the 
business plan foresaw, no managerial autonomy was ceded to the business units. 
“…I did not see any point in the existence of business units if the decisions on issues 
concerning personnel management, budgeting, or procurement for instance were made 
outside those units… there was strong disagreement on this issue, but the CEO at the 
time [articulated] the seemingly logical argument that here I cannot monitor a single 
directorate for economic, planning and personnel… how will I be able to monitor four 
or more? … The truth, however, is that when you establish business units, they must 
have different functions” (Interview PI, 30 June 2006). 
The effort of the CEO to control and coordinate the inner organisational context, and the 
effects that the concentration of managerial power in his hands had in his effort to secure the 
trust of his subordinate managers over his competence to perform the objectives with the 
business plan objectives, are discussed in the next section.  
                                                 
1 It was provided by the then manager, who was responsible for the company’s strategic and 
administrative planning.  
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6.3.3. Implications in the effort of the CEO to legitimise his position 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that accountability in organisational systems is the outcome of the 
norms, rules and values known to and shared by the members of an organisational system 
that underline the objectives of their organisational action, and establish a rule following 
aspects of action and behaviour. This is why, while the meaning that underlines 
organisational action can be influenced by individual actors, it cannot be defined by them. 
The meaning of the action is collectively formulated, and thus individual actors cannot 
control the perception that the other members of the organisational system form about their 
intentions and objectives. That argument becomes clear from the way that subordinate 
managers perceived the CEO’s decision to concentrate managerial and planning authority in 
his hands, and to overcome the formulated operational strategy by not establishing the 
business units foreseen with the business plan. 
 
While the operational and managerial conditions in the organisation described in the previous 
sections, and the lack of trust over subordinate managers competence to perform their role 
may justify the CEO’s decision to concentrate managerial power in his hands, the reality is 
that, without the necessary independence and the assigned responsibility for which one 
would remain accountable, planning, control, and performance evaluation systems have no 
practical role to play in the company’s ongoing organisational action. Managers regard 
themselves as agents when they have the ability to act, to make decisions to participate in the 
formulation of the objectives of their departments or business units, to control the process 
and the outcome toward objectives, and finally to remain accountable for any deviations from 
the collective formulated rationality (as this is described by the objective and the selected 
action). If the responsibility for the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the 
organisational objectives lies solely with the CEO, this leads to the isolation of his 
subordinates from the process of the company’s managerial and operational modernisation; 
moreover, as the following quotation indicates, it cancels out the learning objectives that the 
management with the 1998-2002 business plan were hoping to meet.  
“So in this case we have the issue of responsibility. On the one hand, the management is 
obliged to allocate responsibility and monitor the result of actions. On the other hand, 
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the existing situation in our organisation is very convenient for everyone. No essential 
responsibility is given to organisational sub-groups, so one is not interested in 
monitoring the efficiency of their actions. At the same time, the managers and 
employees remain complacent, since the actions of the organisation are determined by 
others. Any objections raised by the CEO concerning the suitability of the business 
organisation and its qualities may be justified; however business units cannot operate 
without clear allocation of responsibilities and without decentralisation…” (Interview 
PI, 30 June 2006). 
Managers felt that the patterns of organisational interaction remained unchallenged and they 
were once again denied the opportunity to act collectively and demonstrate their competence 
by undertaking managerial responsibilities. It is significant that in contradiction to what Law 
2414 foresaw, the business plan made (period 1998-2002) did not foresee any executive 
authorities and tasks to the administrative council1, which in practice constituted the only 
collective management scheme with an executive role to play. The lack of an administrative 
council meant that all information available to the BoD2 was controlled by the CEO. This is 
why the ability of the company’s board of directors to formulate the company’s strategic 
objectives and to control the administrative manager for the efficient implementation of the 
social, financial, investment and operational objectives set with the business plan was 
limited, as the following quotation indicates (trans.): 
“The BoD is required to exercise control in accordance with the objectives that have 
been placed. What possibilities exist [for the BoD] to realize effectively its role, to 
exercise control on CEO’s decisions, when all the information that it receives emanates 
from the CEO who is the one under control. There never was an operational unit within 
the organization that could have access to information and that it will be accountable 
directly to the board of directors so that the latter can be in position to monitor CEO’s 
actions” (Interview BA, 4 September 2006).  
The crucial conclusion to be made is that while the 1998-2002 business plan was used by the 
CEO as a communication mechanism to control and rationalize financially organisational 
action, it did not constitute a framework of inner organisational dialogue, and it did not 
enhance participatory management. As the citation that follows exemplifies managerial 
                                                 
1 The formation and allocation of managerial responsibilities to the administrative council was first 
foreseen in the socialisation act.  
2 Contrary to the conventional perception the BoD in the OSE has no executive powers. It has the 
responsibility for the company’s social control and strategic planning. 
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authority, and organisational dialogue are seen by the CEO, as contradictory concepts 
resulting in inefficiencies when the intention of the administrative director is to exercise 
management by objectives. The need to exercise his authority according to the efficient and 
effective application of the managerial and operational objectives set with the 1998-2002 
operational plans, becomes essential for the CEO, not only due to his belief that his 
subordinates are incompetent to perform the allocated responsibilities, but more importantly, 
due to his belief that no moral principles and values existed to influence subordinates actions 
and their objectives. It is obvious that the CEO believed that only self motivated interests are 
those underlining his subordinates’ actions and the only way to control their effects is to 
closely monitoring these by exercising his authority.  
“…I am satisfied with the way that organisation’s executives reacted, in my way of 
work which is not particularly easy, because when you are the head in an organisation 
there is no tolerance for many discussions, particularly if you have a specific direction 
and targets to implement. If a CEO discusses a lot it means that he does not know his 
work. Discussion is based upon the exchange of opinions, but it is also an indication of 
the way work has to be done. Decision making is not a democratic process in the sense 
that the majority decides; rather it has a technocratic meaning of what has to be done 
according to the targets. Administration is required to function according to this form, 
because organisation’s employees are morally exhausted…” (Interview MI1, 06 July 
2006). 
With his decision not to establish independent operational units and to allocate 
responsibilities to the heads of these units, the CEO breached the rationality that underlined 
the business plan. The changes in the operational strategy were perceived by subordinate 
managers as an action that served CEO’s individual interests, the targets, and the terms 
incorporated in the managerial contract which the Chairman of the BoD and the CEO signed 
with the ministries of Finance and Transport. Many senior managers, members of the 
administration in the period 1998-2002, perceived the performance indicators in the business 
plan and the managerial contract were nothing more than the delineation of trends concerning 
passengers’ service development, easy to configure and to depict. As a former general 
manager stated (trans:)  
                                                 
1 The company’s first appointed CEO  
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“There are targets in the management contract signed by the Managing Director but 
there is also a problem… they are downgraded… you don’t have any trust because it 
depends on the target of the person negotiating the business plan according to which he 
will act… so the CEO described the situation with the worst terms. Because business 
plans have long-term 5-year targets, the management sets high targets with too many 
prerequisites which are never fulfilled because the conditions that were set prior to that 
have not been met. In microeconomic indicators, that is, in the deficit [figure], you set a 
downgraded target which is easily met and you also expect that you will be rewarded 
for this effort. Therefore, you do your own calculations and you know what you can 
achieve. So you set targets depending on what you can achieve and how you can be 
rewarded for it.” (Interview ML, 09 June 2006). 
Moreover, employees and managers became increasingly concerned over the objectives and 
motives of the CEO. The CEO’s need to comply with the requirements and expectations of 
the Greek Government and the European Committee for a financially independent and 
economic effective rail organisation concentrated the company’s investment strategy upon 
the completion and modernisation of the rail axis between Patrai-Athens-Thessaloniki (total 
length 700km; see the railway map). From a business perspective, this was the part of the 
Greek rail network in which the provision of rail services for customers and freight could 
generate adequate operating income for the rail company. Moreover, it was the part of the 
Greek rail network from which the investments for its modernisation secured financing from 
the European Union, as part of the Trans-European rail network. For the rest of the rail 
network (total length of 2205km), the management foresaw minor investments, aiming to 
keep the rail network operational but without implementing major modernisation projects, a 
decision which in practice was leading these parts of the network to operational neglect.  
“…so there are scenarios which envisage a reduction of cost. One of these scenarios, 
which is not documented out of concern for the potential political fallout, stipulated 
drastic cuts in expenses by closing down the network of the Peloponnese1…” 
(Interview MI, 06 July 2006). 
Moreover, the company’s financial rationalisation, presupposed the restriction of the 
company’s business activities to those services that could generate operating profits. It is 
significant that, in contrast to the explicit with the strategic plan (1998-2005) corporate aims 
                                                 
1 It is the most financially inefficient part of the Greek rail network with limited operating capabilities 
owing to the lack of investments on rail infrastructure and superstructure.  
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and business actions, the CEO believed that the provision of services to freight customers in 
Greece has no profitability potential. As the following quotation indicates, the CEO believed 
that only the provision of rail services to passengers can secure the necessary and demanded 
financial viability to the company’s business activities.   
“The transportation of goods requires the existence of cargo… there lies the difference 
between Greece and other networks in Europe. There are two main economic centres in 
Greece; one in Athens and one in Thessaloniki. According to one view, the railway in 
Greece should turn to commercial transportation; I think that this strategy is wrong. 
Nowadays, goods are transported door-to-door. The railway does not have such 
business capabilities… and it cannot compete with cars as a means of transport… 
However, it is difficult to admit that we’ve lost the game and even more difficult to 
convince people that this policy is not effective” (Interview MI, 06 July 2006). 
However, as the above quotation indicates, the CEO could not persuade the inner, 
organisational context to provide reasoning over the need for the company’s financial 
rationalisation, and the restriction of the company’s operational activities. The rationale that 
rail services and profitability are two incompatible concepts and objectives, and that it is 
inappropriate to evaluate the performance of the OSE according to short-term financial 
performance indicators, was still dominant in the Greek social context, influencing the 
behaviour of organisational actors. Apart from the managers in the finance and accounting 
departments who prioritised the control of the company’s operational deficits, for the rest in 
the research participants, the development and modernisation of the rail network were the 
prime strategic objectives for the company to enhance its operational and consequently, 
earning potential. 
“The suggestions of reconstruction of OSE which were discussed between the 
government and OSE administration… gave rise to controversy… In general, this is a 
business plan [1998-2002], which demands an essential shrinking of the railway 
network… the justification that these suspensions are taking place in order for OSE to 
become a profitable business is at least historical and naïve… it is the social role and 
the large indirect macroeconomic benefits that the railway offers and that the state 
should fund… the construction of greedy road works is a challenge and a major 
scandal… it is a scandal to continue with the ratio 1 to 5 for funds that are allocated to 
railway and road works respectively.” (Interview KN, 7 September 2006) 
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The CEO could not persuade his subordinate managers and employees, nor did he have the 
power to impose upon them strategies aiming at the company’s radical financial 
rationalisation through the abolition of the loss-making operating activities and parts of the 
rail network. This is why the CEO’s intentions remained implicit, and did not become 
explicit objectives defined in the company’s business plan. However, while the implication 
of instrumental mechanisms of accountability in the strategies of administrative managers to 
dominate the inner organisational contexts, and to impose their rationality emerge (as the 
analysis in Chapter 2 indicates), as the main reason for their disaggregation from the ongoing 
business activity, the present analysis argues that such an argument can only partially explain 
the segregation of business plans from the ongoing business activity in a state-owned 
organisation.  
 
Despite the fact that in the case under study, the business plan failed to make explicit all 
managerial intentions, and moreover, to establish relationships of mutual trust between the 
CEO, and his subordinate managers, the meaning of organisational action - as that was 
defined from the central choice of the accounting segregation between rail services business 
units, and infrastructure manager - was the outcome of a social process and thus, it 
established a rule-following aspect of business action. The power of subordinate managers 
and employees to penetrate the conditions of organisational reproduction, and the motivation 
of the CEO to manage and control organisational action resulted in the business plan being 
used as a norm that communicated to the outer institutional environment, what collectively 
was perceived by organisational actors, a legitimate operational strategy, conventional to the 
company’s operating and financing needs. Still, while the 1998-2002 business plan managed 
to express collective objectives in relation to the company’s accounting disaggregation, its 
use in the formulation of the company’s relationship with its outer environment, and more 
particularly with the Greek Government, failed. This topic is discussed in the next section. 
6.3.4. Patterns of continuation in the relationship between the Greek 
Government and the company’s administration 
Through managerial accountability reform, the Greek Government aimed to enforce a new 
model of public administration based upon managerial performance evaluation, and the faith 
that assigning increased responsibilities to the CEO would secure the efficient, and 
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transparent use of the financial resources, entrusted to the OSE by the Greek Government 
and the European Union, for the managerial and operational modernisation of the rail 
company. More important, managerial accountability reform aimed to detach Greek 
politicians from the OSE’s administration. Nevertheless, the reality is that the business plan 
and the objectives formulated with it could not be used by the government in its effort to 
evaluate the CEO’s performance, as well as the efficient and effective implementation of the 
business objectives formulated and agreed with these.  
 
Managerial accountability reform, introduced with law 2414 of 1996, had not been 
thoroughly planned by the Greek Government. The Greek Government, and more 
particularly the Ministries of Transport and Finance (the responsible Ministries), lacked the 
necessary organisation and competent personnel that would allow them to use the business 
objectives formulated by the OSE in order to evaluate the company’s management 
performance. It is significant that, in the Ministry of Transport, the relevant department 
employed only two staff members with the responsibility to evaluate the operational 
strategies proposed by OSE’s management.  
“We used to gather information and to read the organisation’s year-end reports 
concerning the efficient implementation of the projects included in the investment plan. 
But as we were only two people, it was impossible for us to exercise efficient control 
[on behalf of the Ministry of Transport]…” (Interview DX, 26 September 2006). 
The absence of a responsible institutional body that would define the country’s railway 
strategy1 led to responsibility being transferred to OSE2. While it may be argued that 
historically the national railway policy coincides with the company’s strategy (since the 
national railway network constitutes OSE’s asset having the responsibility to develop, 
                                                 
1 For example, in the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Transport decides on the closure of railway 
lines in agreement with the Ministry of Defence. A Rail Authority has been established and is 
responsible for the construction of rail infrastructure and for the operation of rail systems. In Italy, the 
Ministry of Transport and Communication has the responsibility for the formulation of the country’s 
rail strategy and regulation. In Austria, the BMVIT Sektion II (supreme authority for railways and 
other public traffic systems) is responsible for the interconnection between national and regional 
planning affairs, finance and control in the entire railway organisation. In the UK, the Strategic Rail 
Authority is the main government agency that deals with rail (ERRAC, 2004) 
2 Some European countries have an independent ministry responsible for their national railway policy 
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maintain and operate it), assigning such a responsibility to the company’s management can 
be viewed at least as inconsistent. Owing to this inconsistency, the organisation and its 
management are in practice both the controller (since the company’s management is the one 
which formulates the national railway policy and in practice legislates), and at the same time 
the one under control (since it is the one who implements that policy). Hence, keeping the 
national railway policy contingent on the company’s strategy means that the Greek state’s 
rail policy is defined by OSE’s business objectives that are in turn influenced by the 
managerial objectives included in the management contract signed between the Ministers of 
Finance and Transport and the CEO (according to law 2414/1996). Upon the satisfaction of 
the objectives incorporated in the management contract, CEO’s compensation is based. The 
outcome of this contradiction is that the country’s railway policy may be captured by the 
motivational characteristics of the actions and decisions of the rail company’s administrative 
manager. Consequently, the theoretical concept of the dialectic of control, the power that the 
subordinate has to control the information that the super-ordinate needs becomes an 
oxymoron, since the controller, the ministers of finance and transportation cannot derive and 
evaluate the necessary information for their objectives; instead they are totally dependent on 
the information provided by their subordinate (the CEO). Thus, the contractual relationship 
between the government and the management becomes meaningless, with the set operational 
business and managerial objectives becoming irrelevant to that relationship. 
“In Greece, the state never had knowledge of the railway… despite what is being said, 
what has ever been said and written, Greece could not make a distinction between its 
railway policy and OSE” (Interview DX1, 26 September 2006). 
Moreover, the efficient implementation of the business plan and the managerial objectives 
stipulated with it were contingent upon the completion of the work projects by ERGOSE and 
to the fulfilment of the government’s financial obligations towards the organisation, as 
defined by the economic agreement2 signed between the OSE and the Ministry of Finance. 
                                                 
1 This particular manager for a period of approximately of three years was working for the rail 
department of the Ministry of Transport and he was the Minister’s of Transport (2001-2004) advisor. 
2According to the economic agreement, the government has undertaken the following responsibilities: 
a) to finance the company’s investment plan, b) to compensate the company for the provision of non-
commercial services and for maintaining the rail infrastructure (in order to balance the market 
conditions and the competitive disadvantage between rail transport companies and road transport 
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However, the Greek Government was proved, once again, to be inconsistent to the 
obligations emanating from law 2671/1998 that defined the financial responsibilities of the 
Government towards the organisation. Apart from the provision of the necessary financial 
resources concerning the investments in the rail infrastructure and superstructure, the 
company had to borrow funds from Greek and foreign banks for the costs related to the 
maintenance and operation of the rail infrastructure and the provision of social services. 
During the period 1997-2000 the financial contribution of the Greek Government towards 
covering fixed expenses like the maintenance and management of the rail infrastructure, and 
variable costs emerging from the provision of social services was nil. While the government 
was underwriting the contracted loans, the capital borrowed and the interest rates charged on 
the principal amount burdened the organisation, further deteriorated its financial position and 
restricted the CEO’s ability to meet the agreed financial targets. 
 
Apart from the difficulties in the financing relationship with the Greek Government, the CEO 
of the OSE was not in a position to control the business action of OSE’s subsidiary 
ERGOSE, and to keep the subsidiary’s management accountable for any deviations from the 
agreed objectives with the OSE. While ERGOSE had been established in order to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of OSE’s investment projects, (those 
financed by European funds), the reality is that the subsidiary’s establishment resulted in 
increased contradictions and conflicts. The relationship between the two companies (the 
parent and the subsidiary), at least for this first period (1998-2001), was characterised by 
continuous conflicts between their managements, owing to the effort of the parent company 
to exercise control upon ERGOSE. As the following quotation states (trans.): 
“They ceded [the Greek Government and OSE’s previous administrations to ERGOSE] 
the management of national and European funds without any control. The period 1997-
2002 was characterized by a great clash between OSE and ERGOSE. On the part of 
OSE, its subsidiary was refusing to be subjected to any form of control by OSE. Control 
of ERGOSE was particularly essential [for OSE]. This company had assumed the 
                                                                                                                                                       
companies) as well as c) to continue financing, until 2002, when the modernisation of the 
infrastructure would have been completed, the total annual operational cost. Moreover, the 
government agreed to undertake the total accumulated deficit, (approximately €1.106 million), which 
was acknowledged to be the result of the Greek Government’s refusal to compensate the organisation, 
according to the obligations emanating from the 1972 economic agreement. 
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responsibility of carrying out the organisation’s investment plan. If this plan is not 
carried out, the goals of the business plan are worthless. The way in which the 
investment plan is carried out also determines the quality of the relations between OSE 
and its subsidiary. So what OSE wanted was to realise the degree of progress of the 
investment plan. This company [ERGOSE] did not manage to respond to the demands 
and expectations for which it was established” (Interview TZK, 28 August 2006) 
An example of the negative effects upon OSE’s business planning, from ERGOSE’s inability 
to fulfil its responsibilities towards OSE, is the case of the purchase of electrified train 
engines, a decision made by OSE in 1998. While it was expected that the modernisation of 
the railway infrastructure and its electrification, or at least a large part of it, would have been 
completed by 2002 (according to the investment plan before the Athens Olympic Games), the 
delays in the construction and implementation of the necessary projects (that have yet to be 
completed) have resulted in these engines, purchased by OSE, remaining unused in the 
warehouse.  
“…based on the plan we should have electrification of the railways but these 
complementary projects [of the electrification of the rail truck] did not proceed. As a 
result, we now have electric locomotives which are not used…” (Interview TD1, 13 July 
2006). 
When the 1998-2001 OSE’s CEO tried to exercise his authority by attempting to change the 
subsidiary’s executive management, which he perceived as being responsible for the delays 
in the completion of the modernisation projects on rail infrastructure and superstructure, he 
clashed with the Greek Government and was removed from his position.  
“…what happened is that he attempted to fulfil his authority and to take control of 
ERGOSE. He had made the decision to call shareholders’ general meeting, as he could 
do by law, and to change the subsidiary company’s executive management… though 
the minister of transport had a different opinion… one night he invited us [the general 
directors] in his house and he announced to us that he had been removed from his 
position” (Interview ML 10 June 2008). 
The reality is that instrumental forms of control, like the business plans, the managerial 
contracts and the economic agreement between the company and the government, had no role 
                                                 
1 Senior manager at the operation department  
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to play in the relationship between the management of OSE and the Ministries of Transport 
and Finance. It can be argued that their incorporation provided the CEO with increased 
powers, since they made each party’s responsibility transparent and, moreover, allowed the 
CEO to control the information necessary for the evaluation of business and managerial 
performance. It has become clear that such an increase in power was not desirable to the 
Greek Government, which continued to intervene in the company’s day-to-day management 
in order to perpetuate the already existing relations of power. This is why the patterns of the 
interrelationship between the company’s executive management and the government 
remained unchallenged, permeated by the government’s decisive intervention and pre-
eminence in the day-to-day organisational activity.  
“…when a Minister contacts you, he does not do it to accommodate you but usually to 
ask you for a personal favour, or to guide you by supervising you. However, 
supervision is an unclear concept, what is there to supervise? There are specific legal 
frameworks which determine Ministers’ supervision. If he considers imposing his views 
on who becomes a director as supervision, this is not supervision but rather 
intervention…” (Interview MI, 06 July 2006) 
Even though the CEO had signed a five year managerial contract, almost three years after his 
appointment, he was removed from his position. While it was a legal requirement, the 
managerial contract signed in 1998 was the only contract ever signed between the Ministry of 
Finance and OSE, thereafter executive management. All the successive Chairmen of the 
Board of Directors and CEOs were appointed without signing a managerial contract. 
Furthermore, none of the sequential operational plans (made after 2002) has been approved 
by the government. Consequently, the disaggregation of business plans from the planning 
and operational control procedures is the result of the inability of organisational actors to 
retain a level of managerial independence from the Greek Government. 
“The most serious impact of the non-approval of business plans is the fact that they 
became undermined within the organisation. In other words, the business aspect ceases 
to be an element of the organisation’s day-to-day functioning... (Interview TV, 14 July 
2006) 
Within the context of the Greek rail organisation, decoupling of instrumental forms of control 
as organisational phenomenon emerged in order to accommodate the Greek government’s 
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needs to dominate the organisational context. That was a result directly related to the 
government’s inability to use business plans and the managerial contract in order to evaluate 
OSE’s managerial and business performance, and to impose its objectives and interests upon 
the organisation. The immediate effect from the fact that business plans had no role to play in 
the formulation of relations of responsibility between the various roles, performed by OSE’s 
organisational actors, the Greek government and the European Committee, is that the control 
of the rationality underlying decision making and business action has become problematic. 
6.4.  Discussion 
Chapter 6 describes the materialistic conditions governing the patterns of organisational 
interaction in the context of the Hellenic Railway Organisation, and how the legitimate 
structure of managerialism has influenced the transmutation of these patterns. The first part 
of the analysis aims to make apparent the critical role of the European Committee in the 
process of the company’s modernisation according to the principles of managerial 
accountability reform in the public sector, as analysed in Chapter 2. For analysis purposes, 
the influence of the European Committee was examined in two different, but at the same time 
interrelated, socio-economic contexts: the micro one which is related to the reforms taking 
place in the European rail industry, and the macro one which is related to the Greek 
governments strategic choice to improve the country’s fiscal conditions in order to meet the 
criteria agreed by the member states of the European Union with the Maastricht Treaty, and 
the country to become part of the Euro-zone.  
 
Emerging from the influence of the European Committee at micro level was the company’s 
segregation and the establishment of ERGOSE, as well as the application of new control 
mechanisms aiming for transparency in the use of the available European and National funds 
for the modernisation of the company’s assets. According to the European Commission, a 
critical condition for the necessary transparency and efficiency in the use of the allocated 
financial resources to be achieved is OSE’s managerial independence from the Greek State, a 
perception also shared by the company’s employees, and managers. The latter perceive that 
the intervention of political parties and the employees’ industrial union in the organisation’s 
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business planning activities and day-to-day management is responsible for the company’s 
inability to apply its modernisation process efficiently.  
 
The analysis in that section offers a very interesting contradiction in relation to the argument 
developed in Chapter 2, according to which the coercive influence of the institutional 
environment emerges as the main reason for the disaggregation of formal control systems 
and performance measurements (Lawton, 2000; Laegreid et al, 2006). In contradiction to that 
argument, the analysis shows that managers perceive the introduced changes, and in 
particular the use of financial indicators (in the effort of the European Union to measure the 
efficiency in the use of the European funds, in order to maintain OSE, and its subsidiary 
ERGOSE accountable for any inefficiency and deviations from the agreed objectives), as a 
positive and needed change. Even though the institutionalisation of business plans1 as formal 
systems of control was not initiated by the company’s management, the influence of the 
European Committee has mobilised reflexive monitoring of action, and has made imperative 
the need for the rationalisation of the process according to which the formulation, 
implementation and monitoring of the investments on railway infrastructure is applied. For 
that reason, the role of the European commission is seen as positive by employees and 
managers. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasised that the positive perception that 
employees, and managers have over the role of the European Union is in addition based on 
the provision of financial resources from the CSFs. These were made available in order that 
the company could modernise the rail infrastructure and superstructure, as well as the 
managerial and operational control systems. For that reason, the company’s management and 
employees accepted the decision made by the European Committee in agreement with the 
Greek Government to establish ERGOSE, and to transfer to the subsidiary the responsibility 
for implementing the company’s investment plan.  
 
However, while the European Committee perceives that managerial independence is 
contingent upon the company’s financial independence from the Greek Government, such a 
                                                 
1 Aiming at a first stage to secure that the investments financed by the European Union are in 
accordance with the overall objectives, agreed with the European Committee and the Greek 
Government, and at a second stage to measure the efficiency of the implementation process, in terms 
of budgeted financial resources, and time targets.  
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perception is not shared by employees and managers in the OSE. The latter believe that the 
primary objective of the OSE should be the provision of rail services to all citizens. In order 
for that objective to be realised, the rail network’s expansion and its modernisation should be 
the first priority for the company and its administrative managers. However, such an 
objective cannot be satisfied without the financial support of the Greek Government, first for 
financing the implementation of the necessary project, and secondly for providing financing 
for the rail company’s operating needs. For that reason the proposed disaggregation by the 
European Committee, with the European Directive 91/440, between the management of the 
rail infrastructure and rail operators, aiming at the corporatisation of the OSE, and to secure 
transparency in the financing relations with the Greek Government, was seen by managers 
and employees as irrational.  
 
The disaggregation between rail infrastructure and rail operators prerequisites a major shift in 
the norms and rules that shape operational action. In complex operational systems like the 
railways, such a shift is not always easy to achieve (see Chapter 4). Especially in OSE, where 
responsibilities are not strictly defined, and, patterns of organisational action are shaped by 
informal rules and regulations, the disaggregation between the company’s operational 
systems can result in operational failures. The case of the British Railway Industry provides 
the ground for such a critique (see Chapter 4) in addition to the planning and control 
inefficiencies, which have emerged from the company’s bad cooperation with its subsidiary 
company ERGOSE. This is why the perception shared between employees and managers is 
that the implicit objective pursued by the European rail Directives, of the business 
disaggregation of the management of the infrastructure from the provision of rail services, 
has not been thoroughly planned by the European Committee, whilst at the same time they 
were acknowledging their incapacity to formulate strategies that would efficiently apply the 
OSE’s business disaggregation.  
 
Even though they were not made explicit in the previous analysis, it would have been wrong 
to exclude reasons that justify the opposition to the company’s business disaggregation that 
are related to the ontological characteristics of human behaviour. More particularly, the 
reasons are related to the anxiety that such a change would cause to employees and 
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managers. The latter were fully aware of the fact that any effort for the company’s financial 
rationalisation pre-supposes the abolishment of benefits, and, more important, job reductions. 
This argument is made apparent in Chapter 5, when the proposed strategies by the formulated 
operational plan caused the reaction of the employees’ union. As a result of the inner 
reactions and opposition in the period 1991-1997, it was not made possible for the OSE to 
apply an operational strategy concerning the disaggregation between the manager of the rail 
infrastructure and the operating business units.  
 
Managerialism that emerges in the context of the Greek public sector with law 2414/1996, as 
a result of the Greek Government’s effort to meet its macro-economic objectives, 
conceptualises all the legitimate meanings that give substance to the target of the European 
Committee and the Greek Government to corporatize OSE and to rationalise financially the 
company’s operating activities aiming at the company’s profitability. For that reason, the 
company’s disaggregation was one of the main strategic objectives assigned to the newly 
appointed CEO in June 1997. However, as the case of the first nominated candidate for the 
position of the CEO indicates, managerial authority in the organisational context of the OSE 
is not pre-given. In the organisational context of the OSE, subordinates have increased power 
and the ability to restrict the authority of the CEO to impose strategies unilaterally, such as 
those related to the company’s business disaggregation.  
 
The need of the appointed CEO to gain the trust of his organisational subordinates and to 
legitimate his authority to plan and control organisational action, resulted in order the five-
year (1998-2002) formulated operational plan to adopt the accounting segregation between 
the rail infrastructure business unit and the operational divisions. The present analysis 
concludes that the decision concerning the company’s accounting disaggregation was the 
outcome of the ability of the CEO to acknowledge the materialistic conditions in the 
organisational context of the OSE that bound his authority to impose unilaterally operational 
strategies that contradict the views and perceptions of his subordinate managers and 
employees. Moreover, it was the outcome of CEO’s intention to realise his objectives, which 
was the company’s financial rationalisation. The CEO could not use the operational plan 
made in order to articulate reasons that could justify the rationale of the company’s potential 
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business disaggregation or any other business scheme apart from the company’s accounting 
segregation. The selected operational strategy was compatible with both, which is perceived 
by employees and managers as acceptable operational strategy, and the CEO’s effort to 
control and coordinate organisational action in order to reorganise it. Even though the 1998-
2002, operational plan was not the outcome of a democratic process based upon dialogue and 
collective forms of management, it managed to establish a rule following aspects of 
operational action with certain objectives to be accomplished by the CEO and his subordinate 
managers and employees. This is why the 1998-2002 operational plan gained a substantial 
meaning, implicating organisational roles in the process of the company’s financial 
rationalisation. 
 
Even though organisational actors failed to establish relationships of mutual trust, since the 
CEO was regarding his subordinates as incompetent to contribute efficiently to the 
implementation of the business objectives agreed with the Greek Government, and the 
European Committee, while on the other hand the subordinate managers believed that the 
performance objectives described with the operational plan were manipulated by the CEO, 
the analysis will not argue that this was the reason for the disaggregation of the operational 
plan and business objectives from the day-to-day operational action. The effort of the CEO to 
legitimate his authority resulted in the operational plan being made and the objectives set to 
be used in order to define roles and responsibilities, aiming to designate those competent to 
perform the allocated responsibilities and to apply the company’s reorganisation, a 
conclusion in agreement with the argument made in Chapter 31 according to which, is the 
distinction between action and intention that gives substantial meaning to instrumental forms 
of control (Kallinikos and Cooper, 1996: 3). 
 
The disaggregation of the operational plan from the company’s day-to-day operational 
activity was the result of the pressures exercised by the Greek Government on the CEO, 
aiming to impose interests and practices beyond its defined role with the managerial contract 
and law 2414/1996. The reality is that the formulated operational plan never defined the 
relationship between the company’s management and the Greek Government. The fact that 
                                                 
1 Section 3.4. 
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the National rail strategy overlaps the company’s business strategy means that the company’s 
management never gained the intended independence from the Greek Government by the 
European Committee. Even though the subsequent appointed managers were formulating 
operational plans, as the European Committee requires, none of these has been approved, at 
least explicitly, by the Greek Government. At this point a major contradiction emerges in 
relation to the company’s reorganisation and modernisation, between the intentions of the 
European Committee, and those of the Greek Government. The emerging implications on the 
ongoing organisational operational action, and the company’s relationship with the European 
Committee and the Greek Government, are discussed in the following chapter.  
6.5. Conclusion 
The purpose of the present chapter was to describe the way in which the managerial 
accountability reforms introduced in the period 1996-2002 influenced the process of the 
reproduction of the Hellenic Railway Organisation. The chapter emphasised the predominant 
role of the European Commission in the process of the company’s modernisation, and the 
efforts of organisational actors to influence and to inform the process of reproduction.  
 
The analysis indicated that the failure of operational plans to constitute frameworks of 
organisational interaction and to establish managerial authority was the outcome of the 
contradictions, and inconsistencies characterising the institutional environment. In practice, 
the operational strategies formulated were the outcome of the intra-organisational tensions, 
and secured a level of managerial independence from the coercive influence of the Greek 
Government and the European Commission. Nevertheless, such independence contradicts the 
implicit objectives of the Greek Government, which has been targeting to secure its influence 
upon managerial action, and has resulted in sterilising the managing director’s authority from 
controlling the ongoing operational action.  
 
The following chapter describes the structuration process in the period 2002-2006, and the 
emerging implications upon the managerial and the operational action from the decisions that 
the subsequent managing directors received in relation to the objectives and requirements of 
the European Directives. Given the fact that executive management lack managerial 
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independence and autonomy, along with the fact that the operational plans (which were 
incorporated in order to secure legitimacy and trust to the CEO), have no practical substance, 
the following chapter attempts to describe the structures which have influenced and informed 
the formulation of accountability relationships. 
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7 Chapter – Discontinuing accountability and the way towards 
the deregulation of the Greek rail industry: a direction without 
tomorrow? 
7.1. Introduction  
In contrast to the period 1998-2002, which is characterised by the decision to segregate the 
company’s accounting between the rail infrastructure business unit and the operating 
business units, the period 2002–2008 the following analysis considers the company’s 
business segregation, and its transformation from a single entity to a holding company. The 
following analysis gives an account of the materialistic conditions that have influenced the 
decision of the disaggregation of OSE, and attempts to discuss the way in which successively 
appointed CEOs1, in the period 2002-2008, managed to justify and achieve the company’s 
business segregation.  
 
Two important aspects have to be emphasised in this introductory note; the first is that the 
strategic and operational plans drawn by successively appointed CEOs in the period 2002-
2008 have not been approved - at least explicitly - by the Greek Government. In 
contradiction to what law 2414/1996 required, in the period 2002-2008, the company’s 
successive CEOs and Chairmen of the Board did not sign a managerial contract that would 
define the management’s objectives according to which they would have been assessed for 
their performance by the Greek Government. Moreover, law 3429/2005 (which amended law 
2414/1996) did not foresee managerial contracts, and gave Ministers the right to dismiss the 
management without compensation. The second aspect relates to the fact that this is a period 
during which the reforms in the European Rail Industry had gained a more holistic approach, 
defined by the European Directives 2001/12, 2001/13, 2001/14, (the first rail package), as 
well as by the European Directives 2004/51, 2004/50, 2004/49, (the second rail package). 
These directives open up the rail transport market for freight and cargo services (the 
passenger market will be in 2010) to regulated competition2.  
                                                 
1 After June 2001, when the first CEO was removed from his post during the period 2002-2008, the 
successive Greek Governments and Ministers of Transport appointed six successive CEOs. The 
company’s business segregation was designed and implemented by two different CEOs, (the one 
remained only for seven months at his post). 
2 See Chapter 4, section 4.3. 
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The analysis within this chapter, therefore, aims to describe the use of the formulated 
business plans by the successive administrators in the period 2002-2008 as interpretive 
schemes and norms, communicating and justifying the rationale for the company’s 
segregation, facilitating the need of the successive administrator managers to control and 
coordinate organisational action. Moreover, the analysis in this chapter aims to describe how 
the effort for the formulation of common meanings between organisational actors was 
influenced by the contradictory intentions of the Greek Government and the European 
Committee, identified in the previous chapter. The present chapter is divided in two sections. 
In the first section, an account of the rationale that influenced the decision for the company’s 
business segregation is provided, whilst in the second one the materialistic conditions and the 
reasons that led to it are discussed. 
7.2. Towards a new rationality of operational action 
The OSE business segregation was the outcome of the revision of the five year (1998-2002) 
operational plan, which took place in 2003 under a new executive administration,1 and it was 
based on the establishment of a holding company. The company’s reorganisation, the 
business segregation between the infrastructure division and the service operator were 
defined as management’s primary objective in order for the company’s business activities to 
gain the necessary financial and administrative efficiency in the objectives which, according 
to managerial opinion (as this is expressed in the 2003–2007strategic plan), the previously 
formulated operational strategy, that of the company’s accounting segregation, had not 
managed to achieve.  
“The initiatives taken should pave the way for the creation of those initial conditions 
under which the OSE, one of the oldest and least susceptible to organisational change 
organisations, could evolve into a more modern corporation, able to function within a 
constantly changing economic environment, its guiding principles being a) to serve its 
customers-users and b) to become profitable” (SAAS, 2005: 224; trans). 
Moreover, the company’s business segregation was aiming at the complete separation of the 
financial accounts between the rail operator and the infrastructure manager, so that the costs 
related to the rail infrastructure’s management and maintenance would burden the Greek 
                                                 
1 2002-2005 
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Government, and not the rail operator. As the analysis in Chapter 6, shows, the previous 
relationship, based upon the economic agreement between the Greek Government and the 
OSE, was not effective, since the Greek Government never fulfilled its obligations towards 
the organisation for operating unprofitable services.  
“The autonomous infrastructure will result in relieving the transportation services of the 
inevitable losses which are caused by the operation of the specific sector [management, 
maintaining and modernising the infrastructure] and whose recovery should be assumed 
by the Greek State. Moreover, the establishment of separate companies and business 
entities will contribute to the distinct apportionment of the financial results [profits or 
losses] of the organisation among its different operating services and, in this way, will 
be able to exercise the option of cutting its loss making operational activities.” (OSE, 
2004). 
The first step towards the company’s segregation took place in 2003 when, under a new 
administration, OSE preceded to the establishment of three new subsidiary companies, 
aimed, as stated with the 2003-2007 business plan, at the more efficient exploitation of the 
company’s assets. In addition to ERGOSE, which is the administrator of the company’s 
investment programme (established in 1997), three more subsidiary companies were 
established: PROASTIAKOS S.A. (the urban transport operator), GAIAOSE S.A. (acting in 
the field of real estate), and THRIASIO S.A. (a logistic services provider company). The 
Company’s disaggregation was completed in 2005, when the train operator “TRAINAOSE” 
(responsible for the provision of rail services) was segregated from “EDISY” (the 
infrastructure manager), at first, as independent business units, and later, in 2007, as 
independent corporations (see the coming figure 7.1).  
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Figure 7.1: OSE’s new organisation after January 1st 2007 
 
Initially, the 2003 - 2007 business plan proposed the foundation of eight subsidiaries, 
operating under the parent company OSE. OSE retains responsibility for the formulation of 
the strategic framework within which the subsidiaries would operate and coordinate, whilst it 
also retains the ownership of the rail assets (the rail network infrastructure, the 
telecommunication systems, the train stations, the train engines, the land and the buildings). 
However, the eight subsidiary companies put forward in the 2003 - 2007 business plan was a 
suggested number, without making explicit the management’s intentions over the corporate 
and operational objectives of the company’s reorganisation. As the following quotation 
indicates (provided by a senior manager, member of the 2003 - 2007 administration), the 
business plan was rather a suggestion made by OSE’s executive management to the Ministry 
of Transport for the possibility of establishing subsidiary companies. This is why under 
successive reviews1 of the 2003-2007 operational plan took place, under successive 
administrators (period 2005-2008), the number of the subsidiary companies was reduced, 
initially to six, and at a later stage to five companies2.  
“…in general, it was the senior management who drew up the business plan (2003-
2007), and it did not impose it but merely referred to the possibility of establishing 
subsidiary companies. There was no formulated action; it was rather just more ideas…” 
(Interview, TV 14 July 2006; trans.). 
                                                 
1 The first one took place in 2006 and the second one in 2007. 
2 Those mentioned above.  
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Even though OSE’s disaggregation into various businesses, that would more efficiently 
financially and operationally exploit the company’s assets, pre-existed as an idea in the 
organisation, and had been discussed in the company’s BoD (BoD articles 287, 18.03.1996), 
the business disaggregation of EDISY from TRAINAOSE is seen as a decision beyond any 
form of business rationale and relevant experience1 of the way that other national European 
rail companies, with characteristics similar to those of the OSE, applied the segregation 
between the infrastructure manager and the rail operating divisions. Based upon the model of 
business segregation, applied by the German railways, the plan established a complicated and 
costly system of managerial, operational, and financial interdependencies between the 
established companies, based on contractual relationships. As a manager sarcastically 
commented, in an effort to make apparent his disagreement with the management’s choice 
(trans.):  
“…The German model was adopted, as if there were even the tiniest relation or 
similarity between Greek and German railways2…” (Interview DX, 29 September 
2006). 
Within a period of three years (2005-2008) the company’s net losses were almost doubled. 
At the end of the financial year 2004, the company had annual losses equal to €5763 million, 
while at the end of the financial year 20074 the group had annual losses equal to €950 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 6, the analysis shows that the application of the accounting segregation was compatible 
to the reforms applied in other European rail networks, and countries with similar characteristics, in 
terms of population, population density, and length of the rail network as well as economic 
characteristics, to those of OSE and the Greek Economy. For that reason, OSE adopted a model of 
organisation (according to which separate divisions remain under one entity) similar to the one 
adopted by Belgium, Ireland and Luxemburg. 
2 In relation to the German rail network, which is the longer among the 25 country members of the 
European Union with a total length, in 2002, of 35.986 km, of which 53% is electrified; the Greek 
one has a length of only 2.383 km - which makes it the smallest among the 25 countries - of which 
only 3% is electrified. While in 2002, the total passenger-km for the German railways reached 69.294 
million, for Greece this was only 1.836 million. In 2002, the freight tonnes carried by the German 
railways reached 267 million; for OSE there were only 2 million tonnes (ERRAC, 2005). 
3 It is significant to say that from these €576 million, €237 million are interest expenses outcome of 
the fact that the company has to borrow in order to cover its operating deficit in which the cost of 
managing and maintaining the railway infrastructure is also included and operating unprofitable 
services is included. According to law 2671/1998 these are costs that should had burdened the Greek 
Government and not the organisation. 
4 2007 was the first year in which the company began to publish annual financial reports using 
International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS). While IFRS were not required, they were 
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million. The cost of services, from €373 million in 2005, increased to €682 million in 2007, 
while the organisation’s total liabilities from €4 billion in 2005, reached €8.5 billion at the 
end of 2007. As the following article taken from a newspaper indicates:  
“The Greek Railways show a deficit that has accrued over all these years [since 1972 
when the company was established] and has reached the 7.5 billion Euros… the split of 
the companies the business disaggregation of infrastructure and service operating 
division… seems to have cost dear for the organisation, jerking the accumulated deficit 
to the point of 2 billion Euros within one year and a half. Moreover, we should bear in 
mind that in the 2004 sessions of Parliament, the ex-Minister of Transport made 
mention of a deficit reaching 3.5 billion Euros. A relevant memorandum circulated to 
the Prime Minister gave an account of the fatal financial haemorrhage which was 
caused by the company’s disaggregation.” (Kassimi, 2007). 
Opinions of research participants vary on who had the initiative for the decision for the 
company’s business segregation and the formulation of the holding company; was it a 
decision imposed on the Ministry of Transport by the company’s management as the 
following quotation indicates? After all, the 2003-2007 business plan and those who 
modified1 it were never officially approved by the Greek Government.  
“…OSE has exclusive knowledge of the railway in Greece and therefore it imposed the 
business separation under the pretext of European directives. It is a myth that the EU 
imposed the separation. OSE demanded that the political leadership separate the 
companies… in other words, the decision was not imposed on OSE, but rather OSE 
suggested the decision to the Ministry, which agreed” (Interview DX, 29 September 
2006).  
If the decision was not imposed on the Ministry, was it imposed on OSE’s management by 
the Minister of Transport, as the manager’s opinion below indicates?  
                                                                                                                                                       
suggested by the European Directives as the most appropriate standards for reporting financial 
accounts. According to the group’s 2007 financial statements, the shift to IFRS did not have any 
impact on long-term and short-term liabilities.. 
1 The introduced amendments took place with the 2005-2007 business plan and the 2005-2006, 
business plan. 
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“It was the decision of the Minister, who was educated in Germany and admired 
anything German1…” (Interview VIA, 19 September 2006). 
The value of the aforementioned conflicting opinions is not their difference, which arises 
from the fact that the first opinion came from a minister’s associate (during the period in 
which the changes were taking place), while the second came from a member of the 
management team who made the decision. On the contrary, the value rests on the illustration 
that the Company’s transformation into a holding company has been the outcome of a 
process in which the CEO and the Minister of Transport2 were closely involved, whilst the 
plan (2002-2007) was worked out by a group of independent consultants, appointed for that 
purpose by the CEO. The invocation of the European Directives, and more particularly the 
new conditions created in the European rail industry by the requirements of the European 
Directive 2001/123, were incorporated by the managing director in the period 2002–2005, in 
order to justify the need for the company’s business segregation, and the transformation of 
OSE into a holding company. As one of his successors in the company’s management 
admitted (trans.): 
“…I did not find any reports demonstrating what the organisation wants, regardless of 
what the European Community suggests…” (Interview KF, 11 September 2006).  
The only action that the management took in the period 2002-2005 was to construct a new 
organisation for the company, where the vertically functioning business units became 
independent businesses, and to draw a business plan, which in reality constituted a mission 
statement defined by the CEO’s visions over the future of the Greek rail industry in the 
changing and competitive European Environment. At no stage in the process of the 
company’s segregation was OSE involved, as a nexus of systematic relationships and roles 
functioning to formulate implement and control the various corporate actions related to the 
company’s disaggregation, their effects upon operational action and the generated costs. The 
2003-2007 business plan was not the product of a collective managerial process, in which the 
                                                 
1 The Holding Company as a form of business organisation in the European Rail Industry has been 
adopted by the German Railways.  
2 In 2004 general elections, it was the conservative party of New Democracy which gained the 
majority from PASOK, which previously ruled the country.   
3 See the analysis made in Chapter 4, section 4.3. 
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various directorates and departments would have collaborated and mutually agreed on 
dividing overlapping responsibilities, operational, and administrative tasks. The decision for 
the company’s business disaggregation concerned only a small number of senior managers, 
who were aware of the plans of the CEO and the discussions conducted with the Minister of 
Transport.  
“…there were no hierarchies or collective bodies holding meetings or making their 
views heard. What we had in OSE was the power of one person, not even of two, but 
rather of one… whoever was aware of the situation in the OSE [period 2002-2005] 
were also aware that the managing director had imposed his views on everyone…” 
(Interview DX, 29 September 2006) 
As a result the segregation of EDISY from TRINAOSE is seen by many managers and 
employees as nothing more than the uncritical adaptation to the requirements imposed on the 
organisation by the European Directives.  
“...I have no conception of what they mean. We have to follow the instructions for the 
segregation, in other words, to destroy the time-tested model which has functioned 
normally, even though not faultlessly, and replace it with another model of doubtful 
utility. By observing the changes [it is important to mention that he does not use the 
phrase “by participating to the implementation of the changes”] we serve the dogmatic 
views once again. A dogma of religious dimensions [he becomes sarcastic]” (Interview 
XI, September 2006). 
The ability of the appointed CEO in the period 2002-2005 to impose his will on the 
organisation was the outcome of the perception, shared by many employees and managers, 
that the CEO of the period was competent to perform the company’s reorganisation and the 
efficient implementation of its investment project. Since 1994, the CEO, appointed in the 
period 2002-2005, had held the position of general manager of the rail infrastructure division, 
and he was perceived by many within the organisation, (managers and employees) as 
competent to take over the company’s management. From the position of the General 
Administrator of the infrastructure directorate, he had made apparent to other employees and 
managers his ability to develop the company’s rail infrastructure efficiently according to the 
dominant rules and objectives in the organisation values, as these have been developed over 
the years, mainly from the company’s technical personnel, which still constituted the 
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dominant collective within the organisation. His appointment to the position of the CEO 
signalled to employees and managers that the expansion of the rail network constituted the 
strategic priority1 for the OSE, an operating strategy different from that of the company’s 
corporate and market orientation that the administration in the period 1998-2001 had set as a 
priority, and for which the head of a directorate quoted (trans.):   
“We tried to promote and sell to customers a rail product [he means rail services] 
without having managed to create one” (Interview TD, 13 July 2006). 
The fact that he was coming from the company’s establishment also gave him the ability to 
understand the way in which power relations were functioning in the organisation, and the 
dominant role of the employees’ union in that interplay. The adoption of the holding 
company as a form of business reorganisation, and more particularly the existence of the 
parent company OSE, was intended to secure public ownership of rail assets, and to signal to 
employees and their representatives that the group’s state-owned character and their 
employee rights were not under threat. Thus, in contradiction to the analysis of the previous 
periods made in Chapters 5 and 6, no collective reaction against the plans of the CEO for the 
company’s disaggregation can be claimed.  
 
The general perception among the interviewees is that the CEO has offered employees’ 
representatives a peculiar form of co-administration that led to a strange truce between the 
employees’ union and the company’s management, and to the support of his plans for the 
company’s segregation. As the following quotation indicates, through changes in the 
company’s organisation, the Human Resource Management directorate came under the 
CEO’s direct control, and gave him the ability to play politics by satisfying the demands of 
the industrial union for the promotion and transfer of employees and managers that they were 
                                                 
1 It is significant of what argued that his appointment at the position of the CEO was accompanied by 
the vision of expanding the rail network to the West part of Greece, where no rail track exists. 
However, the construction of the “Western Rail Track” demands a new rail network of total length of 
747 km. The budgeted cost of that project is €2,71 billion, which is profoundly underestimated, 
taking into consideration that OSE will need in total €8 billion to complete the rail track between 
Patrai-Athens-Thessaloniki (the modernisation of which started in early 1990s), which has the same 
length and less technical difficulties.  
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indicating1 to him. By contrast, in the period 1998-2001 (discussed in chapter 6), the analysis 
argued that through the application of performance measurements, and managerial control 
mechanisms, the CEO of the period aimed to communicate to employees and managers a 
message of meritocracy by designating those managers competent to perform managerial 
tasks and responsibilities. In the period 2002-2005, the participation in the company’s 
management appears to be contingent upon the agreement among with the intentions and 
objectives set by the CEO of the period. 
“…you cannot have the Directorate for Personnel directly answerable to the Managing 
Director, because that would give him the ability to monitor personnel management 
through transfers and promotions… with this modification, the personnel becomes the 
exclusive responsibility of the Managing Director and the political games that he was 
playing” (Phone conversation EG2, 12 May 2008; trans.) 
For that reason, many managers fiercely attacked the 2002-2005 CEO for the methods he 
used to control organisational action and behaviour, whilst many referred to him using 
pointed remarks concerning his intentions and interests. As a manager states (trans.): 
“...the management have never been interested in how evaluation according to 
performance measurement will result, since, in the last analysis, they have never been 
assessed according to their performance measurement. This policy peaked in the period 
2002-2005. The fact is that the management of this period has destroyed the 
organisation, since the administrative and financial efficiency of the organisation do not 
constitute the end that should be served. The management is weighted in favour of the 
politicians, the contractors and the suppliers whose interests are willing to serve, being 
indifferent to the organisational efficiency of the Greek Railways Company.” (Interview 
PI, October 2006). 
Before continuing it has to be emphasised that the absence of any strategy that made explicit 
to subordinate managers, and employees, the objectives that the company’s segregation 
would serve has characterised the whole process of the company’s disaggregation, since 
                                                 
1 It is notorious that the proportion of 70% to 30% represents the share in the promotions of 
employees and managers that the two main employee representative groups (representing the two 
main political parties of PASOK and New Democracy in OSE) shared. The proportion was changing 
according to which party was the ruling one.  
2 Human resource manager 
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2003 under three successive administrations and CEOs. As one of the successors of the 2002-
2005 CEO admits (trans.): 
“In my opinion, the effort for improvement concerns only the senior staff of the 
management of the Greek Railways Company; it does not concern the junior staff. The 
low levels of hierarchy are not aware of the march of events; this is why I am talking 
about communication and training. If the participation procedures, the corporative 
culture, the management contracts, the targets set remain at the managerial level, there 
will be no developments in the OSE...” (Interview KF, 12 October 2006). 
Many of the managers interviewed even ignored the existence of the various business plans, 
made by the different CEOs, while they could not pledge the actual number of the subsidiary 
operational companies. OSE has turned out to be an expensive production for business plans, 
without any influence in the company’s operational and investment strategies, and the 
company’s day-to-day management. Thus the dominant perception among employees and 
managers is that the only objective the various administrations have is to serve implicit 
interests that contradict the effort for the company’s modernisation. 
“…in our organisation you do not understand why business plans are assigned… in 
other words, the Minister may have called the director and told him to assign this 
project to the said company…” (Interview PI, 03 October 2006). 
Failing accountabilities, which is the topic of the subsequent discussion, aims to describe the 
effects upon organisational action from the lack of tensions in the day-to-day organisational 
action outcome of the ability of the CEO to dominate the inner organisational context. 
7.3. Failing accountabilities 
The problems in cooperation and coordination between OSE and ERGOSE, and the emergent 
conflicts between the management of the two companies in the period 1998-2001 (discussed 
in the previous chapter) should have been indicative of the potential difficulties and conflicts 
in the relationship between the parent company OSE and its subsidiaries. When one of the 
CEOs of one of the newly established subsidiaries was asked about the actual target of the 
reforms, the researcher was told1 that the OSE and the Ministry of Transport were hoping 
                                                 
1 Interview KF, 12 October 2006 
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that the reforms would generate more transparency in decision making, owing to the 
competitive relationships and tensions between the different managing directors. However, 
when the researcher asked whether she would be mainly accountable for her actions to the 
Minister of Transport or to the CEO, and the BoD of the parent company, OSE, she 
unhesitatingly answered that she would be accountable to the Minister. In the intended 
accountability relationship, the dominant figure remains the Minister of Transport – an 
outcome contradictory to the intentions of the European Directive which aims for the 
company’s managerial independence from the Greek Government. Moreover, it was 
contradictory to the objectives that OSE’s disaggregation came to serve.  
 
Furthermore, OSE’s capability and authority of coordinating and controlling the business 
action of subsidiaries is limited. It is significant that at least until the end of 2007, a year after 
the subsidiary companies were established1, no contracts had been signed between the parent 
company and the subsidiaries. The existence of the contracts was a precondition for the 
efficient operation and the transparency in the financial transactions between them. For 
example, through contracts, the financial relationships for the use of the rail network which is 
owned by OSE, managed by EDISY and used by TRAINAOSE, would had been defined. 
However, OSE could not formulate an agreement commonly accepted by the subsidiaries 
that would have defined, for example, the tariffs that EDISY would charge TRAINAOSE for 
the use of the infrastructure, and the allocation of responsibilities and costs between the two 
corporations in the case of a rail accident. An additional explanation of why contracts had not 
been agreed and signed between the companies can be identified with the fact that the OSE’s 
segregation had not yet been finalised. While the changes were taking place in 2006, the new 
CEO (2005-2007), in an effort to rationalise the business venture (planned by the 2002-2005 
CEO) in terms of cost (as one of the consultants suggested), had already decided to re-merge 
the subsidiary companies and to formulate a holding company with a maximum of two or 
three subsidiaries.  
                                                 
1 In 2006 
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“…we should note that the venture is not finalised and we are expecting new changes in 
the near future with the merging of subsidiary companies…” (Interview1, 25 August 
2006; trans.)  
The reality is that OSE was not ready for the business disaggregation between the 
management of the rail infrastructure and the rail operator. Owing to the continuous changes 
of administrator managers, and the subsequent changes in the company’s operational 
strategies, the company never managed to complete its operational and managerial 
modernisation, which would have secured the efficient application of its business 
segregation, as had been foreseen with the previous business plan (1998-2002).  
“One morning, while we had missed all deadlines, the organisation’s management at the 
time proceeded with its business separation without any study or plan. The notorious 
companies were established; then they saw that this could not happen and finally they 
set up five, six companies…” (Interview DK, 29 April 2008). 
In 2001, a total2 of €90 million was allocated from the C’ CSF3 for the business actions 
concerning the reorganisation of OSE and the implementation of its business plan4. The 
operational programme was divided in two main actions: “Operational Reorganisation and 
Development of OSE5” and “Development of OSE Information Technology6 Systems”. 
Roughly €30 million were allocated to the company’s reorganisation and €60 million to the 
development of information technology systems. According to a 2001 internal note 
(informing the CEO of the period 2001-2002, about the new conditions created by the first 
                                                 
1 It was provided by a member of the management consultant team. 
2 The total financial resources made available from the C’ CSF and the National budget were almost 
€2 billion. Additional to the €90 million available for the company’s operational and managerial 
modernisation, almost €1.8 billion were spent on the modernisation and the development of the 
company’s railway infrastructure (upgrading the rail axis, signalling, remote management 
installations equipment), and €190 million on the creation of the Athens suburban railway.  
3 The Operational Programme ‘Railways, Airports, Public Transport’ falls within the sectoral 
programmes of the 3rd CSF for the programming period 2000-2006. The entire budget of the OP is 
co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund and amounts to €2,937,600,380. Total 
Public Expenditure amounts to €2,687,600,380 (SAAS, 2001: 1). 
4 The actions incorporated in the  strategic and operational plans made started to be formulated in 
1995, financed by the B’ CSF (it was discussed in the previous chapter) 
5 For this first period until 2003, the actions concerned the completion of the accounting segregation.  
6 Computerisation of spare parts; computerised recording of passenger operations; computerised 
recording and monitoring of freight operations; computerisation of financial management; railway 
line monitored electronically  
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rail package), the company’s general managers suggested to the CEO of the period that the 
allocated funds with the third CSF be used in order for the company to complete the actions 
foreseen by the 1998-2002 operational plan, and to implement fully the accounting 
segregation between business activities. Up to that point, OSE could only partially satisfy the 
requirements of the European Directives. The company could only report separate profit and 
loss accounts for the activities of the infrastructure management and the service operators. It 
could not, however, report separate balance-sheets, as the European Directive 2001/12 
requires, while the allocation of operating costs and expenses in the various business 
activities was based on conventions that did not satisfy the European Commission’s demand 
for financial transparency concerning the financial subsidies provided to freight and 
passenger operators. The meaning in the general managers’ suggestions was that the different 
operational and managerial activities and synergies should be effectively separated, by 
establishing the business units and the efficient allocation of the operating and financing 
costs to the different business units to be succeeded. As the following quotation indicates 
(trans.), the accounting segregation was the precondition either for the company’s separation 
into organisational sections within the same business, or for its segregation into independent 
businesses, a strategy which, as the following quotation makes apparent, had not yet been 
finalised. 
“…even though Directive 2001/12 gave the possibility of not having to create separate 
businesses, nevertheless the requirement of keeping and publishing separate financial 
balance sheets indirectly imposes such a solution… what must be done essentially is to 
liquidate the existing company and then set up separate businesses or separate 
organisational sections within the same business…”(OSE, 2001). 
However, in the period 2002-2005, the company’s management cancelled out all the 
strategies related to the company’s operational and managerial modernisation. Apart from the 
shift in the company’s operational strategy from the accounting segregation to the business 
one, and the foundation of the holding company, all the formulated actions concerning the 
company’s information technologies (economic resource planning systems, and costing 
systems, included) ceased. The reason the management of the period articulated, in order to 
justify to the European Committee the need for change in the company’s operational strategy, 
was that any plans made by the previous administrations were unofficial, whilst no classified 
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documents in the organisation, could be identified in order for the new administration to 
apply efficiently the strategies formulated by the previous management (period 1998-2002).  
 
Being, however, a prominent member of the previous two administrations, (since 1994 he 
had been the general manager of the rail infrastructure division), the CEO raised questions 
over his stance towards the European Committee and the organisation. When I discussed the 
issue with one of the general managers in the period 2000-2002, the instant reaction was: “He 
is lying…” (telephone conversation ML, 16 January 2009). Moreover, as the manager 
responsible in the period 1999-2001 for the planning of the so-called “Information 
Technology Master Plan” indicated, not only had the company made the necessary plans for 
the application of information technology systems (accounting systems included), but it was 
also ready, before the end of 2001, to make the necessary tenders. That means that they had 
prepared the descriptions of the conditions, the terms and the targets that the information 
systems provided would be required to meet. 
“The project plans were structured in 2001 at formal declaration level, which means 
that the specifications were drawn up and projects were to be proclaimed. The new 
management, coming as it did from the Greek Railways Company, [in the sense that the 
2003-2006 CEO, the one he is referred to, as well as the general managers, OSE’s 
employees] were aware of the completion of the project plans; however, on grounds of 
expediency, he throws everything away. This decision has had disastrous results with 
the costs [of drawing the Information Technology master plan] coming up to 3 million 
Euros instead of 56 million dr.’[approximately 164,000 Euros]... the consultant joined 
in 2005 [the European Committee demands that all the project plans and 
announcements must be done in cooperation with a consultant, who provides the know-
how], and since then nothing has happened. As a result, all information systems and 
subsystems that exist today are failing…” (Interview THP, 28 August 2006) 
Since 1985, the computerisation of the finance and accounting departments as well as the 
application of cost models have constituted a primary objective for all the administrations 
and thus, for all the business plans made. In contrast, however, to what has been planned, all 
the formulated strategies and actions have remained inactive. For example, while recording 
financial transactions, keeping and analysing financial records are still problematic for the 
organisation these are the only functions that the accounting department can perform 
satisfactorily. The reason is that bookkeeping, along with the records of employees’ and 
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managers’ payroll, are the only functions supported by an information technology 
application, which however, cannot support the analysis and interpretation of the annual 
balance-sheet. Furthermore, OSE has not yet managed to develop a cost model that would 
permit the company’s management to assess and evaluate information related to the cost 
generating activities1, and moreover, to treat departments and business units as cost and 
profit centres in order to formulate a reliable and competitive pricing policy, which has to be 
said it is not the company administration’s responsibility. Tariffs for the transportation of 
goods and tickets prices for the transportation of passengers are responsibilities that remained 
with the Minister of Transport. 
 
Cash-flow management is fragmented with the management of long-term and short-term 
interest bearing liabilities, as well as the leasing agreements to be managed and monitored 
with the use of Excel files which each responsible department has developed and updates 
independently from the other departments. The relevant directorate for the management of 
the operating supplies and material still cannot monitor the implementation of contracts, and 
the payments made and required to be made to suppliers, with negative effects on cash-flow 
management. Any effort for the application of modern managerial systems that would make 
operational planning and action more efficient has failed. The organisation still does not have 
a fully developed system of booking seats and issuing tickets and, as a consequence, the 
company has limited capacity to offer advanced customer services, and - more important - to 
monitor and control the revenue generated from its main operating activity, namely the 
provision of rail services to passengers and freight customers.  
“…how can you make an organisation customer-centred when you don’t develop the 
necessary policies for customer services? For example, the only goal is to reduce 
journey times, but these times do not include waiting times for the issuing of tickets or 
for accessing the station and points of ticket sales, which do not exist. We had bought 
thermal printers which we did not use because the printing paper was too expensive. 
                                                 
1 While the modernisation of the rail track gave the opportunity to the organisation to increase its 
market share the inability of the organisation to control the generated costs has resulted in order the 
increase in the transportation work to increase disproportionally operating costs in relation to 
operating revenues. In 2005 every additional €1 of operating revenue costs to the company €7.5 (in 
that amount the costs that should had been covered by the Greek State are also included) 
(Mourmouris, 2010) It is apparent that the administrations have done nothing to control operating 
expenses.  
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They do not understand, however, that we would make up for these expenses by 
reducing the time required to serve a client, who would not have to wait 1min 43 
sec…’’ (Interview LN1, 27 June 2006). 
The lack of progress in the modernisation of the company’s managerial and operational 
control systems also characterise the implementation of the company’s investment plan 
(which is implemented and monitored by ERGOSE). Although a large amount of National 
and European funds2 has been dedicated for the development of the railway in Greece, and 
especially for the modernisation of the railway axis between Patrai, Athens and Thessaloniki 
(see the rail map), where transportation business activity is strongest, and where the interest 
of the European Commission is (due to the fact that it is part of the high-speed Trans-
European network), OSE still has significant operational weaknesses and limited business 
capabilities that makes it impossible for the company to reduce the per unit cost and to 
increase its operating revenue. It is significant that in all the reports made to the responsible 
Managing Authority for the progression of the work financed by the B’ and the C’ CSF, all 
the rail projects implemented by OSE and ERGOSE are failing to make progress and, as a 
result, a large amount of financial resources made available by the European Union was lost 
and transferred to other investment activities (SAAS, 2006).  
“Strategic and operational planning administration is non-existent. The business plans 
might be drawn, but not carried out. For instance, projects which were scheduled for 
2003 by the relevant investment plan are still included in the 2006 investment plan... 
there is work scheduled by the departments which have never been implemented and 
this is why the competent departments have never taken into consideration that 
whatever is planned should be implemented as well” (Interview TK3, 25 August 2006). 
The entire project concerning the modernisation of the rail infrastructure and superstructure, 
financed by the A’, B’ and C’ CSF, has failed to be implemented efficiently and as a result 
the company has fallen behind the set, time and cost targets agreed with the European 
Committee and the Greek Government (Gioti, 29 January 2010). The track has not yet been 
electrified, while no modern systems for the administration and control of rail traffic have 
                                                 
1 Operational manager responsible for traffic control  
2 At the end of 2013 the allocated European and National financial resources are expected to reach the 
€8 billion (Gioti, 29 January 2010).  
3 Manager responsible for the strategic and operational planning administration  
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been fully applied. Indicative of the company’s limited capabilities in the administration of 
its investment plan is the project of the construction of the Athens suburban railway which 
was supposed to have been finished by 2004, and is still under construction (trans:): 
“…the target was to have an electric suburban railway by the Olympics [2004]. Years 
passed before the construction methods and the contractor were decided, and the project 
was submitted half-ready at the last minute. This clearly demonstrates our weakness, 
because we had everything at our disposal, including the necessary funds, but we did 
not make it. The French and the Germans would do it in 2.5 years. A project which 
should have been completed in 4 years, even in conditions of typical Greek relaxed 
attitude, is still not finished” (Interview TD1, 13 July 2006) 
While OSE’s and ERGAOSE’s relevant departments continue to produce, the information 
related to the progression of the performance indicators2, required by the European 
Committee, the Greek Government and the executive management of OSE and ERGAOSE 
seem unwilling or indifferent to control the cost of the implemented projects. Significant is 
that ERGAOSE has not managed get to develop a cost accounting system monitoring the 
implemented projects. They prepare information for the European Committee but it is 
obvious that they do not use it in order to monitor in a systematic way the cost efficiency of 
the implemented projects.    
“Efficiency? I don’t think it is of interest to any responsible party. During the last 
decade in Greece, with the Community Support Frameworks and the Olympic Games, 
we have lost our sense of monitoring project costs. I have experienced this personally 
and it may be one of the causes of the fact that I am here talking to you instead of being 
in my office… Those on the part of the OSE who insisted on monitoring project costs 
are here now, talking and drinking coffee” (Interview PI, 03 October 2006) 
Significant to the disappointment and frustration that some of the managers have with the 
status of the present organisational relationships, and their effects on the patterns of 
operational action is the following quotation, provided by one of the research participants. 
According to his opinion the military type of organisation that had defined the culture of the 
rail industry in early years3 of its establishment (and which also characterised OSE in its 
                                                 
1 Senior manager, member of the management team which designed and applied business segregation 
2 See Chapter 6, section 6.2.1. 
3 See Chapter 5, section 5.2. 
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early years), and which was based on restrictive and oppressive relationships between 
superordinates and subordinates, was the appropriate one for the efficient and effective 
operational and administrative control of OSE.  
“22 years ago, when I was first appointed to the railway company, OSE had the 
appropriate organisational culture, based on a military type of organisation. I am glad to 
say that I had the opportunity to experience that [the organisation of operational and 
administrative relationships according to military standards]. Nowdays however, 
something like that does not exists anymore, since organisational relationships do not 
function according to hierarchical norms, but rather according to personal relationships 
[without meritocracy].” (Interview XD, 26 September 2006).    
In order for the company’s various administrations and the Ministry of Transport to conceal 
the failures to achieve the implementation of the investment plans, the continued reductions 
in the time-target of the Athens-Thessaloniki route was used as a performance indicator and 
was communicated to the to create the perception that apart from any delays and wrong 
doings there is a slow, but steady progress in the modernisation of the Greek railway 
industry. The following section describes the effort of the company’s management to 
manipulate the pressure exercised by the European Community, and the Greek Society for 
the provision of advanced, customer-orientated transport services, and to gain the necessary 
legitimacy in order to secure the necessary financial resources for the implementation of the 
company’s operating and investment projects. 
7.3.1. Performance measurements, manipulation and legitimacy  
The reduction in the journey time, mainly on the Athens-Thessaloniki route, where the main 
commercial activity exists, constitutes a key performance indicator not only for evaluating 
the company’s performance, but also for evaluating managerial performance. This is why it 
was included in the terms and conditions of the only managerial contract signed with the 
CEO of the period 1998-2002, and moreover, it has been inextricably linked to the progress 
of modernising the railway infrastructure. The reduction of the journey time in that particular 
service however, has reached its operating limits because the progress of work on rail 
infrastructure is very slow, and does not justify such a reduction in journey time, an opinion 
shared by many managers and implied in the following quotation (trans.): 
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“…reducing journey time [Athens-Thessaloniki] is just a showcase which every 
management tried to achieve and every Ministry tried to pass. This is because it is a 
slogan for the people. We reduced time from 8 hours to 6, from 6 to 4 h 30min and to 
4h 15min. It shows that we are doing something, something is happening. It is also our 
best service. But it has reached its limits...” (Interview TB, 14 July 2006). 
The technical systems are inadequate for the train speeds necessary to reach the time target. 
According to the 1998-2002 operational plan, in order for trains to reach Thessaloniki from 
Athens in four hours and twenty minutes (it was estimated that this was the break-even point 
in order for the particular service to become profitable), the completion of certain work in the 
mountainous parts of the axis was regarded as a precondition, In 2005, when trains reached 
Thessaloniki in four hours and fifteen minutes, the required work was still incomplete.  
“In 1978 I was hired as a civil engineer in order to work in the project concerning the 
development of the railway infrastructure between Athens and Thessaloniki. Thirty 
years have been passed since then whilst twenty years more will be needed [lets hope he 
exaggerates] in order these works to be completed. In contrast the works concerning the 
rail axis between Barcelona and Madrid which have the same length like the one 
between Athens to Thessaloniki lasted only three years” (Interview TZK 13 July 2006). 
Time reduction is seen as a target set by the management in order to persuade the public and 
the European Committee that the modernisation of the railway industry is progressing, 
despite difficulties and slowdowns.  
“Managements in general lack vision – how can appointed managements have vision? 
… of what sort? 10-year vision? It will not be here in 10 years. So when all these 
administrators lack vision, they are ceaselessly trying to sell substitutes for vision to the 
public opinion and to their bosses: look who I am, I will reduce the train journey to 
Thessaloniki to 4h 15min [he becomes sarcastic]” (Interview CH, 12 September 2006). 
However, time targets cannot be perceived as being isolated from other rules, regulations and 
functions that define the nexus of interrelationships for the provision of cost efficient and, 
above all, safe rail transport services. Train traffic is regulated by certain rules that define for 
example, train speed at certain parts of the rail route or the antecedence between itineraries. 
Moreover, traffic regulations define the responsibilities of all those employees involved in 
order to secure the safe journey of an itinerary (engine drivers, train personnel, transport 
controllers, points men etc.). However, the existing traffic regulations are old and they do not 
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meet the new operational conditions created by the investments in infrastructure and train 
engines. The task of changing the regulations demands a great amount of time and human 
resources while there is not an adequate number of personnel to undertake it. Furthermore, 
the formulation of new traffic regulations has become more complicated owing to the fact 
that the modernisation of the infrastructure and the construction of double rail-track have not 
yet been completed.  
 
For that reason, the CEOs issued circular letters so that the management would allow engine 
drivers to increase speed. However, circular letters can only introduce amendments to traffic 
regulations for a certain limited time period, so that the necessary changes in the rules will 
take place according to the developments in the work on the infrastructure and the relevant 
operating subsystems. As the aforementioned manager further states, circular letters are the 
outcome of decisions made by CEOs, and for that reason they do not necessarily express the 
needs and capabilities of the operational system. This is why the constant reduction of the 
time objective, as the following quotation indicates, is perceived as a self-interest target 
imposed by each CEO, ignoring the actual capacity of the operational system and its ability 
to accommodate high speeds in order to reach the time targets set, and moreover, the 
suggestions made by the relevant directorate. A conclusion is aptly indicated in the coming 
quotation provided by the manager responsible for managing and time scheduling the 
itineraries, who aims to exemplify the self-interest way in which the CEOs act (trans.): 
“He [the CEO] will achieve the reduction of journey time, he [the CEO] will threaten, 
he [the CEO] will pay ransom [he means bonuses to the engine drivers], he will make it 
[the CEO will manage to reach the time objective]. Yes, but you tell him [the 
subordinate to the CEO] that in the way these trains are going to reach Thessaloniki in 
4h 15min there will be accidents. Yes, however, accidents have a strong “stochastic 
character”, they do not have a “determinist relation” [a cause and effect relationship], 
that is, accidents will not definitely occur and even if they do, this will not definitely 
happen on the first day that these speeds will be introduced. No, accidents will happen 
one day! If we are lucky they may happen after we have left office, so they will not 
necessarily be linked to the policy that led to the reduction of time. It will be the fault of 
a man, so let’s hang him [while responsible for the accident is the particular policy 
designed and implemented by the company’s senior managers the allocation of 
responsibility is personalised usually at lower ranking employees and managers of the 
operational divisions]. But the rail truck materials will not be strong enough, it will be 
ruined well, the road materials will not be ruined in two weeks. In two years, maybe 
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three. It will last with this performance, then performance will drop, but I will not be 
part of the management then. These are the results of the lack of a concrete business 
policy introduced by managers… (Interview CH, 12 September 2006). 
The policy that has been followed by the successive administrators tends to destabilise the 
operational system, making it unreliable and unpredictable. The period since 2005 has been 
characterised by serious accidents. While no concrete conclusions can be reached by the 
existing records, the general perception is that these accidents have been the outcome of the 
policy described. In support of that argument is the opinion offered by one of employees’ 
representatives according to which, after the Second World War the Hellenic Railways had 
experienced a single major accident, in 1985 that caused the death of two people. In the last 
two years, as he mentioned, the TRAINAOSE (the rail operator) has experienced 27 rail 
accidents that caused the death of four people (Interview VA, 20 February 2009). As an 
employee further mentions (trans:).     
“…old safety regulations had a philosophy, they may have been outdated considering 
the technology we have today, but they were wisely structured. In order for an accident 
to happen, there has to be some sort of bypassing of the regulations. We maintain the 
regulations, we modernise the safety control systems, we increase the speed and we 
submit circular letters concerning these regulations. That is, first we make essential 
improvements and then we adjust the regulations… I feel a lump in my throat and I 
seriously doubt whether the existing mechanism is ready to deal with a crisis. We used 
to be very effective, we’ve always had accidents, damages, we’ve always had an ageing 
railway network but, as I’ve already mentioned, there was a certain formalism with 
regard to safety and crisis management. I have had to face accidents primarily for 12-13 
years; I see that we are facing a serious problem with the increase in speed. When you 
don’t have a reliable system of safety and infrastructure, you reduce speed in order to 
increase reaction time…” (Interview RD, 12 July 2006). 
It is indicative of the organisational conditions that no appropriate study of the circumstances 
and factors that led to a particular accident has taken place. The most bizarre and awkward 
aspect in operational action, however, is that while it is a Greek government’s obligation 
emanating from the European Directive 2001/13, no independent committee has so far, been 
charged with the responsibility of investigating the conditions under which an accident has 
occurred. As a result, the OSE and its management are, at the same time, the controller and 
the one under control.  
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“…what the organisation is lacking is a permanent, official and serious body that 
controls safety…” (Interview CI, 12 September 2006). 
To recapitulate, the use of time objectives as the main operational target within the existing 
configurations of power has proved to be a useful tool in the hands of each executive 
manager, used to ‘window dress’ any operating and investment failures. At the same time, 
the way in which responsibility is allocated at critical moments of the organisational 
operation, such as in the case of accidents, has been used so that the system’s operational 
deficits would remain unchallenged. As the following quotation taken from a newspaper 
article indicates (trans.): 
“The employees of the Greek Railways Company stress the importance of the fact that 
yesterday (12 July 2007) the first head-on train crash occurred since 1985 and they very 
much fear that a second crash is just a matter of time... the management of the Greek 
Railways Company are trying to conceal their embarrassment and find answers... The 
engine-drivers and the station-masters considered responsible for the accident were 
suspended, and the committee of the organisation will examine the cause of the 
accident. The competent authorities have already attributed, since yesterday, the cause 
of the accident to human error and avoided to mention the shortcomings of the technical 
system which are of vital importance” (Moumouris, 2007). 
With the establishment of the holding company, the operating conditions and patterns of 
organisational action for the employees in these companies have become more complex. The 
existence of a single company secured the efficient operation of certain parameters of traffic 
control and the simplicity in the relationships between the various departments and 
organisational roles, and made sure that certain rules existed, which are easy to understand 
and be applied by employees.  
“I will not talk about cases that I have not examined. However, having the experience of 
all these years and having received certain pieces of information, I can conclude on the 
reasons an accident occurred. It is because of the conflicting activities. We had a single 
mechanism, single service exploitation, a single system in terms of customers and 
goods, and all structures belonged to a single directorate. Now all these belong to three 
different general directorates, whose activities conflict with each other.” (Interview RD, 
12 July 2006). 
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The most important aspect in the OSE’s operating activity, however, were the personal 
relationships that have been developed between the members of the organisational system. 
The patterns of interrelationship that have evolved during all these years have given to 
employees and managers the ability through personal communication to overcome some - of 
the many the truth is - inefficiencies that the operating system has. As one independent 
management consultant said (trans.):  
“It is the first time that I see in a state-owned organisation that an engine driver can call, 
on his cell phone, the general director responsible, and to inform him about a problem 
that he faces while he performs his duties” (Interview, 9 October 2006).  
The establishment of the new companies introduced complex and conflicting relationships 
without the necessary technological advancements needed for their management, while the 
personnel has not managed yet to endorse in practice the way that the new relationships are 
controlled and the responsibilities have been allocated. In addition, it has started to create 
antagonistic relationships between the employees and managers of the various subsidiaries, 
with diluting effects upon the common identity and the patterns of interpersonal 
communication, established over all these years operating under one company. As a 
consequence, as the following quotation indicates, any form of managerial and operational 
control system in existence has collapsed. 
“At no management level are decision making, operational action and management 
efficiency controlled. Even the existing control mechanisms, the embryonic ones, have 
collapsed… nobody knows what is going on” (Interview LS, 10 July 2007). 
The current state of affairs in the Hellenic Railway Organisation is the outcome of what was 
defined in Chapter 3, as the unintended consequences of the organisational action: one 
outcome of the fact that organisational roles are not interrelated with any form of collective 
planning and managerial procedures. Business plans made have no actual role to play in the 
formulation of the company’s business objectives, or in the formulation and control of 
business strategies towards the successful implementation of the business objectives. 
However, while responsibilities for the company’s segregation and its effects tend to be 
assigned to the 2002-2005 management team, and to be personalised to the CEO of the 
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period, as well as to the management teams that followed the 2002-2005 CEO, the analysis 
will argue that the crisis is holistic, and it concerns the way in which the systematic 
relationships have been functioning, not only within the context of the organisation, but in 
addition, between the organisational context, and the outer environment. The decision for the 
disaggregation of EDICY from TRAINAOSE is the outcome of that entire crisis. 
7.4.  Discussion  
The key issue discussed in the present chapter is the effect on the financial and operational 
aspects of business actions from the powerlessness of organisational actors to influence the 
structuration process of the patterns of systematic relationships that have been influencing 
organisational action, the outcome of their inability to maintain a level of managerial 
independence from the coercive influence of the institutional environment. For that reason, 
the present analysis argues that the disaggregation between EDISY and TRAINAOSE was 
the outcome of the desperation of organisational actors, and the company’s executive 
management of the time to establish their competence and to gain the trust of the institutional 
environment concerning the efficient use of the allocated European and National financial 
resources. Thus, in contradiction to the opinion expressed by many managers and employees 
who hold the CEO of the period 2002-2005 responsible for the company’s segregation, the 
present analysis will adopt a distinct approach in order to explain the reasons behind the 
particular decision.  
 
For the present analysis, the decision for the company’s disaggregation has started implicitly 
to be formulated among managers and employees as a potential form of business 
organisation, long before it was actually realised, with the post-2003 business plans. As 
already mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the company’s disaggregation into 
separate businesses began to be the subject of discussion from the early 1990s, as a result of 
the European Directive 91/440 (discussed in Chapter 6). The demand of the European 
Committee for the accounting segregation of the state-owned rail organisations in Europe 
started to formulate the perception among the company’s employees and managers that the 
potential segregation of the OSE may result in the more efficient use of the company’s assets.  
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However, owing to the fear and the distrust of the employees towards the government’s 
intentions that the potential disaggregation between the railway infrastructure manager and 
the operating business units might result in the abolishment of the company’s public 
character (discussed in Chapter 5), any discussions concerning the company’s segregation 
into independent businesses concerned only secondary activities like those of the provision of 
logistic services and the management of the company’s logistic centres, the management of 
the company’s communication system (in order to provide telecommunication services to the 
public), or the development of the significant real estate property of the OSE. This is why 
with the 2003-2007 business plan the management proposed to the Ministry of Transport the 
establishment of eight subsidiary companies. In reality, the company’s management with the 
2003-2007 business plan was reproducing the perception dominant in the organisation that 
better and more efficient exploitation of the OSE’s assets can contribute to the company’s 
profitability. It is significant that, with the 2003-2007 business plan, the management of the 
period was stating that some of the subsidiaries in the years to come (they did not define in 
how many years) could become profitable, and therefore they could be listed in the Athens 
Stock Exchange. However, as the manager responsible for the company’s strategic planning 
quoted (trans.): 
“On occasion, the business plans express desires or necessities…” (Interview VT, 14 
July 2006). 
The desire which the above manager referred to is for the management to turn the 
organisation into a financial and operationally efficient corporation. However, in order for 
the management to do that, it was necessary to segregate the two main operating activities: 
the management of the infrastructure and the provision of rail services. As discussed in 
Chapter 41, through the segregation, the rail operator the OSE would have been in position to 
develop the necessary operational and business strategies, and to evaluate its financial 
performance without having to bear the cost of maintaining and modernising the railway 
infrastructure. While the decision of the way that segregation will be implemented belongs to 
the national governments and members of the European Union, the analysis in Chapter 4 
argued that the demand imposed by the European Directives for the accounting segregation 
                                                 
1 See section 4.4. 
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targets to impose on the company the business separation between the rail infrastructure 
business unit and the rail service one. For that reason, nevertheless, it had adopted the 
company’s accounting segregation as the most efficient operational strategy; planning 
relating to the company’s business disaggregation between the management of the 
infrastructure and the provision of rail services for passengers and freight transport began, 
with the 1998-2002 business plan. This is why, as the analysis in the previous chapter 
indicated, the company was vertically organised into business units, with independent 
managerial and operational control procedures.  
 
Whereas the need of the CEO of the period (1998-2002) to control and coordinate 
organisational action and the company’s operating deficit resulted in the decision for the 
company’s accounting segregation, chapter six shows that the aim of the CEO was to 
designate those managers competent to perform the company’s business segregation. Hence, 
the argument made in chapter six was that the company’s business disaggregation was 
postponed after 2002, when the modernisation of the company’s managerial and operational 
control systems would have been completed. This is why the first stage towards the 
company’s complete separation with the 2003-2005, business plan was implemented with the 
establishment of two business units: one responsible for the provision of rail services, and the 
other for the management of the rail infrastructure. In 2006, both these business units started 
operating as independent corporations, EDISY and TRAINAOSE, under the parent company 
OSE. The reality is that the European Directives constitute a strict framework of 
organisational action that dominates the formulation of the rail strategy, not only because of 
the explicit requirements enforced by them, but mainly because of the implicit aims pursued 
by the European Committee, which in reality aims to endorse the privatisation of the state-
owned rail operators1. Nevertheless, their articulation by the company’s CEO cannot provide 
an adequate explanation for the shift in the company’s business strategy, from accounting 
disaggregation to business segregation between the rail infrastructure manager and the 
service operator.  
 
                                                 
1 See the analysis made in Chapter 4, section 4.3. 
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The multiple, and diverse business models1 existing in the European rail industry suggest that 
each country adopts a model of reorganisation influenced by its national priorities, and the 
particular social and economic circumstances that it faces. Thus, it is suggested that the 
introduced reforms in the European rail industry influence, and become influenced by the 
operational and financial conditions of the national rail companies, the corporate and 
professional culture they have developed, and the perceived social and economic role they 
play. This is why in the period 1998-2001, analysed in the previous chapter, the materialistic 
conditions characterising the OSE and the intention of the then CEO to control organisational 
action and its outcomes, led to the company’s accounting disaggregation. 
“…there is no specific model in Europe. The situations are considered within the 
framework of organisational approaches which result from various and, sometimes, 
contradictory political policies; the above-mentioned policies either meet the marginal 
requirements of the European guidelines or move towards meeting the most demanding 
ones” (Interview BA, 26 September 2006). 
Business disaggregation and the establishment of the holding company were presented as the 
ultimate solution for improving the prospects of a company that has huge financial deficits, 
and which has been unable to efficiently modernise its network, and to secure the rail 
operator’s commercial and financial prosperity and, moreover, to plan and control the 
investment process efficiently. As in the case of the performance objective of the time target 
of the Athens-Thessaloniki itinerary, the company’s disaggregation was a show-case aiming 
to secure the trust of the Greek people that something was happening towards the company’s 
modernisation.  
“….on the one hand there is the Ministry which turns a blind eye to the journalists 
criticising the railway employees for being inefficient and holding them responsible for 
the shortages of the organisation and, on the other hand, turns a blind eye to us, saying 
that, owing to the present state of affairs, we are not answerable for these shortages. Of 
course whatever he says [he means the Minister] he says it for public relation purposes. 
                                                 
1 Complete separation in private companies (Great Britain); holding company (Germany and Italy); 
infrastructure managers and railway companies set up as separate companies with independent 
executives (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal and Norway); hybrids where 
railway infrastructure financing is separated but infrastructure and operating activities remain under 
one entity (France, Austria); separate division within an integrated company (Belgium, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxemburg) (NERA, 2004). 
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It is a schizophrenic situation. The image of the average trainman is that of the person 
who eats away the money of the Greek people and this is not fair. It is also thought that 
if there were no shortages of the rail industry, the state budget would be much better. 
You can handle it by establishing two companies: the infrastructure and the operation 
one. In this way you will be able to control service quality, while you will be free [OSE] 
from the blame concerning shortcomings in the management of the rail infrastructure” 
(Interview TB, 14 July 2006). 
The fact that the Ministry of Transport and the company’s management were incapable of 
positioning the company within the new environment, in the way foreseen by the European 
Directives, led them to adopt an accounting strategy that aimed to transfer all operating costs 
to the state (which however imposes on the organisation to borrow funds in order to finance 
its operating costs and interest expenses), and to enable the operator and the infrastructure 
manager to show profits, or at least to have balanced profit and loss accounts as the first rail 
packages demand. The only rationale that can be identified behind the implemented business 
venture, and the only safe conclusion that can be drawn is that the creation of the holding 
company was intended to free the newly established rail operator TRAINAOSE from 
operating and non-operating costs that it could not finance from its operating activities, as the 
European Committee demanded with the first and the second rail packages. This is why the 
parent company OSE owns all the assets that the subsidiaries exploit for the purposes of their 
businesses. In addition, employees and managers remain in the parent company, and they are 
transferred under the status of detachment to the subsidiary companies. However, the cost 
that burden the subsidiaries would not be that of the managers’/employees’ wages (the level 
of which is defined by collective agreements), but rather it will be the cost defined by the 
conditions existing in the market. The difference in the wage would be paid by OSE. 
“As far as the personnel are concerned, the management of the Greek Railways 
Company followed the German model according to which the entire personnel belongs 
to a separate company and can be detached to the subsidiary companies on the market 
value basis, which will be defined by the conditions existing in the market and not on 
the basis of wage claims” (Source: Greek Railways Company). 
It becomes apparent that the only effort made with the company’s disaggregation was to 
manipulate the pressure exercised by the European Commission and the Greek people for the 
company’s inability to apply its modernisation project efficiently within the time, and cost 
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targets set with the business plans, and to use the financial resources provided for that 
purpose effectively. Moreover, the company’s disaggregation intended to provide indirect 
financial subsidies to the new companies in an effort to overcome the demand imposed by 
the European Directives for a competitive financial and managerially independent state-
owned rail organisation.  
 
It is important to conclude that, with the decision for the company’s segregation and the 
establishment of the holding company, no clear boundaries can be drawn in the relationship 
between the company’s management and the leadership of the Ministry of Transport. 
Consequently, the manipulation of the expectations of the Greek people and the European 
Union cannot be seen as the outcome of the resistance of the inner organisational context 
towards to the imposed expectations, but rather as the outcome of the contradictions that 
characterise the relationship of the two interrelated environments - Greek institutional 
environment with the European one, - and from the way that these contradictions are 
influenced by the various institutional and non-institutional interests that these environments 
come to serve.  
 
It is accepted that organisational and legal reforms as these are imposed by the European 
Directives are not sufficient to provide the targeted efficiency and quality in the European 
rail industry. The only way the changes introduced by the European Committee, can have a 
positive result is through, the provision of sufficient financing by the European National 
Governments (adequate compensation for Public Services Obligations and sufficient 
investment in rail infrastructure) for the development of the rail industry in Europe. 
However, among the 27 European countries, Greece has the lowest annual expenditures for 
maintaining and managing the rail infrastructure, and it allocates financial resources for 
investments on railway infrastructure below the European average amount dedicated by the 
rest European countries (Ludewig, 2010). OSE has the burden of all the cost of the 
modernisation of the rail infrastructure that the Greek State could not take or the set 
development priorities, and the economic interests served have not allowed it to take. Thus 
the only way for OSE to become an efficient organisation is for the Greek Government to 
dedicate more financial resources for the development of the Greek rail industry and the only 
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way to do that is to stop giving priority to the development of the country’s road network (as 
discussed in Chapter 5, this is a policy started in 1950s). Still an important question emerges 
concerning the objective of the European Committee; since the interference of the National 
States in the development of the European rail industry is a precondition for its efficient 
development is it positive that deregulation and competition will have positive effects?  
7.5.  Conclusion  
The present chapter describes the conditions governing the disaggregation of OSE into a 
holding company. More particularly, the present chapter describes the patterns of 
interrelationship between the company’s administrator managers, their subordinates, the 
Greek Government and the European Union, and aims to understand the way in which the 
formulated patterns of interrelationship attempted to delimit individual behaviour, and to 
impose the company’s business disaggregation between the railway infrastructure manager 
and the service operator, an operational strategy that is seen as irrational by organisational 
managers and employees.  
 
Even though the company’s disaggregation was the outcome of a decision received between 
the Minister of Transport and the company’s CEO in the period 2002-2005, the analysis 
argues that, in reality, it started to be formulated implicitly long before it was planned and 
imposed with the 2003-2007 business plan. It was the outcome of the incompetence of the 
organisational system to reinvent and modernise its operational and administrative 
procedures according to the legitimate model of the customer-orientated and profit-making 
business organisation imposed by the European Directives concerning the rail industry. The 
analysis supports the belief that the company’s separation is used by the company’s 
management and the Greek Government in order to manipulate the pressure by Greek public 
opinion and the European Committee for the company’s inability to use the operational funds 
allocated to it effectively and productively. 
 
The company’s failure to apply its modernisation project efficiently was the outcome of 
certain materialistic conditions that restricted the company’s ability to maintain a level of 
independence from the coercive influence of the institutional environment. The conclusion 
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that the formulated business plans made by the successive administrations had no actual role 
to play in the company’s day-to-day management, and in influencing the patterns of 
organisational action, is the outcome of the fact that no definite responsibilities between the 
role of the company’s managing director and the ministry of transport can be identified.  
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8. Chapter – Concluding remarks   
8.1.  The objectives of the research  
The transformation in the patterns of organisational action and accountability from the 
application of strategic and operational plans, as formal accountability mechanisms, aiming 
at making transparent the relationship between the management of the Hellenic Railway 
Organisation (OSE) and the Greek Government, in addition to securing the company’s 
managerial independence from the Greek Government, and to promote objectivity in the 
evaluation of managerial performance, is the theme of the present study. Following Giddens’ 
approach to Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1979; 2002), an account was presented on the 
conditions and power relations that have influenced the structuration process in the patterns 
of organisational integration and interaction in the OSE, from the application of business 
plans and performance objectives.  
 
More particularly the objectives of the research were: 
1. To depict the way in which strategic and operational plans implicated in the ongoing 
organisational action in the OSE, and the formulation of meaningful relationships 
between the appointed administrative managers, their subordinate managers and 
employees, and between the inner organisational context and the outer environment, 
namely the Greek Government and the European Union became possible; 
2. To depict the power relations between the various collectives in the process of the 
formulation of operational strategies, and to conceptualise the ability of administrative 
management to control and coordinate managerial and operational activities in the OSE, 
using the operational plans and operational objectives for planning and performance 
measurement purposes.  
8.2.  The importance of the research  
Reforms underlined by the managerial accountability administrative model were introduced 
in the Greek public sector in 1996 with law 2414, aiming at the structural reformation of the 
state-owned enterprises in Greece. While contradictory evidence exists over the efficiency of 
managerial accountability reform in the various countries in which they have been applied, 
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the structural contradictions characterising the Greek social context make the reformation of 
the Greek state-owned enterprises a complicated and intensive task with an increase in 
conflicts. The OSE, one of the oldest Greek state-owned organisations, and, as argued in 
Chapter 3, the most problematic one, is seen as a case study that directly addresses the 
research issues. The rapidly increasing operating deficits, the inability of the OSE to realise 
its strategic objectives, the lack of transparency in the company’s management raised the 
issue of the inappropriateness of the implementation of managerial accountability reforms in 
the Greek social context, and made OSE an important case to be studied and analysed.  
8.3.  Summary of the thesis and research results  
Reforms in the OSE were initiated as part of the managerial accountability reform in the 
Greek public sector, which in turn are underlined by a global model of public administration 
that perceives the private sector as a more efficient model of administration than the public 
sector one. The Greek Government’s explicit aim was to enforce the company’s managerial 
independence and to apply performance evaluation techniques of managerial action. 
However, as Chapter 2 shows, while the purpose of managerial accountability reforms in 
Greece and elsewhere has been to address the issues of operational efficiency, economic 
effectiveness and transparency in the public sector, contradictory evidence exists about the 
model’s ability to meet the conceptualised expectations (Glyn and Murphy, 1996; Newberry 
and Pallor, 2004).  
 
Shifting from process control to the evaluation of results raises questions about NPM’s 
capabilities to modernise operational procedures in state-owned organisations and to secure 
transparency in the use of the allocated resources (Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Ballas and 
Tsoukas, 2004; Newberry and Pallor, 2004). As the review of the literature in Chapter 2 
shows, the Greek public sector not only faces particular difficulties in endorsing instrumental 
forms of accountability, but, more important, it faces difficulties in applying accounting 
methods for recording, analysing and disclosing financial transactions (Venieris and Cohen, 
2004; Papadeas, 2008). These findings directly challenge the applicability of NPM as a 
model of public administration in the context of the Greek public sector, and the capacity of 
the applied reformation process to modernise the context of state owned enterprises.  
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As the present analysis argues, the conceptualised accountability relationship with the NPM 
model, which is based upon the faith that accounting mechanisms have the capacity to keep 
decision makers accountable for their decisions, fails to identify the contradictions in the 
ongoing organisational action emerging from the multiple and fragmented character of the 
accountability relationship, and, consequently, the fact that organisational contexts are not 
coherent and consistent (Sinclair, 1995; Goddard, 2005). The contradictions have become 
more complicated and intensive in social contexts, such as the Greek one, characterised by 
the increased influence of various interests in the formulation of public policy, and the 
limited experience of state-owned organisations in participative management schemes.  
 
Thus, central to this analysis is the argument that strategic and operational plans are 
implicated in strategies of power that aim to marginalise inner organisational dialogue, with 
major effects on managerial participation and cooperation (Townley, 2003; Ribeiro and 
Scapens 2006). The lack of inner organisational dialogue and participation in decision 
making are examined as the most critical reason for business plans and the formulated 
objectives failing to be coupled in the ongoing managerial and operational action in state-
owned organisations. The use of operational plans for accountability purposes is relevant 
when inner organisational actors and collectives can understand and perceive as reasonable 
the meanings and objectives conveyed with these, and, more important, when they have 
participated in the formulation of these objectives.  
 
For that reason, the present analysis rejects the conceptualisation of accountability as a 
mechanistic and unidirectional relationship based upon the power of the Greek Government 
to use performance measurements to keep OSE’s CEO accountable for his decisions and 
actions, and upon the CEO’s power to use control and performance measurement systems to 
keep his subordinates employees and managers accountable for their actions. Accountability 
(the concept of which is discussed in Chapter 3) is seen by the present analysis as a social, 
and political process within which everyone is mutual accountable, based upon inner 
organisational dialogue and trust among the members of an organisational system 
(Mackintosh and Scapens, 1990; Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Dillard et al., 2004).  
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Accountability is based upon the capacity of agents to explain the reasons for their actions at 
discursive and practical level. At discursive level, agents can articulate reasons over their 
purposes and objectives. At practical level, accountability defines what is considered as an 
acceptable form of action, and thus it establishes rules that define agents’ behaviour, and 
makes it possible for them to self monitor their actions. Thus, the conceptualisation of 
business plans as interpretive schemes1, norms2 and facilities3 (Scapens and Mackintosh, 
1996), implicated in the process of the rationalisation of the ongoing organisational action, 
presupposes that these are the product of a collective process: the outcome of the tensions 
created between the members of an organisational context, and between the members of an 
organisational context and their external environment, which influences the rationalisation 
process. For that reason, the critical issue, in the process of rationalisation of the business 
action in state-owned organisations, is the understanding of the formulated business plans, 
not as mechanisms symbolising managing directors’ transformative capacities, but as 
normative forms of dialogue.  
 
However, the application of managerial accountability reform is seen as an ‘episode’ of 
radical change in the organisational systems of state-owned enterprises. As argued in Chapter 
2, the applied administrative model is foreign to the Greek corporate culture, the result of a 
multilevel process that has to be studied beyond the strict boundaries defined by the national 
settings within which OSE operates. The introduced “crisis” aims to redefine the patterns of 
organisational interaction in the Greek state-owned organisations and, consequently, the 
roles, norms and rules that influence the accountability relationships and define 
organisational action and agents’ behaviour according to an administrative model dominant 
in the Anglo-Saxon world. 
 
For that reason, the articulation of reasoning over the rationality of the intentions and 
objectives of the reorganisation becomes problematic. In that sense, the increased powers 
allocated to administrative managers, whose role is critical in the process of the 
                                                 
1 Used in the process of planning. 
2 That legitimises certain strategies and objectives. 
3 Used by managers in the process of managerial and operation control and in the coordination of the 
various department and individuals. 
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transformation of state-owned enterprises, results in increased conflicts and contradictions in 
their effort to control and coordinate organisational activities. The power of administrative 
managers is bounded by existing legitimate roles, established rules and values that constitute 
an organisation’s system of accountability. Thus, as the analysis in Chapter 3 argues, the 
reactions against the introduced changes from the emerged inner-organisational conflicts 
depend on the way that the dominant role of the administrative manager realises its power. 
For that reason, the power of subordinates to operate as leverage to the power capabilities of 
super-ordinates is perceived to be critical to the formulation of accountability relationships. 
This is why the use of strategic and operational plans, as mechanisms of inner organisational 
dialogue, is seen to be contingent upon the ability of subordinates in the OSE to balance the 
increased powers allocated to administrative managers by the Greek Government.  
 
The case of the European rail industry is a typical example of radical change initiated in the 
national settings of the member countries of the European Union. Until the early 1990s (in 
1992 the UK railways were privatised), the European rail industry was managed mainly by 
state-owned railway corporations which had at the same time the obligation to maintain rail 
infrastructure, and to provide efficient, safe and time-accurate rail services. Chapter 4 aims to 
make explicit the influence of the European Commission upon the formulation of the railway 
policy in Greece, and traces the conditions and factors which influenced the reforms in the 
European rail industry that lean towards a single model of competing operators using a rail 
network managed by separate infrastructure managers.  
 
The ‘railways problem’, as defined by the World Bank in 1992, is associated with the 
accumulation of high financial deficits by state-owned rail companies and the decline in the 
market share for freight and passenger transport. Defined by the neo-liberal perception about 
the role of the state in economic development, the World Bank perceives that the financial 
crisis in the rail industry is the product of national state interventions that protect rail 
companies from the conditions imposed by the competition in the transport industry. 
Opening the European railway industry to regulated competition became a priority for the 
European Commission. Through the segregation of state-owned companies, between service 
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operators1 and rail infrastructure managers, the European Committee, explicitly aims towards 
the financial rationalisation of the operation of the rail companies in Europe. However, 
implicitly it promotes the privatisation of rail operators (Perkins, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, the intentions of the European Committee have faced the opposition and the 
reaction of the European state-owned rail companies. The multiple models of business 
organisation existing in the European rail industry indicate the ability of state-owned rail 
companies in Europe to influence the transformation process, and to resist the reforms 
imposed by the European Committee. The use of accounting mechanisms for measuring 
managerial and business performance in state-owned European rail organisations aims to 
create the necessary conditions that would allow the application of European policies. The 
accounting segregation between the two main operating activities in rail organisations - those 
of the provision of rail service, and the management of the rail infrastructure, - enforced by 
the European Directives 91/440 and 2001/12, aims to control and measure the efficient and 
effective use of the financial resources allocated from the European Committee and the 
National Governments for the investments made on rail assets. In addition, it aims to make 
transparent the financial relationship between the state-owned rail organisation and the 
National Governments. The provision of financial subsidies by the National Governments to 
rail organisations is seen as an illegitimate action responsible for the financial, and 
consequently, the managerial dependence of the state-owned organisations from the National 
States.  
 
The strategy of the European Committee has been to enforce competition and to turn 
European rail organisations into financially sound corporations, managed not according to 
social and political objectives, but rather according to market-driven objectives. The effort of 
managers in rail organisations to meet the financial and profitability objectives set with the 
operational plans’ upon the attainment of which the evaluation of their performance is based, 
is expected to make imperative the need for the business disaggregation of the European 
state-owned rail enterprises, between the revenue generating activities of service provision, 
and the cost generating activity of managing, modernising and maintaining the railway 
                                                 
1 The operational division mainly concerns the provision of services to freight and passengers.  
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infrastructure. Privatisation is seen as the next logical step following the disaggregation of 
rail organisations, the outcome of the influence exercised by private competitors. Chapter 4 
made apparent that the changes in the European rail industry aim to alter the norms, values 
and cultural elements that have been shaping action and accountability in the European rail 
organisations in order to enforce structural changes in the European rail industry based on 
privatisation and competition. 
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the unique example of privatisation in the European rail 
industry that took place in the UK fails to provide adequate evidence for the operational and 
financial efficiencies that competition and privatisation can introduce in the rail industry, at 
least in the European context. At the same time, state-owned rail organisations in Europe 
have achieved remarkable operational and technological advancements, like the creation of 
the Trans-European high-speed rail network that has gained the trust of the societies in which 
they operate over their competence to use public investments efficiently, and to provide 
operational efficient and customer-orientated services. As Chapter 4 concludes, the 
discussion over the decline of the importance of the European rail industry in the social and 
economic development of the national states in Europe has be transferred from their close 
relationship with the National Governments to the dominant patterns of economic and social 
relationships that give priority to those sectors of the transportation industry that maximise 
private investment.   
 
The need to define the materialistic conditions and the role of the Greek State in the 
development of the Hellenic Rail Organisation led the present analysis to incorporate in 
Chapter 5 evidence from the very early stages of the development of the rail industry in 
Greece. That was a necessary stage in the analysis in order that the researcher could gain a 
grasp of the context in which managerial accountability reforms were introduced. In the first 
section of Chapter five, the analysis aims to depict the conditions under which state-
ownership emerged in the Greek rail industry, and to indicate the role of the Greek state in 
the rise and decline of the Greek railways in the Greek economic and social context.  
 
  200
The contribution of private companies in the development of a technologically advanced 
network, and the provision of services that satisfied the transportation needs of passenger and 
freight services, are still acknowledged by employees and managers in the OSE. However, 
the analysis reached some rather disappointing and gloomy conclusions about the role of the 
Greek state after the 1950s period. The opinion of managers and representatives of active 
social groups (the thesis will argue that this is the general perception) is that the Greek state 
has intentionally undermined the development and expansion of the Greek railways. In 
contrast to other European countries, particularly France, where in the aftermath of World 
War II the development of the rail industry became a priority for the country’s social and 
economic reconstruction (Meunier, 2002), Greece failed to develop and maintain a social and 
financing plan that would have supported the rail industry. As a consequence, the importance 
of the railway industry in the country’s economic activity began to decline. This is the period 
(1950-1970) during which the absence of governmental support led the private companies to 
leave the Greek rail industry, and as a result ownership was concentrated in the hands of the 
Greek state.  
 
The first attempt of the Greek Government to formulate strategies aimed at boosting the 
shrinking rail sector in Greece took place in 1966; this led to the establishment in 1972 of 
OSE as an independent state-owned corporation. The analysis of that period highlighted 
some of the basic conditions which influenced the way in which OSE was developed in 
relation to the strategies and objectives set by the 1966-1977 strategic and operational plans. 
Through the incorporation of elements of the organisational constitution, the analysis shows 
that informal social conflicts defined organisational development in ways contradictory to 
those intended by the first strategic and operational plans (1966-1977). The need for the 
development of a corporate-orientated organisation was overlooked, whilst a vertical, 
centralised organisation, incompatible with the objectives defined in the 1966-1977 business 
plan, was established. At the same time OSE inherited from its predecessors patterns of 
organisational action and organisational relationships formulated upon military forms of 
organisation, not compatible with the corporate characteristics that the plan foresaw.  
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The socialisation of the OSE (discussed in the second section of Chapter five), through the 
initiation of social control and collective management, was a critical moment in the 
company’s structuration process. The company’s socialisation aimed to alter the relationship 
between the company’s management and the Greek government, and to secure the 
company’s managerial and operational independence. Socialisation was the outcome of what 
was seen as a collective quest for increased social accountability and participation in the 
company’s management. The formulation of the 1983-1997 strategic plan indicates that 
employees and managers embraced and tried to endorse in their ongoing operational action 
the use of social and business objectives. The 1983-1997 strategic plan and the economic 
agreement between the organisation and the Greek state (which has existed since 1972), 
reflect collectively formulated meanings of the social role of the rail company in the Greek 
social context, summarised on the argument that the state is responsible for the development 
and modernisation of the rail infrastructure (rail network) and rolling stock-material, and, 
moreover, for compensating the organisation for the provision of services provided for social 
and not commercial purposes. Within the framework of socialisation, strategic plans and the 
economic agreement aimed to sustain long-term commitments between the various 
collectives represented in the Representative Assembly of Social Control (ASKE).  
 
However, the Greek Government never fulfilled its financial responsibilities towards the 
organisation (as these emanated from the 1972 Economic Agreement with the organisation). 
At the same time, OSE was unable to formulate an operational plan that would have defined 
the necessary operational strategies and the required resources in order that the company 
could implement the investment projects formulated with the 1983-1997 strategic plan. 
Moreover, for a period of thirteen years, OSE was unable to disclose its financial accounts 
and, more importantly, to maintain an efficient and trustworthy recording mechanism of 
business transactions in order to provide to ASKE with the necessary data to exercise social 
control. As a result, ASKE never became functional. Social control and democratic dialogue 
remained irresolute, with each interest group trying to accomplish its particularistic interests 
through direct negotiation with the government, or the company’s senior administrators who 
were seen as government’s representatives. As a result, the company’s business objectives 
were never realised, and any effort for its operational and administrative modernisation failed 
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to be applied. The turning point in the socialisation process was the deregulation and 
privatisation programme intended to be applied by the Greek Government in the period 
1990-1993.  
 
The analysis of the period 1990-1993 which takes place in the third section of Chapter 5 
provides an account of the conflicts that emerged over the Greek Government’s intentions to 
restrict the company’s financial deficit through the reduction of its business activities. 
However, the profound necessity for the company’s financial and operational 
‘rationalisation’, while shared by all collectives, did not gain adequate support. The effort for 
the company’s reorganisation, according to the European Directive 91/440, aiming the 
company’s operational rationalisation according to financially efficiency objectives, became 
the subject of a political conflict, which caused increased contradictions in the inner 
organisational context, and distracted the organisation from the efficient incorporation of the 
European Directive in the Greek rail industry. Managers and employees in the organisation, 
as well as social groups and local communities, perceived that the intended disaggregation 
between the rail infrastructure management and the service operating business units aimed at 
serving the government’s ideological objectives, which was the privatisation of OSE, and 
through privatisation, the decline of the company’s market share in the Greek transportation 
market.  
 
The common perceptions of the social and public character of the OSE, as well as the action 
of the employees’ union were bound by the behaviour of administrative manager, who 
resigned from his position in an effort to distance himself from the strategies followed by the 
Minister of Finance. However, the pressure exercised by the European Committee for 
transparency and efficiency in the management and use of the financial resources made 
available with the European Support Frameworks, in addition to the need of the Greek 
Government to control and restrict the company’s accumulated deficit, made imperative the 
need for change in the company’s administration and operational action towards a model of 
business action that prioritises financial over social objectives.  
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While in the Greek public sector the change towards a model of business organisation that 
would be based upon instrumental forms of accountability is allied with law 2414/1996, the 
analysis argues that its origins should rather be identified with the country’s participation in 
the European Union. It is the participation in the European common market, and the 
accompanied responsibilities for opening up to regulated competition sectors of the Greek 
economy that have been dominated by state-owned monopolies, like the rail one, that 
triggered the changes in the OSE. However, with law 2414 of 1996, reforms gained a more 
holistic character towards managerialism and the faith assigned by the government to the role 
of the executive managers that they have the capabilities to modernise the company’s 
administrative and operational procedures, and to undertake the responsibility to turn the 
company into a financially efficient and competitive rail organisation.  
 
For that reason, chapter six distinguishes the influence exercised by the European Union, on 
the organisational context of the OSE, at two distinctive, and at the same time mutually 
informed contexts: the micro one, identified with the reforms introduced by the European rail 
Directives1 and the European rules and regulations, and the macro one, identified with the 
macro-economic objectives set by the Greek Government for the country’s participation in 
the Economic Monetary Union (EMU). The analysis in Chapter six begins with a 
presentation of the changes initiated by the European Committee at micro-level. At this level, 
the changes introduced by the European Commission target the financial rationalisation of 
the operating and investment procedures in the OSE.  
 
The objective of the analysis on the influence exercised by the European Union at micro-
level is to depict the perception that employees and managers in the organisation have of the 
role of the European Committee in the process of the company’s operational rationalisation. 
The analysis argues that although employees and managers disagreed with certain strategies 
enforced by the European Committee, (mainly the one related to the OSE’s disaggregation 
and the foundation of the company’s first subsidiary company ERGOSE), they regard as 
positive the influence exercised by the European Committee. Critical to their judgement over 
the positive role of the European Committee in the process of the company’s modernisation 
                                                 
1 See the analysis made in Chapter 4, section 4.3. 
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is the fact that employees, and managers acknowledge as inefficient and underproductive the 
way that the organisational system was functioning under the coercive influence and control 
of the Greek Government, and that the enforced regulations and practices have emancipative 
characteristics aiming to set the company to be managerially autonomous from the Greek 
Government. An additional reason that justifies the positive perception that employees and 
managers have for the role of the European Commission in the company’s modernisation 
process is the fact that the country’s participation in the European Union secures the 
necessary financial resources for the modernisation of the company’s operational systems. 
The need of the organisation and the Greek Government to secure the financial resources 
available with the Community Support Frameworks is seen by the present analysis as the 
main reason that secures the authority of the European Commission to impose the required 
changes on the Greek Government and the OSE. 
 
At the micro-level, the Greek Government, using law 2414, aimed at securing the necessary 
power and status for the appointed manager administrators, and to legitimise their authority, 
to control and coordinate organisational action in the context of the OSE. More particularly, 
the Greek Government expects that the appointed executive managers would manage to 
control and reduce the company’s continuously increasing financial deficit. With law 2414, 
the Greek Government’s explicit intention is to dissociate its self from the company’s 
management and the accompanied financial responsibilities in order for its economic 
objectives to succeed at macro-level, and to join the EMU. For that reason, while the 
European rail directives refer to national governments and not to rail companies, the decision 
for the company’s disaggregation and the incorporation of the requirements of the European 
Directive 91/440 in Greek law was one of the major decisions assigned to the company’s 
executive management. As the analysis in chapter six shows, the expectation of the Greek 
Government is that the appointed CEO would manage to formulate the necessary strategies, 
to rationalise financially the company’s operating procedures, and at the same time secure the 
consensus of the inner organisational environment towards organisational changes. The use 
of the 1998-2002 business plan by the first appointed CEO (1997-2001) in his effort to 
secure the trust of the Greek Government, his subordinate managers and employees over his 
ability to meet their expectations is the subject of chapter six.  
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The operational strategy concerning the company’s disaggregation according to the European 
directive 91/440, selected by the first CEO who was appointed in the period 1997-2001 , was 
formulated on the basis of the accounting segregation between the service divisions and the 
railway infrastructure division, and the establishment of managerial independent business 
units. The decision for the company’s accounting segregation, according to which the OSE 
met the marginal requirements of the European Directive 91/440, was the result of the CEO’s 
belief that the particular operational strategy was the most financial effective and appropriate 
for the OSE, demanding the least financial resources and effort for its implementation, and 
for that reason having the least effect on the operational process. The decision made was 
intended to serve the CEO’s main managerial goal, which was the control and decline of the 
company’s financing deficit. The CEO of the period 1997-2001 believed that the OSE’s 
segregation into different businesses would have caused increased costs, and moreover, it 
would have distracted the company from the efficient and effective implementation of its 
investment project. The administrative conditions existing in the organisation, the lack of any 
form of available data concerning the company’s operating and financing activities with 
major examples being the under-functioning of the accounting departments and the 
administration of strategic and operational planning, made the use of the operational plan an 
inappropriate mechanism for interpreting past results and formulating future business actions 
based upon their financial efficiency.  
 
With the aim of securing the trust of both the Greek Government and the European 
Committee, the CEO’s key objective was to rationalise the company’s operations financially. 
The OSE’s financial rationalisation and the realization of the commitments he undertook 
towards the Greek Government with the managerial contract were the objectives that gave 
substance to CEO’s role. Thus, as the analysis in Chapter 6 argues, the 1998-2002 business 
plan managed to establish meaningful relationships between the CEO and his subordinates in 
the OSE; as a result of this, the company was able to start applying some first changes 
towards the reorganisation of business action according to financial efficiency criteria. 
Hence, in the financial years 2000 and 2001, the management managed to control and reduce 
the company’s financing deficit, and to increase the company’s productivity.  
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An additional reason that led to the adoption of the company’s accounting segregation was 
the fact that the CEO distrusted the competence of his subordinates to meet the challenges 
and operational dysfunctions1 that would have emerged from the OSE’s business 
segregation. The lack of efficient operational control systems that would have made it 
possible for the company’s senior management to direct and control the way that employees 
function and to evaluate the outcomes of their actions, made the CEO reluctant to adopt the 
company’s business segregation as an operational business strategy, fearing the negative 
effects that his subordinate’s intended or unintended actions would have had upon the 
company’s ability to provide operational efficient rail services. Thus the company’s 
management decided to apply the OSE’s accounting segregation, an operational strategy 
which, as Chapter 4 argues, had been applied by other rail state-owned organisations in 
European countries with similar socio-economic characteristics to Greece, and which in 
addition was in agreement with what has been perceived by employees, managers and 
employees’ representatives as a rational operational strategy compatible with the company’s 
social and public characteristics. This is why the decision for the company’s accounting 
segregation also reflected the fear of the organisational actors and collectives that the 
institutional segregation of the manager of the infrastructure from the operating divisions 
might lead to the privatisation of the rail operator. In an effort to avoid conflicts with his 
subordinates and their union which would have caused him the loss of control within the 
organisation, and distrusting his subordinates’ capabilities and intentions, the decision of the 
company’s accounting segregation aimed to legitimise CEO’s authority and to facilitate his 
power to control and coordinate organisational action.  
 
As the analysis in Chapter 6 argues, the decision for the disaggregation of the financial 
accounts between the infrastructure manager and the rail service operating units is seen as a 
learning process. The CEO, through the modernisation of the company’s managerial and 
control systems and the application of performance measurements, aimed to designate those 
managers competent to perform organisational roles, and responsibilities, to modernise the 
company’s managerial and operational procedures, and, more important, to alter the 
                                                 
1 It was an estimation based upon the experience that business desegregation in other European rail 
networks offered.  
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rationality that had been defining the ongoing organisational action. As the analysis in 
Chapter 6 argues, the OSE’s business disaggregation was in reality postponed after 2002, 
when according to the business plan made and the targets set, the company’s modernisation 
through the application of managerial and operational control systems would have made the 
application of such a strategy possible. 
 
It has become apparent that the power of subordinates to penetrate the conditions of 
organisational reproduction, and the motivation of the CEO to manage and control 
organisational action, resulted in the business plan being used as a norm that communicated 
to the inner and the outer institutional environment, what collectively was perceived by 
organisational actors, a legitimate operational strategy, conventional to the company’s 
operating and financing needs. Still, while the 1998-2002 business plan was the outcome of 
the day-to-day tensions, its use in the formulation of meaningful relationships between the 
company’s management and the Greek Government failed. 
 
As the analysis in Chapter 6 shows, the Greek Government had neither the ability to control 
the efficient implementation of the business plan, nor the intention to use that in the process 
of the evaluation of managerial performance. The Greek state lacked the necessary 
institutions that would have made possible the company’s evaluation according to its 
financial and operational performance. As a result, the use of normative forms of 
accountability brought the CEO into a superior position in relation to the Greek Government, 
and made the concept of dialectic of control an oxymoron. The lack of an institutional body 
responsible for the formulation of the country’s rail policy resulted in that responsibility 
being assigned to the CEO of the OSE. As a result, OSE’s CEO became the controller, since 
he was responsible for the formulation of the country’s rail policy, and at the same time the 
one under control, since he was the person responsible for the implementation of the 
formulated rail policy. Thus, the contractual relationship between the government and the 
management became meaningless, with the set operational and managerial objectives 
becoming irrelevant to that relationship. This is why, after the CEO’s removal from his 
position (two years earlier from what the management contract foresaw), all the CEOs 
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appointed after him never signed a managerial contract, and all the following business plans 
made did not have the approval - at least the explicit approval, - of the Greek government.  
The corporate, and managerial independence of the OSE declared by the Greek Government 
remains irresolute, while the intervention from the ministers of transport and finance has 
been decisive and intensive, over not only the formulated operational strategies, but in 
addition, the company’s day-to-day management. This is a conclusion that contradicts the 
objectives of the European Directives concerning the European rail industry that constitute 
legal commitments for the Greek Government, according to which the OSE has to be 
managerially and financially independent from the Greek Government, in order to draw its 
business and investment plans according to corporate and profitability objectives and not 
according to the interests served by Government. This is why Chapter 6 concludes that the 
disaggregation of business plans is the result of the structural contradictions characterising 
the company’s institutional environment, and more particularly the different objectives 
pursued by the Greek Government and the European Committee. The immediate effect of the 
fact that business plans had no role to play in the formulation and allocation of 
responsibilities, is that transparency in decision making and the control of the rationality 
defining business action became problematic. The implications and contradictions which 
emerged, and their effects upon the company’s reorganisation, are discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
In Chapter 7, the analysis concerns the period 2002-2008, during which the OSE was 
segregated into six subsidiary companies operating under the parent company OSE. Chapter 
7 provides an account of the materialistic conditions which influenced the decision for the 
company’s disaggregation, the establishment of separate businesses for the management of 
the railway infrastructure and the provision of rail services to passengers and freight 
customers. The decision for the disaggregation of these two operating activities contradicts 
the rationality of the decision made, with the 1998-2002 business plan for the company’s 
accounting segregation, a decision, which as Chapter 6 concludes, was the outcome of the 
tensions in the everyday organisational actions that generate accountability in organisational 
systems.  
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OSE’s business disaggregation was the outcome of the revision of the 1998-2002 operational 
plan, made under a new administration (2002-2005). According to the new five-year business 
plan (period 2003-2007), the company’s business disaggregation is set to be the primary 
objective in order for the company to gain the necessary financial and operational efficiency 
which, according to management’s opinion, the previously formulated operational strategy, 
that of the company’s accounting segregation, had not managed to achieve. In addition, the 
company’s business disaggregation was aiming to ensure that the responsibilities and 
financing liabilities of the Greek State towards the OSE would be fulfilled, and that those 
costs related to the rail infrastructure’s management and maintenance would finally burden 
the Greek Government and not the rail operator, and that the rail operator would be 
compensated for the provision of rail services for social purposes. The decision for the 
company’s business segregation was in accordance with the expectations of the European 
Committee, which regards the company’s business segregation as a more transparent and 
efficient operational strategy for the state-owned European rail organisations.  
 
While the inability of the previous administration (period 1998-2002) to compute the total 
cost that the company would have to bear if the business disaggregation had applied, resulted 
in the accounting segregation being seen as the most cost effective strategy, no efficiency 
studies concerning the sustainability, and the possibility that the cost effectiveness of the 
venture could be identified. The invocation of the European Directive 2001/12 was the only 
reason given by the managing director in the period 2002-2005, in order to justify to 
subordinate managers and employees the rationality for the OSE’s business segregation 
between, a company responsible for the management of the railway infrastructure (EDISY), 
and a company responsible for the provision of rail services to customers (TRAINAOSE).  
 
Since 2003, the organisation has been implicated in a costly, inefficient reorganisation 
process that has not yet been finalised. As a consequence, within a period of three years the 
company’s net losses were almost doubled from €576 million in 2004 to €950 million in 
2007. The accrued financing deficit, at the end of 2007, reached €8.5 billion from €4.5 billion 
in 2005. Moreover, the company’s investment plan concerning the OSE’s managerial 
modernisation and the application of new information technology systems have failed. 
  210
Significant is the fact that the company still has not managed to develop coherent financial 
and cost accounting systems. All administrative procedures are fragmented with the 
management not being in a position to exercise basic managerial tasks, like the management 
of the company’s cash flows, and to monitor the company’s inventories and supplies policy. 
In addition to the company’s incapacity to complete its administrative modernisation, the 
modernisation of the rail infrastructure has also failed. The creation of the electrified double 
rail track, and technological advanced systems concerning the management of the 
infrastructure, as well as the creation of the Athens suburban railway has major time delays, 
and over-excessive cost. The costs and operational inefficiencies which emerged from the 
company’s disaggregation were such that the most possible scenario is for the OSE to re-
emerge1.  
 
The disaggregation of the OSE was the outcome - a decision strictly made by the Minister of 
Transport and the CEO of the OSE in the period 2002-2005. It was the result of the lack of 
tensions from the ongoing organisational action, the consequence of the power of the CEO to 
dominate the inner organisational context. Since 1994, the CEO, appointed in the period 
2002-2005, had held the position of the general manager of the rail infrastructure directorate. 
Many employees and managers perceived him as the most capable and competent manager to 
take over the management of the organisation, and to apply a business strategy according to 
the dominant norms and values that consider the expansion of the OSE’s operating 
capabilities as a priority over the financial rationalisation of the company’s operating 
activities. Moreover, his long-term employment in the OSE also gave him the ability to know 
the way in which power relationships function in the organisation and the dominant role of 
the employees’ union. His well-established authority, and the fact that he offered employees’ 
representatives a form of co-administration, gave him the power to marginalise any voices 
against the company’s disaggregation, and to proceed with his plans.  
 
                                                 
1 It was announced in a conference for the Greek Railways by the new deputy Minister of Transport 
(of the new elected Government of PASOK) that the holding company will be merged into two 
companies; one responsible for the management of the infrastructure and the other one responsible for 
the provision of rail services. However, he did not make clear whether these will be independent or 
they will operate under a parent company (The conference was organised by the Technical Chamber 
of Greece, January 29 2010) 
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However, in contradiction to the opinion expressed by many managers and employees who 
hold the CEO of the period 2002-2005, responsible for the company’s segregation, the 
present analysis will adopt a distinct approach in order to explain the reasons behind the 
particular decision. Business disaggregation is seen by the present analysis as the outcome of 
the inability of organisational actors to maintain a level of managerial independence from the 
coercive influence of the institutional environment. The current analysis argues that the 
company’s segregation is the product of a process that implicitly started to be formulated 
long before it was actually realised with the post-2003 business plans. While many managers 
perceive that national governments and railway organisations have the ability to reorganise 
the national rail industry according to national priorities, the requirements imposed by the 
European Community for the company’s financial rationalisation, in addition to the 
deregulation of the European rail industry, made imperative the need for the company’s 
business disaggregation. 
 
The company’s business segregation was the outcome of a number of contradictions 
characterising the objectives and strategies pursued by the main parties implicated in that; 
namely the Greek Government, the European Committee, and the OSE’s Executive 
management. The first contradiction is related to the objectives pursued by the Greek 
Government and its liability to endorse the requirements imposed by the European directives, 
and to open the rail market to regulated competition. The particular European strategy 
however, has not yet established its rationality on how competition can make, more 
customers orientated rail companies, and in addition, how they can become financial efficient 
and profitable without the economic support of National Governments. Thus the company’s 
business disaggregation targeted at the provision of indirect financial subsidies to the 
TRAINAOSE (the rail undertaking) in an effort to overcome the demand imposed by the 
European Directives for a competitive financial and managerial independent state-owned rail 
organisation. Moreover, the company’s business segregation and the establishment of the 
holding company was the outcome of the organisational actors’ desperation to establish their 
competence and to gain the trust of the Greek society. The company management’s 
expectation was that OSE’s business disaggregating, would make apparent to the Greek 
society and the European Union the claim of organisational actors that, the accrued deficits is 
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not the result of the company’s operating inefficiencies, but rather, the result of the Greek 
Government’s unwillingness to fulfil its financial responsibilities towards the organisation. 
At the same time the presence of the parent company (OSE) was securing the state-owned 
character of TRAINAOSE that constitutes a collective requirement for organisational actors. 
8.4.  Research findings and literature review  
This study’s findings are in agreement with the results provided by previous research on the 
field studies that challenge the efficiency and benefits emerging from the application of 
managerial accountability reform in the context of the state-owned enterprises, and more 
particularly, in the context of the European rail industry (Bogt and Helden, 2000; Lapsley, 
2001; Townley et al., 2003; Venieris and Cohen, 2004; Ballas and Tsoukas, 2004; Cooper, 
2005; Shaoul, 2006). The present analysis indicates the incapacity of the managerial 
accountability reform applied in the context of the Hellenic Railway Organisation to 
modernise the patterns of operational action, and to make more efficient and transparent the 
company’s administrative model.  
 
Critical to the reformation process in state owned organisations is the role of the CEO, who is 
assigned with the authority to rationalise operational strategies in state-owned organisations 
according to commercial and market-orientated objectives. The concept of managerialism is 
underlined by the assumption that managers can achieve goal congruence between the 
objectives pursued by national governments and key organisational actors. Thus, 
managerialism presupposes authority and power in order for administrator managers to have 
the capacity to control organisational action, and to apply the objectives pursued by national 
governments. The use of operational plans and performance indicators aims to enable super-
ordinates in hierarchical structured social systems, to control and make transparent and 
visible the actions and the objectives of their subordinates. For that reason, the use of 
operational plans in literature is seen to have a dual dimension: to align the objectives of 
manager administrators with those of national governments, and to align the objectives of 
key organisational actors and collectives with those of executive managers. This is why the 
application of operational and strategic plans is seen as a tighter form of control exercised 
from politicians on agent-managers, and as mechanisms that tend to facilitate the domination 
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of managing directors in state-owned business organisations, and to impose predefined 
objectives that alienate organisational actors from the scope and objectives of SOEs 
(Broadbent et al., 1996; Llewellyn and Tappin, 2003; Goddard, 2005; Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 2008).  
 
Complementary to the above arguments, the present analysis argues that the power of the 
general managers to dominate the organisational context in state-owned organisations and to 
impose pre-defined objectives is based upon the ability of subordinate managers and 
organisational collectives to influence decision making. The tensions in the ongoing 
organisational action are those that generate accountability and impose on agents the 
responsibility to self monitor their actions and their effects on organisational systems. This is 
why the accounting disaggregation of the OSE between the operating activities of the 
management of the rail infrastructure and the provision of rail services is seen as the outcome 
of the conscious choice made by the CEO (period 1998-2002) to realise his objectives, and at 
the same time not to disassociate his subordinates from the norms and rules that defined their 
ongoing action. This is why, as the analysis in Chapter 6 argues, the 1998-2002 business plan 
managed to formulate and communicate strategies towards the company’s financial 
rationalisation, whilst through the evaluation of managerial performance, the CEO aimed to 
designate those managers competent to perform the allocated responsibilities. In agreement 
with the argument articulated by Busco et al. (2006), the current thesis supports that the 
formulation of relationships of trust between the members of the organisational system are 
needed to facilitate the acceptance and progressive sharing of new rationalities. 
 
Supportive of the above conclusion over the importance of the tensions between 
organisational agents in generating accountability is the contradictory argument offered in 
the analysis in Chapter 7. In Chapter 7, it is indicated, that the company’s business 
disaggregation, a decision beyond any operational and business rationale that has cost the 
organisation dear, was the result of the lack of tensions in the ongoing organisational action, 
and the outcome of the ability of the CEO, in the period 2002-2005, to dominate the 
organisational context. For that reason, the 2003-2007 business plan, which foresaw the 
company’s business disaggregation, was not used by the company’s management for 
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justifying, communicating or even imposing the decision for the company’s business 
segregation. 
While decoupling is seen by many researchers as the outcome of the conscious effort made 
by the members of an organisational system to comply with inconsistent expectations and 
objectives imposed by the institutional environment, targeting to secure the competence of 
the organisational system to accomplish its productive potentials (Brignall and Modell, 2000: 
290; Dillard et al., 2004; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007), the present analysis supports the 
view that the disaggregation of business plans from the planning and the ongoing control 
process is the outcome of the inability of organisational agents to maintain a level of 
managerial independence from the coercive influence of the institutional environment the 
contradictive objectives of which disorientate managerial and operational action. As the 
analysis in Chapter 6 argues, the use of instrumental forms of accountability made apparent 
the obligations of the Greek Government towards the organisation, and set the company’s 
management in a position superior to that of the Ministers of Transport and Finance who, 
owing to the lack of the necessary institutions, had neither the ability to negotiate the 
objectives incorporated in the business plan, nor the ability to control their efficient 
implementation. Thus, the decoupling of operational plans and objectives from the 
company’s planning and operational control process is the outcome of the inability of the 
Greek government to use these in order to control the intentions and behaviour of executive 
management. This is why even though it was a legal responsibility for the Greek 
Government, and for the organisation, the 1998-2002 business plan was the only plan 
explicitly approved by the Greek Government, and the 1998-2002 management contract, the 
only management contract signed between the Greek Government and the company’s 
management.  
 
Thus, within the context of the OSE, decoupling of instrumental forms of control, as an 
organisational phenomenon, emerged in order to accommodate the Greek government’s need 
to dominate the organisational context, a conclusion that indicates reproduced patterns in the 
relations of power between the various interests influencing the company’s planning and 
management process. This is why, as the analysis in Chapter 6 shows, employees and 
managers perceive the influence exercised by the European Committee as a factor that 
  215
enables the modernisation of the patterns of organisational action, while the coercive 
influence of the Greek Government is seen as a factor that constrains the modernisation 
process and reproduces existing relations of power and interests related to the reproduction of 
already existing relations of power and interests.  
 
The inability of organisational actors to maintain a level of independence from the 
institutional environment resulted, in all inconsistent and contradictory expectations, 
objectives and interests being pursued by the outer environment to undermine the company’s 
operational strategy, and to further deteriorate its financing and operating condition. The 
decision for the OSE’s business segregation was realised so that OSE and the Greek 
Government could meet the challenges, expectations and legal commitments towards the 
European Committee, for opening the Greek rail market to regulated competition (in 2008 
the freight services, and in 2010 the services to passengers), a strategy, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, of doubtful efficiency and benefits. The OSE’s business disaggregation in reality 
constituted the application of an accounting, and not an operational strategy that was 
intending to transfer all operating costs to the state, and to enable the service operator 
TRAINAOSE to show profits. While that conclusion can lead to the argument articulated by 
many researchers in the field of Institutional Theory (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983; Scott, 
1991; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Dillard et al., 2004) that decoupling is the result of the effort 
of organisational actors to adapt to the expectations imposed by the European Committee, 
and gain legitimacy in order to secure the financial resources necessary for the 
implementation of the company’s investment programme, the disaggregation of business 
plans from the ongoing organisational activity is seen as the result of the contradictory and 
inconsistent objectives and interests served by the Greek state and the European Union.  
  
For that reason the present analysis provides support to the argument articulated by Liberaki 
and Tsakalotos (2002), as well as by Venieris and Cohen (2004), that the modernisation 
process in the Greek social context faded out as a result of the social, economic, and cultural 
diversities that exist between the countries members of the European Union, and owing to the 
fact that the Greek Government and the European Committee conceived a narrow frame with 
little investigation on the effects that the application of the rail market deregulation would 
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have had, and how the organisational system could facilitate the implications. This is why, 
following the arguments of Structuration Theory, the company’s business disaggregation and 
the current dreadful operating and financing situation are the outcome of the unintended 
consequences of organisational action, and the outcome of contradictory interests and 
expectations imposed on organisational actors.  
8.5.  Research findings and the contribution of Structuration Theory 
The Structuration Theory was adopted in this study in order to depict the conditions 
governing the continuation and transformation of the patterns of organisational action in the 
Hellenic Railway Organisation (OSE). The appropriateness of Structuration Theory, as a 
framework of analysis in the present study, is underlined by the conceptualisation of 
structures of social conduct, not only as constraints in human action, but also as capabilities 
enabling the reproduction in the patterns of organisational action and accountability.  
 
Managerial accountability reform is understood as a disruption of the established rules and 
norms that define the relationship between organisational actors, and the way they are 
rendered accountable for their actions and objectives. The applied managerial accountability 
reform questions the applicability of the already formulated organisational relationships, 
roles, practices, and their ends and aims to reposition the organisational context of the OSE 
in relation to wider global and local institutions. The elaboration of Structuration Theory by 
the present analysis aimed to depict the capability of organisational actors in the OSE to 
formulate accountability relationships under conditions of crisis. Critical factors in the 
formulation of relationships of accountability between organisational actors were found to be 
the power of subordinate managers to influence the conditions governing the transformation 
of the patterns of organisational action. The conceptualisation of power as a dialectic 
relationship between superordinates and subordinates in an organisational system is the main 
contribution of Structuration Theory in the current analysis. Dialectic of control is seen as the 
precondition for organisational actors to maintain a level of independence from the 
institutional environment and to realise its influence not as a factor that constraints 
organisational action but as a factor that enables it. In that sense, the changes introduced in 
the European rail industry were examined as factors enabling the transformation process in 
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the Greek rail organisation, as long as organisational actors have the ability collectively 
(collectivity is the outcome of the common norms, rules and values that define 
accountability) to influence the changes introduced.  
8.6.  The study’s limitations 
The current thesis has some limitations, mainly related to the adoption of a single case study 
as an empirical method of analysis that does not allow the extraction of generalisations in 
order to verify its conclusions. Nevertheless, by comparing the conclusions reached by the 
current analysis with those generated by other studies, some generalisations can be made 
over the reasons that caused the failure of the modernisation process in the Greek Public 
sector in general and the OSE in particular. For that reason, the current analysis, in the 
literature review section concerning the Greek public sector, elaborated conclusions from 
interdisciplinary fields of research, and not only those conducted by researchers in the field 
of accounting.  
 
An additional limitation is the lack of consistent forms of analysis that make case studies and 
the use of qualitative elements in the analysis problematic. The effort to depict the conditions 
under which agents and structures interrelate, and how that interrelationship affects the 
patterns of organisational action and accountability generates many contradictions on the 
way in which agents perceive that interrelationship, their role and the role of the other agents, 
and collectives in that process. These contradictions generate problems in the flow of the 
analysis, and on the way in which their value and contribution are weighted by the 
researcher. This is why there is always the threat that the analysis and the conclusions 
reached will be biased. In order to avoid such pitfalls, the researcher of this study chose to 
categorise individual perceptions and to incorporate and present all these contradictive 
perceptions, and, through their analysis, to reach meaningful and unbiased results. 
 
An additional problem which emerges in the analysis of the patterns that characterise agents’ 
interrelationships with structures of organisational conduct is the time space that mediates 
between the period under analysis and the one in which the analysis takes place. That time 
space has effects on the way in which agents used to understand the patterns of 
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organisational action, their role and the way these are perceived in the present. In that sense, 
various conditions or second thoughts might have shifted managerial opinion and behaviour 
towards the patterns of organisational interaction. For example, many managers regard the 
OSE’s business disaggregation as a wrong and inappropriate decision. This is an opinion, 
however, which is expressed after the effects of that decision have been realised. 
Consequently, the role of individual agents, and the influence exercised in the continuation 
and transformation of the patterns of organisational action, fails to be realised. The use of 
multiple sources of information is seen by the present analysis as a method for overcoming 
that particular limitation. 
8.7.  Opportunities for future research  
This study was an addition to the limited research on issues of accountability and 
management control in the Greek public sector. This is why the present analysis stresses the 
need for more academic research on the particular field in the Greek public sector. The aim 
of the analysis was to depict the materialistic conditions and power relations influencing the 
structuration process and affecting the formation of relationships of accountability in the 
organisational context of the OSE. In that process, the dominant role of the European 
Committee, and the Greek Government was made apparent, and how the contradictions 
between these two contexts affected the efficient implementation of planning and control 
techniques in the OSE. While evidence on the way that public policy at European and 
national level has been provided, a more thorough analysis is required of the way in which 
the Greek Government and the European Committee formulate and apply public policies, and 
the influence exercised by factors like the independent management and auditing firms. It is 
particularly interesting to depict the contribution of these firms active in the context of the 
Greek public sector in the transformation of the rationality that underlines the operations in 
state-owned organisations.  
 
It has to be said that it is a legal responsibility for the Greek Government and the OSE to 
appoint independent management consultants for the formulation and implementations of the 
investment projects financed by the European Support Frameworks. The reason that the 
European Committee imposes such an obligation on state-owned organisations is in order 
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that state-owned organisations like the OSE can gain the necessary know-how in the 
planning and control process of investment activities. The way that these independent 
consultants are implicated in power relations and how they act under particular materialistic 
conditions provide an opportunity for future research.   
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Appendixes  
 
Appendix 3.1: List of Interviewees at the preliminary stage  
 
S/N Name Unit/Division/department/ Subsidiary/Role Date 
Tape 
Recorded 
1 Δαλλιβίγκας Κ. IT Administration 10.08.2005 Recorded 
2 Διακαναστάσης Α.  ERGOSE; Accounting &  Finance 27.08.2005 Not recorded 
3 Ευαγγελίου Γ. Human Recourse  Management 10.09.2005 Recorded 
4 Καραπάνος Δ. Former Managing Director; Member of the BoD 06.09.2005  Not recorded 
5 Πανάγος ERGOSE; Accounting &  Finance 03.09.2005 Not recorded 
6 Παλιεράκης Α. ERGOSE 12.08.2005 Not Recorded 
7 Πελόνης Η. Internal Control 30.08.2005 Not recorded 
8 Στάμος Λ. Cost Accounting Department 28.08.2005 Not Recorded 
9 Φιλόπουλος Δ. Financial Control 29.08.2005 Not Recorded 
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Appendix 3.2: List of Interviewees 
 
S/N Name Unit/Division/department/Subsidiary/Role Date Tape Recorded 
1 Βασιλόπουλος Α. Employees' representative 20.03. 2008 Phone Conversation 
2 Βερελής Χ. Former Minister of Transport 20.09.2006 
Provided material 
and written 
answers  
3 Βίττου Α. International relationships 19.09.2006 Not recorded 
4 Βλαχογιάννης Α. 
Employees' representative 
in the Committee 
responsible for 
monitoring the 
Operational Plan 
Railways, Airports,  
Public Transport. 
Financed by the 3rd CSF. 
28.07.2006 Recorded 
5 Γράβαρης 
3rd Community Support  
Framework; Monitoring 
& Evaluating Unit 
21.09.2006 Not recorded 
6 Δαλλιβίγκας Κ. IT Administration 19.08.2006 Recorded 
7 Διοννέλης Χ. Infrastructure Division 26.09.2006 Recorded 
8 Ευαγγελίου Γ. Human Recourse  Management 23.06.2006 Recorded 
9 Ευαγγέλου Management Consultant 25.08.2006 Not recorded 
10 Ησαϊα Λ. 
ERGOSE; Monitoring 
and Evaluating OSE's 
Investment Plan 
04.09.2006 Recorded 
11 Οικονόμου Θ. 
Former Manager of 
Economic & 
administration directorate 
31.07.2006 Recorded 
12 Καραβέβας Η. Supervisor of Engine Drivers 21.08.2006 Recorded 
13 Καραπάνος Δ. 
Former Managing 
Director; Member of the 
BoD 
29.04.2008 Recorded 
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List of Interviewees (continues) 
14 Κατσαρής Chief Accountant 24.07.2006 Not recorded 
15 Κούρεντας Γ. ERGOSE,  Managing Director 09.09.2006 
Provided 
material and 
written answers 
16 Κουτρουμπά Φ. 
OSE Strategic Planning; 
TRAINAOSE  
Managing Director 
11.09.2006 Recorded 
17 Λαγός Σ. Traffic Controller & financial controller 10.07.2006 Recorded 
18 Λέπουρας Ν. Financial & Rail Traffic Control 27.06.2006 Recorded 
19 Μανωλάς Λ. General Director Freight Transport division 04.10.2006 Recorded 
20 Μαρκοπούλου Ε. 
Rail Services department 
responsible for the 
pricing strategy 
20.07.2006 Recorded 
21 Μουρμούρης Ι. Former Managing Director 06.07.2006 Recorded 
22 Μπουρανής Α. Freight Transport Division 13.10.2006 Not recorded 
23 Ξερογιάννης Γ. Management Consultant 13.09.2006  Not recorded 
24 Παπαγεωργίου Χ. Former Director General 27.07.2006 Not recorded 
25 Παραδεισόπουλος Ι. 
Strategic Planning & 
development 30.06.2006 Recorded 
26 Πολύκαρπος Θ. IT Directorate 28.08.2006 Recorded 
27 Ράλλης Π. Association of the Friends of the Railways 05.09.2006 Recorded 
28 Ραυτόπουλος Σ. Employees' representative 07.09.2006 Recorded 
29 Ρετσινάς Χ. Infrastructure Division 19.06.2006 Not recorded 
30 Ρουσόπουλος Δ. Infrastructure Division 09.09.2009 Recorded 
31 Ρωξάνης Δ. Accidents 12.09.2006 Recorded 
32 Ρώπος Χ. Ministry of Finance 12.07.2006 Not recorded 
34 Στάμος Λ. Cost Accounting Department 28.08.2007 Recorded 
35 Σταυρακάκης Δ. Accounting and Finance Department 03.08.2006 Recorded 
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List of Interviewees (continues) 
36 Σταύρου Δ. Financial Control 21.06.2006 Recorded 
37 Ταρναβάς Δ. Infrastructure Division 13.07.2006 Recorded 
38 Τζανακάκης Κ. Strategic Planning and  Development 30.08.2006 Recorded 
39 Τζαννέτος Κ. Operational & Rail Traffic Control 28.06.2006 Recorded 
40 Τριανταφύλλου Θ. Infrastructure Division 01.09.2006 Not recorded 
41 Τσάκωνας Κ. Accounting and Finance Department 23.08.2006 Recorded 
42 Τσιαμαντής Β. Strategic Planning and  Development 14.07.2006 Recorded 
43 Φιλιππουπολιτης Α. 
Association of the 
Friends of the Railways 05.07.2006 Recorded 
44 Φιλόπουλος Δ. Financial Control 18.10.2007 Recorded 
45 Χρησάκης Γ. Passengers' Transport  Division 12.09.2006 Recorded 
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Appendix 3.3: Interview Questions guide 
Introduction 
? Can you briefly describe your job function and your main responsibilities? 
? How long have you been at the present position? 
? Can you please comment on the company’s main problems and how these affect its 
operational and financial efficiency? 
Specific Questions related to the OSE’s reorganisation 
? Can you please describe how the OSE’s reorganisation and the formation of the holding 
company affect your current status and responsibilities? 
? Can you please state the level of your agreement or disagreement with the OSE’s 
business disaggregation?  
? What are the challenges the OSE is now facing? 
? Which ones do you consider as the most important reasons that have caused delays in 
the OSE’s modernisation program? 
Business Objectives and external influence  
? In your opinion, how significant is the influence of external factors in the formulation of 
the company’s business objectives? 
? Is the choice of the company’s business disaggregation an operational strategy initiated 
by the company’s management, the Greek Government or the European Union?  
? Do you consider that the formulated business objectives aim to satisfy the European 
Union’s expectations and the policies imposed by the European Directives? 
? Do you consider that the formulated business objectives aim to satisfy the expectations 
and objectives pursued by the Greek Government? 
? Do you regard that the objectives pursued by the European Union and the Greek 
Government are in agreement? If not can you please identify any major contradictions, 
and how these affect the formulation of business objectives by the company’s 
management? 
? How would you evaluate the role of the European Union and of the Greek Government 
in the company’s modernisation process? 
? Can you please state the level of your agreement or disagreement with the statement that 
the formulated business strategies and the company’s business disaggregation improve 
the OSE’s competitive position in the transport market? 
? Do you think that the formulated business objectives and strategies orientated towards 
the OSE’s business segregation are in agreement with the OSE’s Mission Statement for 
the creation of a modern, state-owned organisation, capable of providing safe and cost 
efficient transport services to passenger and freight customers?  
? Are the formulated business objectives the outcome of a collective managerial process?  
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Interview Questions guide (continues) 
? How important would you evaluate the role of the CEO in initiating and motivating 
organisational reformation?  
? Is the OSE’s administration, managerially independent of the Greek Government to 
apply corporate strategies aiming at making OSE a modern and competitive business 
organisation? 
? How are different perspectives on organizational strategies evaluated? Are these 
evaluated when opposed to the principal’s objectives or are these isolated? 
? Which is the role of the strategic and operational department in the formulation, 
implementation and control of the company’s operational, and investment strategies? 
? Do you consider the influence exercised by the industrial union as critical in the 
formulation of business strategies and objectives? 
? How would you evaluate the role of management consultants in the company’s 
reformation process? 
? Can you please describe the level of their involvement in the company’s day-to-day 
activities and how they acquire information from your department/unit? 
? Can you please mention any other factors or interest groups that influence the 
formulation of the OSE’s business strategies?  
? Are the formulated business objectives in agreement with your expectations?  
? In your opinion which should have been the OSE’s prime strategic objective? 
Operational objectives and performance measurement 
? How critical would you consider the influence of the European Union in the company’s 
managerial and operational reformation process and the application of methods aiming at 
measuring managerial and operational performance? 
? Are the formulated operational objectives used by the European Committee in order to 
evaluate the progress of the company’s managerial and operational modernisation?  
? Can you please evaluate the role of the Greek Government in the company’s managerial 
and modernisation process and the application of methods aiming at measuring the 
company’s managerial and operational performance?  
? Is there a system for assessing effectiveness, that is, the extent to which goals and 
objectives are realized? If so, can you please describe how that system is coordinated? 
? Are there adequate channels for top-down and bottom-up flows of information? 
? How have managerial control systems evolved over the past ten years? 
? Are there policies and procedures that guide evaluation and monitoring?  
? Are resources assigned to monitoring and evaluation?  
? Are monitoring and evaluation valued at all levels of the organization as ways to 
improve performance?  
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Interview Questions guide (continues) 
? Are the formulated operational objectives used by the CEO/department’s 
head/supervisor to evaluate operational efficiency?  
? Are the operational objectives used in order to evaluate the efficiency of the applied 
operational strategies?  
? Do you consider that the applied operational strategies, by your 
division/department/unit, are in agreement with the corporate objectives described in the 
business plan? 
? How effective is the organization in meeting those goals as expressed in its business 
plan? 
? Do you consider the influence exercised by the government and political parties as 
restrictive to the use of performance measurements for the company’s day-to-day 
operational, financing and managerial activities and decisions?  
Performance Measurement and Accountability 
? Are the formulated operational objectives used by the Greek Government in order to 
measure the progress of the company’s managerial and operational modernisation?  
? Are the formulated managerial objectives used by the Greek Government in order to 
evaluate managerial performance?  
? Has the use of business plans made managerial action and the use of the allocated 
recourses more transparent and more efficient?  
? Is management evaluated according to its performance and the efficient and transparent 
use of the allocated resources?  
? Is the management rendered accountable for the efficient use of the assigned financial 
resources?  
? Which institutional bodies have been assigned the responsibility for controlling 
management for the efficient use of the allocated resources?  
? Which performance indicators are used in the control process and which is the reporting 
process? 
? How often do you prepare reports related to the company’s and the management’s 
performance? 
? How reliable do you consider the agreed with the managerial contract objectives?  
? Is the Board of Directors in a position to control and evaluate CEO’s choices?  
? Is social control exercised? 
? Can you please comment on the role of the industrial union in the social control process? 
? Has the relationship between the company’s CEO and the government changed? 
? Are organizational values and assumptions aligned with the organization’s actions? 
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Interview Questions guide (continues) 
Patterns of inner communication and interaction 
? Is the business plan seen as a living document? Is it updated and renewed 
periodically? Are key stakeholders (internal and external) involved in giving meaning 
to the business plan?  
? Do the operational plans give members of the organization a sense of purpose and 
direction?  
? What are the main vehicles of internal communication? 
? Do you understand the objectives that the company’s business disaggregation comes to 
serve? Have these been communicated to you? 
? Do you consider that you apply the necessary and appropriate strategies that will secure 
the OSE’s smooth and efficient transformation from a single company to a holding 
company?  
? Can you please comment on the level of your participation in the formulation and 
implementation of the necessary operational strategies towards the company’s business 
disaggregation? 
? Are you evaluated according to the efficient completion of the set operational 
objectives? 
? Are you rendered accountable for any deviations from the agreed operational objectives? 
? Do you discuss operational objectives with your subordinates? If so how often? 
? Do you discuss with your subordinates in the division/unit/department, the reasons for 
any deviations from the objectives set at the beginning of the period and the necessary 
changes in the applied strategies in order to improve the financial and operational 
outcome? 
? Do staff members feel that there is adequate and ongoing communication about the 
organization’s activities?  
? What is the importance of financial information in decision making? 
? What is the role of the accounting department in recording, collecting, processing and 
communicating financial information? 
? How often do you cooperate with other departments/units/divisions in order to collect 
information that will help you to formulate operational strategies and to control their 
outcome?  
? Has your supervisor/manager assigned responsibilities at lower managerial level? 
? Does staff have an easy access to those in the organization with whom they must deal? 
Can they communicate easily with them? 
? Do you consider that there are common organisational values collectively formulated 
that bind organisational action towards common corporate and social objectives?   
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Interview Questions guide (continues) 
? Do you consider that you share common understandings and objectives with the rest of 
the employees and managers in the organisation? If not why? 
? Which factors do you consider as most influential on individual behaviour? 
? Do you trust the intentions and objectives of senior management? 
? Do you believe that the CEO and the general directors have been appointed according to 
meritocratic criteria and their competence to financially and operationally modernise the 
organisational context? 
? Do you trust your colleagues and their intentions?  
? Is competence acknowledged? 
? Do you think that managers are competent to perform the assigned responsibilities at 
managerial and operational level? 
? Have they been appointed according to meritocratic and transparent criteria? 
? Whose objectives are accomplished?  
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Appendix 3.4: Statements incorporated in the questionnaire1 (translated from Greeks to 
English) 
1. State the level of your agreement with the following statements that are related to the 
level of the influence exercised by external to the corporation factors in the process of 
formulating strategic objectives: 
1.1. The strategic objectives meet the expectations of the company’s management and they 
are the outcome of a collective managerial process.  
1.2. The strategic objectives meet the expectations of the Greek Government. 
1.3. The strategic objectives meet the expectations of the European Union. 
1.4. The strategic objectives meet the expectations of the industrial union and employees’ 
representatives. 
1.5. Please mention any other factors the influence of which you consider as critical in the 
formulation of strategic objectives. 
2. State the level of your agreement with the following statements that are related to the 
objectives that the strategic plans, drawn by the organisation, serve. 
2.1. The executive management uses the operational objectives in order to evaluate the 
efficiency of the operational strategies. 
2.2. The formulated strategies and objectives aim to increase the OSE’s market share in 
the transportation industry. 
2.3. The use of strategic objectives for accountability purposes, make the company’s 
management responsible for the produced outcome (operational and technological 
modernisation, financial recovery).   
2.4. The use of strategic objectives for accountability purposes, increase transparency in 
the use of the allocated financial resources. 
3. State the level of your agreement with the following statements that are related to the use 
of operational objectives for performance measurement purposes.  
3.1. The operational objectives define those operational strategies appropriate for the 
successful implementation of the OSE’s strategic objectives. 
                                                 
1 As it is explained in Chapter 3, section 3.5.2, the questionnaire was not used in the analysis process. 
It was rather used as a leverage in the effort to involve the interviewees in the research process and to 
make them familiar with the concepts and issues under discussion.  
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3.2. Performance measurement is of limited value due to the influence exercised by the 
Greek Government and various political factors in the company’s ongoing managerial 
action. 
3.3. Changes in the Government result in changes in the company’s operational objectives.  
3.4. Performance measurement is of limited value due to the influence exercised by the 
industrial union in the company’s ongoing managerial action. 
4. State the level of your agreement with the following statements that are related to the 
level of your participation in the formulation of operational objectives at your 
unit/administration/department. 
4.1. I participate in the formulation of operational objectives in my 
department/administration/unit. 
4.2. I express my opinion in order to improve the outcomes of the applied operational 
strategies. 
4.3. Operational strategies and objectives change according to the opinion I express. 
4.4. I discuss any inefficiencies and bad outcomes with my subordinates.  
5. State the level of your agreement with the following statements according to which you 
are accountable for accomplishing the operational objectives efficiently and effectively. 
5.1. I am accountable for the efficient application of operational objectives? 
5.2. I am obliged to report and explain the reasons for any deviations from the operational 
objectives. 
5.3. I feel obliged to report and explain the reasons for any deviations from the operational 
objectives. 
5.4. I am obliged to make suggestions on the necessary adjustments in the applied 
strategies in order to improve the efficiency of my department/unit/administration. 
5.5. I feel obliged to make suggestions on the necessary adjustments in the applied 
strategies in order to improve the efficiency of my department/unit/administration. 
6. State the level of your agreement with the following statements according to which you 
are evaluated according to your performance 
6.1. I am evaluated according to my ability to meet the operational objectives. 
6.2. My supervisor/manager expresses his disappointment when the operational targets are 
not met. 
6.3. I evaluate my subordinates for their ability to meet the operational objectives. 
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Statements incorporated in the questionnaire (continue) 
7. State the level up to which you cooperate with other members of the organisation for the 
efficient implementation of the operational and managerial objectives 
7.1. I cooperate with my supervisors in the formulation of the operational and managerial 
objectives of my unit/department. 
7.2. In order to receive a decision I rely upon the information provided by other 
departments/units. 
8. State the level of your understanding of the business objectives and strategies  
8.1. I understand the strategic objectives. 
8.2. I understand the operational objectives. 
8.3. I apply the appropriate strategies for the most optimal outcome. 
8.4. I consider that all managers share the same objectives.  
9. State the level of your agreement with the following statements that are related to the 
usefulness of operational and managerial objectives  
9.1. The operational objectives help me at making better decisions. 
9.2. Performance measurement makes me a better manager. 
9.3. Operational/managerial objectives help me to make a positive contribution towards 
the achievement of the company’s overall strategic objectives.  
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Appendix 3.4 Statements incorporated in the questionnaire in Greeks 
1. Σε ποιο βαθμό θεωρείτε υπαρκτή ή όχι την παρέμβαση εξωγενών παραγόντων στην 
διαμόρφωση των στρατηγικών στόχων του οργανισμού; Παρακαλώ σημειώστε ανάλογα 
με τον βαθμό σημαντικότητας. 
1.1. Οι στρατηγικοί στόχοι ανταποκρίνονται στις προσδοκίες της διοικητικής λειτουργίας 
του οργανισμού.  
1.2. Οι στρατηγικοί στόχοι ανταποκρίνονται στις προσδοκίες της κυβέρνησης και των 
πολιτικών προϊσταμένων 
1.3. Οι στρατηγικοί στόχοι ανταποκρίνονται στις προσδοκίες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης 
1.4. Οι στρατηγικοί στόχοι επηρεάζονται από τις παρεμβάσεις και προσδοκίες 
συνδικαλιστικών παραγόντων  
1.5. Παρακαλώ επισημάνετε επιπλέον παράγοντες που θεωρείτε ότι επηρεάζουν τη 
διαμόρφωση των στρατηγικών στόχων: 
2. Παρακαλώ δηλώστε τον βαθμό συμφωνίας/διαφωνία σας με τις παρακάτω προτάσεις για 
τη χρήση των επιχειρησιακών στόχων του οργανισμού ως μεθόδων μέτρησης της 
απόδοσης του οργανικού αποτελέσματος. 
2.1. Οι επιχειρησιακοί στόχοι χρησιμοποιούνται από τη διοίκηση για να αξιολογούν την 
αποτελεσματικότητα των επιχειρησιακών δράσεων 
2.2. Οι στρατηγικοί στόχοι είναι το αποτέλεσμα της ανάγκης του οργανισμού να 
αναπτύξει δράσεις που θα ενισχύσουν την στρατηγική του θέση και θα αυξήσουν το 
μερίδιο του στην αγορά 
2.3. Οι στρατηγικοί στόχοι κάνουν τη διοίκηση υπεύθυνη για το παραγόμενο αποτέλεσμα 
2.4. Οι στρατηγικοί στόχοι αυξάνουν τη διαφάνεια στην αξιοποίηση των πόρων 
3. Σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε με τους παρακάτω σκοπούς των στρατηγικών 
σχεδίων; Παρακαλώ σημειώστε ανάλογα με το βαθμό συμφωνίας/διαφωνία σας. 
3.1. Οι επιχειρησιακοί στόχοι καθορίζουν τις δράσεις εκείνες που είναι απαραίτητες για 
τη πραγματοποίηση των στρατηγικών στόχων. 
3.2. Η σημασία αξιολόγησης της απόδοσης των επιχειρησιακών στόχων είναι 
περιορισμένη εξαιτίας των πολιτικών-κυβερνητικών παρεμβάσεων 
3.3. Οι εναλλαγές στην πολιτική εξουσία μεταβάλλουν τους οργανικούς στόχους 
3.4. Η σημασία αξιολόγησης της απόδοσης των επιχειρησιακών στόχων είναι 
περιορισμένη εξαιτίας συνδικαλιστικών παρεμβάσεων 
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Statements incorporated in the questionnaire in Greeks (continues) 
4. Παρακαλώ προσδιορίστε το βαθμό συμμετοχής σας στον προσδιορισμό των 
επιχειρησιακών στόχων: 
4.1. Συμμετέχω με την άποψή μου στην διαμόρφωση των επιχειρησιακών στόχων της 
διεύθυνσης μου 
4.2. Συμμετέχω προσφέροντας τη γνώμη μου στη βελτίωση των επιχειρησιακών στόχων 
4.3. Οι επιχειρησιακοί στόχοι αλλάζουν ανάλογα με τη γνώμη που εκφράζω 
4.4. Συζητώ με τους υφιστάμενους μου τους επιχειρησιακούς στόχους όταν υπάρχουν 
προβλήματα 
5. Σε ποιο βαθμό είστε υπόλογος για την επίτευξη των επιχειρησιακών στόχων; 
5.1. Είμαι υπόλογος για την επίτευξη των επιχειρησιακών στόχων 
5.2. Είμαι υποχρεωμένος να αναφέρω τους λόγους για τους οποίους υπάρχουν αποκλίσεις 
στους επιχειρησιακούς στόχους 
5.3. Αισθάνομαι υπεύθυνος να αναφέρω τους λόγους για τους οποίους υπάρχουν 
αποκλίσεις στους επιχειρησιακούς στόχους  
5.4. Είμαι υποχρεωμένος να εισηγούμαι απαραίτητες ενέργειες, προκειμένου να βελτιώσω 
την απόδοση της διεύθυνσής/τμήματός μου. 
5.5. Αισθάνομαι υπεύθυνος να αναφέρω τους λόγους για τους οποίους υπάρχουν 
αποκλίσεις στους επιχειρησιακούς στόχους  
6. Σε ποιο βαθμό αξιολογείστε με βάση την απόδοση σας ως προς την επίτευξη των 
ειχειρησιακών στόχων ; 
6.1. Αξιολογούμαι με βάση την ικανότητά μου ναεπιτύχω τους στόχους που έχουν τεθεί 
6.2. Ο προϊστάμενός μου εκφράζει την απογοήτευση του όταν οι επιχειρησιακοί στόχοι 
δεν ικανοποιούνται 
6.3. Αξιολογώ τους υφιστάμενους μου με βάση απόδοσή τους σε σχέση με τους 
επιχειρησιακούς στόχους 
7. Σε ποιο βαθμό θεωρείτε ότι συνεργάζεστε και με άλλα στελέχη για την επίτευξη και 
διαμόρφωση των επιχειρησιακών στόχων. 
7.1. Συνεργάζομαι με τους προϊσταμένους μου για τη διαμόρφωση των επιχειρησιακών 
στόχων της διεύθυνσής μου 
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Statements incorporated in the questionnaire in Greeks (continues) 
7.2. Για να λάβω τις αποφάσεις μου βασίζομαι και στις πληροφορίες που μου παρέχουν 
άλλα στελέχη του οργανισμού 
8. Παρακαλώ αναφέρετε σε ποιο βαθμό θεωρείτε ότι αντιλαμβάνεστε τους επιχειρησιακούς 
στόχους και δράσεις 
8.1. Αντιλαμβάνομαι τους στρατηγικούς στόχους 
8.2. Αντιλαμβάνομαι τους επιχειρησιακούς στόχους 
8.3. Εφαρμόζω τις σωστές δράσεις για την επίτευξη επιχειρησιακών στόχων 
8.4. Θεωρώ ότι όλα τα στελέχη μοιραζόμαστε τις ίδιες αντιλήψεις και στόχους 
9. Θεωρείτε ότι η ύπαρξη επιχειρησιακών στόχων και η μέτρηση του οργανικού 
αποτελέσματος ενισχύουν ή δυσχεραίνουν τη δουλειά σας 
9.1. Οι επιχειρησιακοί στόχοι με βοηθούν να λάβω καλύτερες αποφάσεις 
9.2. Η μέτρηση της απόδοσής μου με βοηθά να γίνω καλύτερος “manager” 
9.3. Η ύπαρξη στόχων με βοηθά να συνεισφέρω στους στρατηγικούς στόχους του 
οργανισμού 
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